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 Abstract 
 
   Many scholars argue that the Internet is a symbol of globalization and avoidance of state 
control. The Internet governance negotiations, which aims to establish an international 
regime for the Internet, is conducted through a multi-stakeholder setting associated with 
extensive involvement of non-state actors. This has been viewed as an indicator for a 
'diminishing state role' in international relations; particularly, formation of international 
regimes. This study indicates that the role of states does not diminish in regime formation. 
States, especially great powers, are the main actors that set international principles, norms, 
rules and decision-making procedures. They create regimes in order to regulate international 
behaviour as to global sectors, including the Internet. States deliberately enable certain non-
state actors to participate in regime formation and governance of some global sectors, based 
on conscious perception of the utility and usefulness of such participation. 
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Chapter 1 
The Research Design 
I. The research problem   
   States have been able to establish international regimes with effective verification systems 
employed to ensure compliance with the agreed rules and norms. International cooperation is 
manifested throughout various issue-areas such as nuclear non-proliferation, international trade, 
intellectual property, environment, human rights...etc. While globalization and complex 
interdependence magnified the need for more global cooperation in order to set rules and norms for 
the growing global interaction in various sectors, transnational non-state actors have emerged as 
significant players on the international scene. Does the emergence of these actors lead to a 
diminishing role of states in setting international rules and norms? In other words, with 
globalization, does the role of the states in forming international regimes diminish? This study seeks 
to answer this question.  
   In this context, this study analyzes the role of states and non-state actors in forming international 
regimes, through a close examination of the 'Internet regime' case. This case is chosen for a number 
of reasons. First, the Internet has been rarely addressed from the perspective of international 
relations, and less so from a theoretical perspective. Second, the Internet regime seems, at the onset, 
to be a favorable case to the thesis of a 'diminishing state role'. The Internet itself is a symbol of 
globalization and avoidance of state control, and the Internet regime's negotiations are conducted in 
what could be called multi-stakeholder
1
 settings, where non-state actors participate extensively in 
the formative process of the regime. Understanding the relationship between the role of states and 
non-state actors in such a configuration could be informative about governance of comparable 
global sectors. This, in turn, could improve our understanding of the dynamics of global 
governance. Furthermore, this helps explore the complexities associated with modes of governance 
that involves both state and non-state actors. Moreover, this study seeks also to reveal certain 
complexities associated with the Internet, which becomes an increasingly important topic of 
international relations with its apparent political, economic, social impact across the world.    
   The Internet began as a project of the United States' government in the 1960s. Currently, much of 
its governance is de-facto undertaken by the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN), which has been delegated to operate the Internet through a federal contract with 
United States’ Department of Commerce. ICANN adopts a self-regulation model for formulation of 
                                                 
1
 'Multi-stakeholderism' refers to involvement of all stakeholders, including state and non-state actors, in regime 
formation.  
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the Internet-related policies. With the worldwide spread of the Internet and its increasing 
importance, the international policy coordination on Internet-related issues has become inevitable. 
In addition, demands have been made for a more universal governance of the Internet. The 
appropriate framework for such governance is still a contentious issue on the agenda of the relevant 
international debate. 
   Whereas the Internet is de-facto administered by ICANN, demands to form an international 
regime for the Internet emerged during the United Nations World Summit on Information Society 
(WSIS)
2
. Throughout WSIS, the United States defended ICANN's status quo and insisted that the 
Internet has to be out of any governmental control, refusing to address its governance-related issues 
through intergovernmental negotiations. On the other hand, several countries argued that Internet 
governance should be addressed through intergovernmental processes under the auspices of United 
Nations. Many of those countries opposed managing the Internet through ICANN, which is a 
private non-governmental corporation subject to California state law.  
   Eventually, a compromise was reached through the summit's decisions to initiate discussions on 
Internet governance in 'multi-stakeholder' settings that involve both states and non-state 
representatives.   The Internet Governance Forum (IGF) has been established and became the only 
forum mandated by United Nations to address Internet governance issues in a multi-stakeholder 
setting that involves states and non-state actors. It is clear that the process of forming the Internet 
regime is not exclusive to states.  Non-state actors are 'formally' accredited to participate directly in 
the process, and their role is recognized as indispensable in the process of forming the Internet 
regime. Multi-stakeholderism became the basic principle upon which the international debate on 
Internet governance is conducted. 
   There is a lack of clarity on the reasons behind direct involvement of non-state actors in the 
process of forming an international regime for the Internet. It is not obvious whether such 
involvement reflects a new transformative trend of 'diminishing state role' in regime formation, or it 
is a conscious policy of the powerful states to promote their interests. In other words, it is not clear 
whether such involvement of non-state actors means that states are not anymore the key actors at the 
international level. In addition, the relationship between state and non-state actors seems complex in 
such configuration since the key state actors consciously defend participation of non-state actors. It 
seems ironic that states are deliberately conceding their jurisdiction and authority over setting the 
international rules. Moreover, it is not even clear why the Internet is de-facto administered by 
ICANN through a self-regulation model without any direct role for states in such arrangement. 
                                                 
2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 56/183 (December 21, 2001) endorsed holding of two phases of WSIS in 
2003 and 2005. 
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   Another complexity lies at the lack of clarity about the substantive issues to be addressed under 
the label of the 'Internet governance' that has been the term used in the literature to refer to the 
international debate on the Internet issues. The Internet involves many different issue-areas that 
range from technical administration of the Internet to the civil rights online. It seems difficult to 
group all these areas under one label. Thus, there is a need for conceptual clarity about substantive 
elements of what might constitute the 'Internet governance' or the 'Internet regime'.   
 Additionally, it is not clear whether the multi-stakeholder processes that recently created to address 
the Internet governance issues will affect the de-facto arrangements of the Internet administration or 
not. Furthermore, potential challenges associated with modes of governance that is based on 'multi-
stakeholderism' seem complex. The multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance and the 
discussion of the relevant issues in informal non-negotiating forums obscure the potential outcome 
of the regime formation process. It is not clear whether this process will lead to establishment of 
formal regime with legally binding instruments regulating international behavior, or informal one 
where compliance to the rules and norms is voluntary.  
   In the case of formal regime, the uncertainty about the entity that will assume the administration 
and enforcement function of the regime adds to the complexity. It is clear that administration of the 
upcoming regime by intergovernmental organization is not acceptable for the key actors. On the 
other hand, administration of the regime by a delegated non-state actor means that states will be 
subject to a private entity, which raises concerns about the legitimacy of such an arrangement.  In 
the case of informal regime where compliance is voluntary, the sustainability and effectiveness of 
the regime might be in jeopardy due to the absence of the monitoring and enforcement mechanisms 
that limit the incidence of free riders. This thesis seeks to address the above-mentioned 
complexities. 
II. Framing the research question 
   The particular question that this study seeks to answer is the following: is the role of states 
diminishing in the process of forming an international regime of the Internet? To which extent non-
state actors could influence such a process? The following paragraphs seek to deconstruct this 
question in order to design the research in a coherent manner. Specifically, we will identify the exact 
issue-area of the Internet that will be addressed as well as the relevant actors to be examined.   
     The academic scholarship related to the Internet is relatively new, as it has emerged with the 
establishment of the Internet as a public forum during the 1990s. Most of the literature has used the 
label of 'Internet governance' to address the issues pertinent to the Internet. The Internet governance 
has been addressed from cross-sectional and multidisciplinary approaches that emerged from the 
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fields of communications, law, public administration, political economy, economics, international 
relations and others.  
    The parameters and scope of the Internet governance, as a concept, have not yet developed. The 
extreme decentralized structure of the Internet and its nature as a cross-jurisdictional arena involving 
many issue-areas makes it difficult to articulate mainstream definition of what could constitute the 
Internet governance. As we will illustrate in the literature review below, there is a broad spectrum 
within the literature on how to approach the concept. For instance, many studies have addressed the 
Internet governance as a regulatory and policy issue focusing on how governments regulate the 
Internet. Others focus on who has the overall authority and control over the Internet, but even those 
are different in identifying what exactly will be subject to such authority: the Internet physical 
infrastructure, its operation, or its content.  
  While this study focuses on examining the role of state and non-state actors in forming the 'Internet 
regime', the question that needs firstly to be answered is which regime? In other words, each regime 
is supposed to address specific issue-area or sector, so could we consider the Internet a stand-alone 
issue area? Could we consider the 'Internet governance' a synonym for the 'Internet regime'? 
   We argue that the Internet can not be limited to only one issue-area, and instead involves many 
issue-areas. This means that the Internet governance can involve many regimes such as electronic 
commerce, protection of intellectual property rights online, combating cybercrime, human rights on 
the Internet etc. The deconstruction of the Internet governance into the constituent issue-areas 
contributes to achieving a better conceptual clarity on what could constitute such concept. In short, 
the Internet governance is a broad concept that can involve many regimes of various issue-areas.  
   Thus, addressing the Internet from the 'regime' perspective requires identification of the issue area 
that will be subject to examination. The focus of this study will be on what we could call the 
Internet architecture regime, which concerns the operation and technical administration of the 
Internet. The Internet architecture, which we seek to define in chapter 3, lies at the core of the 
Internet governance since it is responsible for the smooth functioning of the Internet, and thereby 
affecting all activities performed over the network.  
   Therefore, this study draws a conceptual distinction between the 'Internet governance', and the 
'Internet administration'. The former is a wide-ranging concept that involves all Internet issue-areas, 
while the latter is related to the management of the Internet architecture. Thus, the focus will be on 
examining the role of state and non-state actors in forming the Internet architecture regime.  
   In this context, this study avoids state-centric perspective, focusing instead on comparing the role 
of state and non-state actors involved in the process of forming that regime. Moreover, the study 
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takes a complimentary cognitivist approach that avoids rationalization of actors’ preferences and 
interests, and focuses instead on the dynamics leading actors to establish the regime and the struggle 
among them in the regime-formation process. 
   Consequently, the study identifies the relevant actors that can influence the process of forming the 
Internet architecture regime. Reviewing the Internet history indicates that whereas the Internet had 
initially been an American governmental project, it has actually been developed by a group of 
researchers and engineers that have constituted an epistemic community, which we call the Internet 
epistemic community. Defining what constitute the Internet epistemic community, this study makes 
a conceptual distinction between such community and the Internet technical community that has 
been the label used by many studies to describe the technical groups associated with the Internet 
technology. 
   Members of the Internet epistemic community monopolized the administration of the Internet 
throughout its history by the favor of their knowledge and expertise in developing and maintaining 
the Internet architecture. It follows that the knowledge could have a significant explanatory power 
in understanding the dynamics related to the Internet architecture regime. In this vein, this study 
examines the institutions established by members of the Internet epistemic community; particularly, 
the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and the Internet Society (ISOC), in order to indicate the 
extent to which they could influence the Internet administration. Throughout the study, the role of 
this epistemic community will be examined in the relevant processes related to the Internet 
governance.  
   Since the Internet architecture regime had been initially formed through domestic processes within 
the United States, the latter is the most pertinent state actor that should be examined. Therefore, we 
will examine the United States' stance towards the Internet governance in general and the Internet 
architecture regime in particular. We will explore the domestic dynamics that took place within the 
United States in order to indicate how its preferences and interests have been identified as to the 
Internet governance as well as how its perception of the Internet has been constructed. In this 
connection, the study investigates whether the Internet epistemic community has influenced the 
United States policy regarding the Internet architecture regime, and whether such an influence 
undermines the role of states in global governance of the Interent.  
  Moreover, the study examines ICANN as it represents the de-facto institution that administers the 
Internet architecture. ICANN embodies a new governance model that is based on self-regulation 
and multi-stakeholderism, as opposed to the traditional intergovernmental governance.  Thus, we 
will explore the dynamics that led to the creation of ICANN as well as its role in governing the 
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Internet architecture. We also scrutinize the impact of the Internet epistemic community on 
ICANN's system.  
   Furthermore, the study investigates the international dynamics that took place over the Internet 
governance, particularly within the United Nations' intergovernmental processes. This indicates 
whether the domestic politics of the United States affected its international stance regarding the 
Internet governance. Moreover, we demonstrate how other state actors, particularly the European 
Union, view the Internet governance. This also highlights the tension between the traditional 
intergovernmental governance versus the new multi-stakeholder self-regulatory governance 
embodied in ICANN. 
    In summary, the Internet epistemic community, ICANN, and the United States are the actors that 
are examined along with the relevant intergovernmental processes related to the Internet 
governance. Hence, we can deconstruct the research question mentioned above into the following 
sub-questions: 
 What is the Internet architecture? Who administer such architecture? 
 How do non-state actors influence the process of forming the Internet architecture regime? Is the 
'Internet technical community', represented by IETF and ISOC, a transnational epistemic 
community?  What is the role of such community in the Internet governance? What are the 
values and principles of this community?  How these values and principles have been reflected 
in the Internet architectural design? How could this community influence policy makers in 
different countries of the world?  What are the factors that could lead to the involvement of non-
state actors, in particular, the epistemic communities, in regime formation and/or management? 
 What is the actual role of ICANN in the Internet governance? Could the self-regulatory system 
of ICANN sustain as a governance model for the Internet administration? Could such self-
regulatory model acquire international legitimacy? How does ICANN deal with national 
governments of different countries? What is the role of Internet epistemic community in 
ICANN's system? What is the relationship between ICANN and the American administration? 
Could we consider ICANN's administration of the Internet an indication for 'diminishing state 
role' in global governance? 
 How did the United States identify its preferences and interests as to the Internet? How does the 
United States perceive the Internet? Why does the United States support self-regulatory and 
bottom-up governance of the Internet architecture? Does the Internet epistemic community 
affect the United States policy regarding formation of Internet architecture regime? Why does 
the United States push for the direct involvement of non-state actors in the international 
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processes related to the Internet governance? Is this position a conscious policy to maintain the 
status quo, a reflection of domestic politics, or the impact of the Internet epistemic community? 
 How the Internet governance has been addressed in the official intergovernmental processes? 
Did the international debate over the Internet focus on the Internet technical administration or 
extend to other areas of the Internet governance? How the American perception, preferences and 
interests, which have been constructed domestically, affect its international stance as to the 
Internet governance? Do non-state actors affect such processes? Could these processes result in 
intergovernmental arrangements regarding the Internet? What is the impact of such processes on 
the self-regulatory system of ICANN? What is the future of international cooperation regarding 
the Internet issues? 
III. Hypothesis 
   Globalization and complex interdependence led to spread of transnational actors that can 
affect states' perception of their preferences and interests. The proliferation of technology-
based sectors, such as the Internet, enabled certain epistemic communities, which own the 
technical knowledge and knowhow, to affect the relevant international policies related to 
these sectors as well as policymakers' perception of national interest. The degree of 
involvement of non-state actors in forming international regimes for global sectors depends 
on the characteristics of those sectors. Formation of regimes for technology-based and 
market-oriented sectors, including Internet, is associated with the extensive involvement of 
non-state actors. 
   However, states are still the overarching authority at the international level. States, 
especially great powers, are the main actors responsible for setting international principles, 
norms, rules and decision-making procedures. Their role is essential in forming regimes 
that regulate international behavior as to global sectors, including the Internet. Involvement 
of non-state actors in governance of global sectors and formation of the relevant 
international regimes does not mean a 'diminishing state role' in setting the international 
rules; it instead reflects states' perception of the utility of non-state actors' involvement. 
This, in turn, reflects the growing complexity of international relations, which has been 
associated with globalization and complex interdependence that enabled complex mutual 
interaction among state and non-state actors at both national and international levels.  
   In the case of the Internet, the Internet epistemic community has established and 
developed an international regime for the Internet administration under the patronage of the 
United States' government. The principles and values of such community as well as the 
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domestic dynamics contributed to shaping the American perception of the Internet as an 
open and free medium that should not be subject to governmental regulation and should be 
administered through multi-stakeholder arrangements. Such perception, which has spread to 
European states through the Internet epistemic community, is the basis of the American 
international stance as to the Internet. Thus, the multi-stakeholder administration of the 
Internet does not mean a 'diminishing state role'; rather, it reflects specific preference of the 
key states to involve non-state actors in the relevant arrangements, which is based on 
constructed perception of interests as to the Internet. 
IV. Literature Review 
   As mentioned above, the Internet governance has been examined from cross-sectional and 
multidisciplinary approaches that emerged from different fields. Since the Internet has been rarely 
addressed from international relations perspective, this review encompasses scholarly works and 
studies from various fields.  
   Many scholars have focused on exploring how the technical aspects could affect the governance 
of the Internet. Lawrence Lessig (1999 and 2006) insightfully demonstrated that technical decisions 
on cyberspace have inherent political implications. He argued that cyberspace is governed by the 
code, which means that the design of the software programs can regulate the behavior on the 
Internet by the favor of the rules set into the architecture of these programs. Thus, the code is the 
law in cyberspace and the designers of the code are the authority that set the rules. The Internet users 
are obliged to comply with the rules set by the code. 
    Moreover, Lessig (2002) has formulated a conceptual framework that breaks up the Internet into 
three layers: the physical infrastructure layer (wires, cables, radio frequency spectrum etc.), the 
'code' layer (software), and the content layer that is the most visible to the users navigating the 
Internet. While Lessig's insights have conceptually contributed to unveil certain conceptual 
ambiguities related to the Internet governance, he neither address politics related to the Internet nor 
various actors involved in the Internet governance dynamics. 
   Milton Mueller addresses the Internet governance from a 'regulatory' perspective focusing on how 
the Internet can be regulated. From this regulatory standpoint, Mueller paid too much attention to 
ICANN's as transnational regulatory authority of the Internet. Mueller (1999) focuses on the process 
that led to the creation of ICANN emphasizing the role of the Internet technical community in such 
process. Moreover, Mueller (2002) focuses on the role of ICANN in the Internet governance, from 
institutional economics perspectives, indicating the potential impact of its authority over the 
regulation of the Internet content. In addition, Mueller (2010) addresses the regulatory and legal 
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issues related the Internet as well as the potential challenges related to the Internet governance. 
Mueller's regulatory approach to the Internet governance and his focus on ICANN neglects the 
impact of the other actors on the Internet governance. 
  In line with Mueller's work, many studies have focused on examining ICANN from various 
perspectives. Lee (2008) addresses ICANN from the public administration perspective through 
systemic assessment of the factors and actors that influence ICANN’s overall performance. Antonova 
(2006) considers creation of ICANN a step towards the establishment of a new governance 
paradigm for the digital environments, which embodies the neoliberal principles of market self-
regulation. Pommerening (2004) examines the emergence and implementation of ICANN's two 
governance principles, which are coordination and representation. Klein (2002) indicates how 
ICANN can leverage its technical coordination functions to influence the global public policies 
related to the Internet.   
    Many studies focus on investigating the technical community that has developed the Internet. 
Abbate (1994 and 2000) demonstrates how the creators of the Internet have established a 
community associated with social common values. Abbate also indicates how the technical design 
of ARPANET, the predecessor of the Internet, has been shaped by the interests and values of such 
community, arguing that technical choices regarding the design of the network are the result of 
tradeoffs between competing values. Echoing Lessig's insights, Abbate further argues that the 
different networking designs can lead to different implications. Likewise, McTaggart (2004) 
examines such community from institutional perspective focusing on the future of the Internet self-
governance institutions in the current hyper-commercial context. Both Abbate and McTaggart did 
not contextualize the role of the Internet technical community within the global debate on the 
Internet governance.  
   Domanski (2013) has developed Lessig's three-layer framework of the Internet into four-layer 
conceptual model, which breaks up the Internet into the layers of infrastructure, the technical 
protocols, the software applications, and the content. Approaching the Internet governance from a 
policy perspective, Domanski employs his conceptual model in order to identify the actors that can 
influence policies at each layer with a view to provide a comprehensive account for the actual 
governance arrangements of the Internet. Domanski's objective is to enable policymakers to utilize 
his model in order to formulate the appropriate Internet policies for each of the distinctive policy 
arenas conceptualized by his model. In this context, Domanski employed his model in order to 
investigate the post 9/11 United States' national cyber-security policy through his model. While 
Domanski highlights the multiplicity of actors involved in the Internet governance, he strictly 
addresses them from policy perspective. Domanski's policy approach addresses each layer, and 
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accordingly its policy actors, as stand-alone arena without addressing the dynamics and processes 
that involve all these actors in the global context of the Internet governance. 
   While the above-mentioned scholars and researchers have contributed to a better understanding of 
the Internet complexities, they did not address the Internet from the international relations 
perspective. They focus exclusively on the technical and regulatory issues of the Internet without 
paying attention to the international dynamics related to Internet governance. They neglect the 
intergovernmental processes that addressed the Internet governance internationally such as the 
United Nations' WSIS. Most of those studies focus their analysis on non-state actors; particularly, 
the Internet technical community and ICANN, without addressing their interaction and relationship 
with state actors. 
  Other studies consider the Internet a manifestation of globalization that challenges the primacy of 
states. Shah (2009) examines how metaphors of globalization influence the global governance of 
the Internet arguing that globalization works as a constitutive force that shape the relevant 
institutions and policies. Simon (2006) examines the Internet governance debates that took place 
during the mid 1990s, arguing that the rise of the Internet challenges the international system of 
sovereign states. 
   On the other hand, many researchers have addressed the Internet from a state-centric perspective 
asserting the primacy of states regarding the Internet governance. Drezner (2004) explores whether 
globalization and the Internet undermined the role of states in regulating the global economy 
arguing that great powers remain the key players in handling political and social issues created by 
the Internet and globalization. He contends that states could consciously delegate regime 
management to non-state actors making them acting as "agents of state interests."  Drezner presents 
a model for global governance based on the distribution of state interest and power, examining how 
this model can explain several regulatory issues of the Internet. He concludes that whenever states 
agree about regulatory outcomes, great powers prefer delegating management of the regime to non-
state actors. Instead of conducting a deep analysis and careful examination of the real dynamics that 
took place within the context of the Internet governance, Drezner provides an account that 
rationalizes the state actors' behavior. He presents a rational interpretation of the actors' preferences 
and interests instead of examining the dynamics that led these actors to identify their preferences 
and interests. Moreover, his interpretation about great powers' preference to delegate regime 
management to non-state actors contradict with the fact that most of the international regimes are 
administered by intergovernmental organizations. 
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   Similarly, Bhuiyan (2010) addresses the Internet governance from a state perspective focusing on 
the role of postcolonial states of China, India, Brazil, South Africa, Iran, Tunisia and Cuba on global 
Internet policy issues versus that of the United States. He examines the dynamics that took place 
during the WSIS. Bhuiyan argues that the global Internet policy making in various issues is a power 
struggle between the United States and these postcolonial states. He further argues that although 
influence of non-state actors influence on global communication policymaking has increased, states 
still hold decision-making power. Bhuiyan's exclusive focus on WSIS neglects other processes and 
dynamics that significantly shape the global Internet governance. 
   Focusing on WSIS dynamics as well, Kleinwachter (2004) demonstrates the controversy between 
those who support managing the Internet by ICAAN, and others who want to delegate this 
management to an intergovernmental organization. Kleinwachter concludes that the current era is 
characterized  by a transformation from the old governance system, where states have been the sole 
actors, to a new governance system where there are additional stakeholders and new players other 
than states. Kleinwachter's work is largely descriptive.  
   It is worthy to note that WSIS has been addressed from various perspectives. Shtern (2009) 
examines how the international debate on Internet governance launched within WSIS affects the 
public interest in communication. Pickard (2007) analyzes continuities and changes in global 
communication policy during the last four decades comparing UNESCO debates in the 1970s with 
the recent WSIS in 2005. Pickard argues that changes in the global communication policy are a 
reflection of changes in the global power relations concluding that global communication system is 
dominated and structured along neoliberal lines, which favors expansion of transnational 
corporations over social necessities. 
   One of the outcomes of WSIS has been the establishment of Internet Governance Forum (IGF). 
Epstein (2012) analyzes the dynamics that take place within IGF. He argues that IGF reflects the tension 
between the nation-state-centric and the Internet-community-centric perceptions of authority, indicating 
how it contributes to establishing specific political and cultural norms regarding the Internet governance. 
   Some studies have addressed the Internet governance from state-centric perspective but focusing 
on examining the policies of specific states. Kiggins (2011) examines the American policy as to the 
Internet focusing on how it succeeded to achieve consensus among major economic powers for 
making the Internet a duty-free commercial forum. He argues that this policy reflects the embedded 
liberalism of the United States and its long-term policy of expanding its political ideals and gaining 
market access overseas. While Kiggins has used the label of Internet governance, his study 
addresses only the American policy regarding e-commerce on the Internet. 
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   Likewise, Berleur (2008) reviews certain policy documents of the United States and the European 
Union regarding the Internet. He indicates that those policies are fundamentally economic and 
market-oriented lacking social and cultural considerations.  
   Marcus Franda (2001) addressed the Internet governance from the perspective of regime theory, 
arguing that governments of the developed countries, particularly the United States and the 
European Union, and the private sector have developed rules needed for maintaining the smooth 
operation of the Internet. This led to the emergence an international regime for the Internet, which is 
reflected through international agreements between governments over a number of Internet issues. 
Franda argues that international regimes are being established on certain Internet issues such as 
domain-name registration; taxation and e-commerce; intellectual property; privacy; content 
regulation; and Internet security. He focused on how coordination took place in many venues by 
multiple actors both public and private.  
   Franda does not examine how state actors have constructed their preference and interests as to the 
Internet governance. Moreover, he focuses on formal processes and institutions ignoring the 
informal dynamics as well as role of the technical community that developed the Internet.  Seeking 
to present a holistic perspective of the Internet governance, Franda treats all the Internet issue area as 
one international regime called the 'Internet regime.' However, the multiplicity of the issue-areas 
related to the Internet and the different configurations of actors influencing theses areas makes it 
difficult to put all the Internet issues under a label of one regime. 
   This study addresses the Internet from pluralistic perspective through examination of the 
influential state and non-state actors and their respective roles as to the de-facto administration of the 
Internet and the forming regime of its architecture. Moreover, we will examine the relationship 
among these actors and the impact of each one over the others, and how such dynamics have been 
reflected in the ongoing international debate related to the Internet governance. This study 
emphasizes the impact of knowledge in formation and administration of the international regimes. 
V. Theoretical framework  
   The scholarship on international relations was mainly divided between realists and 
liberals who see the world from different perspective. While realists view conflict as the 
inevitable norm of international relations due to the anarchy, liberals believe in the 
possibility of international cooperation and the impact of international institutions and 
regimes on international behavior. Regime theory, which focuses on international 
institutions and international cooperation, has originated from the liberal mainstream. Since 
the Internet represents an international cooperative facility, regime theory is an appropriate 
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theoretical framework to address the relevant issues. However, regime theory takes state-
centric perspective as well as rationalist systemic approach to theory, which may not be 
sufficient to address the multiplicity of actors, particularly non-state actors, involved in the 
Internet issues. Moreover, the Internet is a technology-based sector where the technical 
knowledge could have an explanatory power regarding the dynamics related to the Internet. 
In this context, the notion of "epistemic communities" and their impact on policymakers is 
an appropriate supplementary component to regime theory, which can be employed to 
address the Internet from a holistic theoretical framework. In this connection, the following 
paragraphs briefly review different approaches to international regimes indicating the 
reasons behind our choice of regime theory, supplemented by the notion of "epistemic 
communities", as the theoretical framework of this study.        
   Stephen Krasner (Krasner 1983) defines regime as "a set of explicit or implicit principles, 
norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actor expectations converge in 
a given issue-area." Krasner introduces a variety of causal variables for the formation and 
development of regimes. The two most exogenous variables are egoistic self-interest 
(usually economic), and political power. The third variable includes norms and principles, 
which can contribute to creation and development of a regime in a specific issue area 
without being directly related to that issue area. The last two sets of causal variables are 
usage and custom, and knowledge, which are not considered by Krasner as exogenous 
variables capable of creating a regime by themselves; rather "they supplement and reinforce 
pressures associated with egoistic self-interest, political power, and diffuse value." 
    In an attempt to integrate theories of international regimes, Hasenclever, Mayer, and 
Rittberger (1997) present exhaustive review of the international regime literature, in which 
they mention three theoretical approaches to understanding international regimes: power-
based, interest-based, and knowledge-based approaches. The difference among those 
approaches lie in the explanatory variables that each one emphasizes. In this connection, 
Hasnclever, Mayer, and Rittberger view three schools of thought within the scholarship of 
international regimes: realists, who base the analysis on power relationships among actors; 
neoliberals, who focus on constellations of interests; and cognitivists, who emphasize the 
role of knowledge dynamics, identities and communication. They argue that the major 
difference which separates the three schools of thought is the degree of 'institutionalism' 
that each school tends to adopt.  By 'Institutionalism' they mean the degree to which 
international institutions, such as regimes, matter. They concluded that each of the three 
theoretical approaches has explanatory power in certain situations and the field of 
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international regimes would be better off by understanding which approach apply into 
which kind of cases. 
   Moreover, they argue that there is a potential progress that could be achieved towards an 
inter-paradigmatic synthesis of the three theories. In a subsequent article Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger explore the possibility to synthesize theories of international regimes. 
They concluded that realism and neoliberalism could be linked to form "a unified rationalist 
theory of international regimes." Because neoliberalism and realism consider actors' 
interests as exogenously given, they suggest 'weak cognitivism' to supplement the gap exist 
in rationalist theorizing. On the other hand, they are skeptical about the possibility of 
integrating radical variants of cognitivism into rationalist approaches due to the sharp 
disagreement between them with regard to both ontology and epistemology (Hasenclever, 
Mayer and Rittberger 2000, 3-33). In the case of the Internet, the multiplicity of actors 
involved in the relevant dynamics makes such integrated or synthesized approach, between 
rationalist theorizing and weak cognitivism, an appropriate theoretical framework for 
addressing the Internet architecture regime as further elaborated below. 
   Realists or power-based theories of international regimes question the significance of 
regimes in the context of international relations due to their focus on the international 
anarchy that force states to care only about distribution of power in the international 
system. Realists assume that states are not only interested in absolute gains from 
international cooperation but also about the relative gains, which made them skeptical about 
the role of regimes in international affairs. 
    Neoliberal or interest-based theories of international regimes, from which 'regime theory' 
has originated, highlights the role played by international regimes in helping states to attain 
common interests. Unlike realists, they adopt an institutional perspective viewing regimes 
as both resilient and effective. However, neoliberals adopt realist assumptions viewing 
states as rational egoists who act only to achieve their own absolute gains. Consequently, 
'neoliberal institutionalism' is considered by many scholars to be bounded because they 
apply rational mode of thinking, which treat actors' interests and identities as exogenously 
given and thus unaffected by institutions. 
   Within the neo-liberal approach, Robert Keohane authored one of the most elaborate 
theories of international regimes that is called 'functional' theory of regimes, which 
sometimes equated with 'regime theory' itself. The label 'neoliberal institutionalism' has 
been associated with Keohane's theory due its focus on the increasing institutionalization of 
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international behavior (Keohane 1989, 1-20). Keohane (1984, 1986 and 1989) intentionally 
approves realist assumptions through acknowledging the centrality of states as key actors in 
international politics and the impact of international anarchy on inter-state interactions 
including their ability to cooperate. Moreover, Keohane seems to accept realism's 
assumption about the basic motivation of states, viewing states as rational egoists who act 
to promote their own interests. Keohane consciously ignores the potential impact of the 
units' domestic attributes on the choices of actors adopting instead a systemic approach to 
theory that focuses on the external structural state of affairs under which governments make 
foreign policy decisions. However, he emphasizes the significant impact of international 
regimes on international political context opposing the realist approach in this regard. 
   Keohane clarifies that his theory of regimes functions under a particular situational 
precondition: the states that are involved in an issue-area must share common interests, 
which can only be achieved through cooperation. While he focuses on issues of 
international political economy and on relations among western countries, he argues that his 
theory will apply whenever common interests exist among states. Agreeing with Keohane's 
arguments, Arthur Stein (1983) asserts that "the same forces of autonomously calculated 
self-interest that lie at the root of the anarchic international system also lay the foundation 
for international regimes as a form of international order…there are times when rational 
self-interested calculation leads actors to abandon independent decision making in favor of 
joint decision making." One implication for Keohane's presupposition of common interests 
among states active in a specific issue area is that actors' interests are not explained within 
the theory, but are taken as exogenously given. 
   Extending the scope of Keohane's theory, Arthur Stein, Duncan Sindal, Kenneth Oye, 
Michael Zurn, and Lisa Martin adopt a game-theoretic orientation relative to international 
regimes in so-called situational-structural approach. Those scholars argue that the 'strategic' 
nature of the situation in which states make their decisions and choices about institutions 
and cooperation should be considered as key variable. They employ various game-theoretic 
pay-off structures in order to account for creation and development of international regimes 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997, 45-58). 
   In this context, neo-liberal approach in general, and regime theory in particular, can 
account for the emerging need to establish a more globalized governance of the Internet 
administration, since all states have common interest in preserving its smooth function. 
Even the United States, which maintains hegemonic status over the Internet administration, 
has an interest in broadening the international participation regarding the Internet 
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administration in order to avoid fragmentation of the global network if other states will 
have decided to create their own 'Internet'. However, regime theory could not account for 
adoption of multi-stakeholder governance to the Internet administration. With its systemic 
approach to theory that focuses on the structural forces of the International system, regime 
theory could not account for formation of a regime for the Internet administration by the 
non-state actors that developed the Internet throughout its history. The Internet architecture 
regime was not a product of inter-state interaction; rather, it has been recently dragged into 
inter-state dynamics. The state-centric view of regime theory makes it difficult for its neo-
liberal approach to address the relevant dynamics of this regime. Thus, the gap of rationalist 
state-centric theorizing needs to be supplemented in order to enable addressing the Internet 
architecture regime through a more appropriate theoretical context. Knowledge-based 
theories of regime or cognitivism, particularly weak cognitivism, is helpful in this regard. 
   Cognitivism tends to adopt institutionalism that is much more emphasized than that found 
in either realism or neoliberalism. Cognitivist approach to regimes consider that rationalist 
reasoning lacks the ability to provide convincing accounts for major changes in the history 
of international relations. Cognitivists focus on states' perception of their interests 
emphasizing the role of causal as well as ideational and normative forces. Thus, part of 
cognitivists' contribution might be viewed as complementary to the rationalist neoliberal 
theory as to regime analysis, through formulation of a theory of preference formation in 
order to fill a gap in neoliberal theorizing. This strand of knowledge-based theories is 
sometimes referred to as 'weak cognitivists'. However, some cognitivists, so-called 'strong 
cognitivists' go deeper suggesting that a sociological perspective is better than rational 
choice in accounting for the institutionalism and its role at the international level. They 
criticize the failure of interest-based approaches to take adequate account of the impacts of 
institutionalized practices on the interests and identities of international actors 
(Hasenclever, Mayer and Rittberger 1997, 136-210). 
   Weak cognitivists assert that "between international structure and human volition lies 
interpretation." (Adler and Haas 1992, 367). Before decisions regarding cooperation can be 
made, interests and preferences must be identified and circumstances have to be assessed. 
Consequently, interpretation is assumed to depend on the body of knowledge held by the 
actors at a given place and time. This knowledge constructs the actors' perception of reality 
and clarifies linkages between causes and effects for the decision makers. Thus, weak 
cognitivists reject to see actors' interests as simply given, rather, preferences are to be 
viewed as contingent on how actors understand and perceive the social world. They attempt 
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to analyze the process of preferences and interest identification before rational decisions are 
made. In summary, weak coginitivists share the assumption that "knowledge actors carry in 
their heads and project in their international encounters significantly shapes their behavior 
and expectations" (Haas 1990). 
   Along with the increasingly technical nature of international issues, there is growing need 
on the part of decision makers for reliable knowledge and scientific information in order to 
reduce uncertainties about interests and how they can be realized.  With the complex 
interdependence, politicians lack the ability to assess the consequences of their decisions; 
they need advice of the scientists and other experts in order to crystallize their interests as 
well as to determine the appropriate course of action. Thus, scientists and experts who have 
the ability to provide the desired knowledge and the relevant advice can influence the 
decisions made by politicians (Adler and Haas 1992, and Haas 1992). 
      Weak cognitivists assert the necessity to integrate scientific knowledge and moral 
concerns as independent explanatory variables into the theory of international relations. 
Sometimes new ideas and knowledge resulted in changes of beliefs, which may or may not 
bring about behavioral change of the actors (Nye 1987, 378-382). If the behavior changes, 
this process is referred to as learning. Joseph Nye (1987, 380) conceptually differentiates 
between 'simple' and 'complex' learning: "Simple learning uses new information merely to 
adapt the means, without altering any deeper goals in the ends-means chain. The actor 
simply uses a different instrument to attain the same goal. Complex learning, by contrast, 
involves recognition of conflicts among means and goals in causally complicated situations, 
and leads to new priorities and trade-offs." The concept of complex learning is particularly 
important for weak cognitivists because it sheds the light on how states redefine their 
interests and alter their preferences in reaction to new knowledge and ideas. Therefore, 
weak cognitivists focus on actors' behavioral change as a result of cognitive change as 
opposed to the change that takes place as a response to structural dynamics such as the 
distribution of power and wealth which is emphasized by the rationalist theories. 
   For knowledge to have an influence on the process of regime formation, it must be widely 
shared by key decision makers. Building on this view, Peter Haas has focused on the 
process through which the views of scientists and experts are channeled to, accepted, and 
acted upon by policymakers. In this context, he employs the concept of epistemic 
communities, which is defined as "networks of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge 
within the domain or issue-area" (Haas 1992, 3). Moreover, Haas argues that epistemic 
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communities are significant "channels through which new ideas circulate form societies to 
governments as well as from country to country" (Haas 1992, 27). Hass elaborately 
discusses the potential impact of those epistemic communities on the process of regime 
formation and framing of the relevant issues.  
   In the case of the Internet architecture regime, knowledge can be considered an important aspect 
that has potential explanatory power in understanding the dynamics of the regime formation. In this 
context, weak cognitivisim could compensate for shortcomings of the regime theory. It allows 
exploring domestic attributes of the actors, particularly, the United States, within which the Internet 
architecture regime has been established and developed. This focus on the domestic dynamics help  
analyze the process of preferences and interest identification that led the United States to 
relinquish its authority over administration of the Internet and to adopt multi-
stakeholderism as a basis for governing the Internet architecture regime. It also indicates 
how those identified preferences and interests have been reflected in the American 
international stance regarding Internet governance. Moreover, weak cognitivism allows 
focusing on non-state actors; particularly, the Internet epistemic community, and its role in 
developing principles, norms, and rules of the Internet administration, as well as its 
transnational impact on promoting multi-stakeholderism as a basis for the Internet 
administration. The concept of epistemic communities is useful in analyzing the role of the 
Internet epistemic community taking into consideration the technical nature of the Internet-related 
issues. 
   Thus, while insights of the regime theory, which has originated from neo-liberal or 
interest-based approach to regimes, would be useful in providing an account for the 
emergence of inter-state cooperation regarding Internet governance, including preservation 
of the smooth functioning of the Internet, weak cognitivism would be helpful in explaining 
the extensive involvement of non-state actors in the Internet administration. Therefore, 
integrating regime theory and weak cognitivism, this study takes a pluralistic approach 
examining the role of states and non-state actors in forming the Internet architecture regime, which 
set the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures for the Internet technical 
administration.  
 VI. Methodology   
   In addition to secondary sources, which include multidisciplinary academic literature on the 
Internet-related issues, the empirical basis of this study is material gathered from primary sources. 
Most of this material is original documents related to the actors that are examined. Specifically, the 
19 
 
technical and policy documents of IETF and ISOC, the relevant policy documents of the United 
States, and the bylaws and regulations of ICANN are investigated. The analysis of these documents 
aims at clarifying how each actor has identified its preferences and interests as to the Internet as well 
as its relationship to the other actors. Moreover, this document analysis indicates the relative impact 
of each actor on the others. Such analysis is supplemented by analysis of the relevant contextual 
processes and events, which characterize the evolution of each actor's perception as to the Internet. 
In addition, the original documents of certain official international events that discussed Internet 
governance issues are also analyzed in order to indicate how the previously identified preferences of 
actors have affected their International stance during such events as well as to explore the potential 
impact of these events on the de-facto Internet architecture regime. The following paragraphs 
briefly introduce the chapters of this study and elaborate on the documents used in the analysis.      
   Chapter 2 presents a brief chronological history of the Internet focusing on some milestone events 
that led to its status as global public facility with a view to highlight the key actors that have 
historically participated in the development of the Internet; particularly, the United States and the 
Internet epistemic community.  
   Chapter 3 aims at demonstrating how the Internet operates through identifying the core 
architectural components that guarantee its functionality. The chapter seeks also to conceptualize the 
Internet epistemic community and to demonstrate how it has developed the Internet architectural 
components and the relevant administration system. The chapter examines the technical documents 
issued by IETF, which set the rules and standards for operation of the Internet. Since IETF has been 
the dominant standards-setting organization for the Internet throughout its history, its documents 
include all the details related to the design of the Internet's architecture. Moreover, IETF's 
documents represent the sole archive that documents the evolution of the Internet technical system 
and its administration since the establishment of the Internet until now.  
   Chapter 4 aims at further clarifying the role of Internet epistemic community on shaping the 
overall Internet system and its governance principles with a view to indicate the extent to which 
technical knowledge can be a powerful instrument employed to impose specific values on the 
Internet architecture regime. The chapter examines the institutions that represent the Internet 
epistemic community; namely, IETF and ISOC. In addition to analyzing the relevant IETF's 
documents, we analyze ISOC's bylaws, policy documents and publications.  
   Chapter 5 aims at understanding the premises of the United States' stance towards the Internet 
governance in general and the Internet administration in particular. The chapter seeks to account for 
the United States international position that opposes governmental control on the Internet and 
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promotes instead the self-governance model, and to indicate the extent to which the Internet 
epistemic community has contributed in shaping such position. The chapter examines the domestic 
dynamics through which the United States' preferences and interests have been identified as to the 
Internet. The analysis focuses on the dynamics that took place during the 1990s, which witnessed a 
transition from the informal ad-hoc administration of the Internet monopolized by the epistemic 
community into a more formal framework with the establishment of ICANN. We analyze the 
policy documents issued by the Untied States government regarding the Internet. These documents 
include the "Green Paper", the "White Paper", the "United States Global Framework on Electronic 
Commerce", and the "Presidential Directive of July 1, 1997." Additionally, we conduct a 
comparative analysis between the substantive elements of the epistemic community's document - 
known as "generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (gTLD-MoU)" – and the 
above-mentioned policy documents of the United States in order to indicate the extent to which the 
epistemic community has influenced the American policy regarding the Internet. Along with this 
document analysis, some of the key events that have shaped the United States' perception as to the 
Internet are highlighted. Since the United States exerted international efforts to establish specific 
international regimes related to the Internet – which goes beyond its technical administration - in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), we 
analyze certain relevant documents issued by these organizations. The WTO documents are entitled 
"The Geneva Ministerial Declaration on Global Electronic Commerce" and "Work Program on 
Electronic Commerce." The WIPO document is entitled "The Advantages of Adherence to the 
WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)."  
  Chapter 6 aims at exploring the governance framework of the new Internet architecture regime 
through examining ICANN's system and its evolution as well as the relevant key players. The 
chapter seeks to foresee whether ICANN's self-governance model could be sustained as a model of 
international governance. We analyze ICANN's bylaws of 1998 and the amended version that is 
currently in force, as well as other several documents and publications issued by ICANN. We also 
analyze the consecutive contractual agreements signed between the American government and 
ICANN, whereby the latter is delegated to administer the Internet. Moreover, we briefly review 
certain well-established regimes that have been formed and currently administered by both state and 
non-state actors in order to explore whether ICANN's multi-stakeholderism could sustain as a 
global governance model.  
   Chapter 7 aims at demonstrating the intergovernmental dynamics that took place regarding 
Internet governance and whether the outcomes of such dynamics could lead to establishment of 
international regimes related to the Internet. The chapter also seeks to indicate the extent to which 
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such dynamics could affect the self-governance principle of the de-facto Internet architecture 
regime administered by ICANN. The chapter examines the key international events that have 
addressed Internet governance; namely, the United Nations WSIS and the World Conference on 
International Telecommunication (WCIT), which was recently held by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) in 2014. This will be followed by a brief review of the dynamics 
and progress made within the two distinct processes created by WSIS to address Internet issues; 
namely, Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and 'enhanced cooperation'. We analyze variety of 
WSIS's documents, including outcome documents, as well as written transcripts and online-
streamed audio recordings for the meetings held throughout the preparatory process of the two 
phases of WSIS focusing on statements, comments, proposals, which have been officially delivered 
and submitted by various actors throughout such process. Moreover, we analyze certain relevant 
documents of the United Nations Commission for Science and Technology (CSTD)
3
, certain 
documents of IGF. We also provide an account for the discussion that took place within 'enhanced 
cooperation' track of WSIS on the basis of interviews – which are conducted in Geneva from April 
30 to May 2, 2014 - with certain delegations that participated in the relevant meetings. Finally, we 
analyze the official proposals and archived transcripts of WCIT's sessions as well as the outcome 
documents of the conference. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 CSTD is a subsidiary body of the United Nations Economic and Social Council mandated to follow up the outcomes of 
WSIS.  
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Chapter 2 
 Brief History of the Internet 
   This chapter presents a brief chronological history of the Internet highlighting the key actors that 
have historically developed the Internet; particularly, the United States government and the Internet 
epistemic community. It focuses on some milestone events that led to the current status of the 
Internet as global public facility associated with dramatic social, economic, and political 
implications.  
   The chapter categorizes the Internet history into three phases. The first phase witnessed the 
creation of the Internet predecessor, ARPANET, by the United States' Advanced Research Projects 
Agency (ARPA). During this phase, an epistemic community of engineers and researchers - who 
were recruited, contracted, or financed to work on ARPANET project - had emerged and continued 
to evolve over the course of Internet history. The work of such community's members on 
ARPANET project contributed in constructing the American government's perception regarding 
ARPANET successor, the Internet.   
   The second phase was associated with a transition from defense-related networking into academic 
and scientific-related networking. During this stage, the focus of ARPANET project shifted from 
establishing a military-based network into creation of a broader academic and scientific facility in 
order to connect universities and research centers across the United States. Several networks have 
been connected to ARPANET comprising what became known as the Internet. Significantly, the 
architectural components of the Internet, which currently ensures its functioning, had been 
established with the invention of the Transmission Communication Protocol/ Internet Protocol 
(TCP/IP) and the Domain Name System (DNS). Moreover, the epistemic community that has 
emerged during the initial design of ARPANET began to develop an informal institutional 
framework for its activities. 
   The third phase was characterized by spread of public access to the Internet and proliferation of 
commercial activities over the network. The Internet became an international public facility 
providing opportunities for content creation by its users as well as profit-making business for start-
up companies and big corporations. With invention of social networking, the Internet became a 
social and political medium for communications and information sharing. The private sector led the 
evolution of the Internet during this phase. Furthermore, the Internet epistemic community has 
established formal organizations to promote its views and values about the Internet. Those 
organizations became the dominant institutions that set the Internet standards and maintain its 
architecture.  
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Three phases of the Internet evolution 
I. Creation of ARPANET: emergence of an epistemic community from military-sponsored 
project 
    The Internet has begun as a government-controlled investment in the national defense of the 
United States. The Cold War made scientific research a matter of national defense for the United 
States, especially after success of the Soviet Union to launch the first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957. This 
advancement of the Soviet in the space race created a robust national commitment to science, 
leading to creation of the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA)
4
 (Keefer and Baiget 2001, 
90-95).  
   After the creation of NASA, the mandate of space exploration was removed from ARPA, forcing 
the latter to begin exploring development of computer-related technology. The scarcity of ARPA's 
computer resources, along with its extensive research on connecting computers across long 
distances, led to the creation of ARPANET, the first multicomputer network. With focus of ARPA 
on issues that were not strictly defense-related, the institution began in 1960s to establish 
professional relationships and close ties with researchers of computer science departments at 
universities across the Untied States. In this context, the idea of a network that would link people at 
distance emerged (Moschovitis 1999, 34-43). 
   The creation of ARPANET took almost a decade paving the way for its successor, the Internet. In 
1963, Joseph Licklider, head of ARPA's command and control division, began to promote his idea 
about developing integrated computer network shifting the focus of his division from defense-
related information processing into time-sharing systems
5
 and computer technology (Kita 2003, 62-
77). Licklider's successor, Robert Taylor, focused on a more specific plan to create network of 
computers that can connect various research centers aiming at bringing researchers together. The 
plan was implemented from 1966 to 1969 leading finally to establishment of ARPANET (Abbate 
2000, 45-46). 
   In order to implement the plan, ARPA contracted academic institutions as well as private firms in 
order to accomplish the required tasks needed to build the network. The academic institutions 
involved in the implementation of the plan hosted the four initial sites to be connected to the 
network (Federal Communications Commission 2007, 35-64). Thus, while ARPA staff initiated 
and managed the project, academic and industry contractors undertook the actual research and 
                                                 
4 In 1972, ARPA was established as a separate defense agency under the Office of the Secretary of Defense and its name 
was changed to DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency). In 1993, DARPA was re-designated as ARPA, 
most probably to show commitment to scientific research that would benefit both civilian and defense industry. For the 
sake of consistency, this study uses ARPA throughout this work.   
5 These systems allow many people, on separate terminals, to use a single computer simultaneously. 
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development (Abbate 1994, 3). This led to emergence of epistemic community that began to 
acquire knowledge and accumulate experience about networking technology.   
  Many graduate students from the contracted academic institutions had extensively participated in 
implementation of the network outline. ARPA provided sustainable funding for those students 
(Aspray 1989, 19). Those graduates of ARPA-funded programs became a main source of computer 
science and networking faculty at American universities, thereby expanding ARPA's community 
into the next generation of computer scientists and researchers (Norberg and O'Neill 1996, 290-
291). The participation of those students is even claimed to be an important factor in shaping the 
anarchic structure of ARPANET and, consequently, of networking communities in general 
(Moschovitis 1999, 62).  
   Although the huge financial resources of ARPA has been the driver for attracting many 
researchers and computer scientists to ARPANET project, managers of ARPA did not conduct their 
relations with those researchers on a merely contractual, financial basis. Rather, ARPA relied on 
cooperative arrangements rather than on contractual terms, and technical decisions were usually 
taken by consensus. Decentralized, informal, and collegial approach characterized the 
organizational culture of ARPANET project. The network itself enabled coordinating scattered 
activities and provided a meeting place for the researchers' community. This management style of 
ARPA helped to create a sense of community among its researchers that began to share common 
values and goals. Furthermore, ARPA used to recruit most of its directors and project managers 
from the promising researchers at universities, who subsequently maintained relations with their 
previous colleagues in order to explore new ideas and to recruit active researchers. Moreover, many 
project managers who were recruited from ARPA's contractors stayed only few years at ARPA and 
then returned to academia or private business (Abbate 2000, 54-69).  
   This management style of ARPA fostered the expansion of the emerging epistemic community 
outside ARPANET project. Moreover, the movement of the engineers and researchers from ARPA 
to academia or industry, and vice versa, helped to sustain a mutual interaction and strong 
relationship between such community and ARPA management
6
. 
   It is clear that ARPA, in its quest to develop networking technology through ARPANET project, 
established close ties with the academic community and industry contractors, recruited computer 
scientists and researchers, hired consultants, contracted companies, funded research and 
experiments in the research institutions as well as in the corporations. Although the trigger of such 
interest in computing and networking technology was the national security concerns of the time, the 
                                                 
6 Appendix I enlists some of the Internet pioneers indicating how they moved from government to academia and industry 
and vice versa. 
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approach followed by ARPA led to the emergence of epistemic community of networking 
engineers whose original members had been either recruited, contracted, or financed by ARPA. 
This community, which expanded outside ARPA, acquired the knowledge about networking 
technology and developed specific values and norms. Moreover, it had sustained the relationship 
and mutual interaction between the government (represented by ARPA), the academia, and the 
industry within the United States. This has created solid ground for further cross-fertilization of 
ideas among those actors. 
   Since members of such community conducted the actual research and development of 
ARPANET, their views and ideas have largely influenced the perception of the United States' 
government regarding networking and subsequently its stance as to the Internet. The technical 
elites; who had been recruited, contracted or financed by government projects of ARPA; were able 
to diffuse their principles and values within the government agencies that recruited or contracted 
them. Since the networking concept was nascent, there was broad space for those elites in shaping 
the perception of the relevant governmental authorities of the United States. This argument can be 
substantiated by the above-mentioned fact - which continues in the context of today's Internet - of 
the movement of engineers and researchers from academia or industry to the relevant government 
agencies, particularly ARPA, and vice versa.   
II. Transition from defense-related networking into academic and scientific-based 
networking  
   In 1972, ARPANET was publicly presented at the International Computer Communications 
Conference (ICCC), where the idea of creating much more expansive network emerged. Moreover, 
the International Network Working Group (INWG), then chaired by Vinton Cerf who later became 
ARPANET project manager, had been formed, with an objective to create international network of 
networks. By bringing computer scientists from the United States and Europe together, INWG 
signaled establishment of growing international networking community (McKenzie 2011, 66-67).  
       Along with the growing ARPANET, two networks, funded by ARPA as well, were forming 
simultaneously during the 1970s: ALOHANET and SATNET. While ALOHANET was 
transmitting packet data through radio frequency, SATNET used satellites to connect computers in 
the United States with several sites in Europe. Vinton Cerf and Bob Khan were seeking to create an 
international network of networks since 1971 through connecting the three networks: ARPANET, 
ALOHANET, and SATNET. The problem they faced was that the three networks employed 
different modes of transmission: ARPANET sends data over telephone lines, ALOHANET uses 
radio waves, and SATNET uses satellites.  In order to overcome this problem, Cerf and Khan 
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developed a standard program that allowed interconnectivity among the three networks by serving 
as a gateway between networks to send and receive data, which is called Transmission Control 
Protocol (TCP). In 1977, TCP was deployed and the first message was successfully transmitted 
across the three networks using this protocol. The success of this experiment – which was funded by 
the US Department of Defense – significantly proved the possibility of cross-network connections. 
In 1978, Cerf and two other ARPA-funded researchers, Jonathan Postel and Danny Cohen, 
enhanced TCP by developing the Internet Protocol (IP). The two protocols together, known as 
TCP/IP, became the standard system used for interconnection among most of the large networks 
(Russell 2014, 233-234).  
  With this possibility of connecting independent networks together, several universities' networks 
were connected to ARPANET broadening access to the network's facilities. Nevertheless, this 
access was restricted to institutions and universities contracted by the Department of Defense to 
work on defense-related projects. Such restriction triggered parallel developments in non defense-
related networking that was manifested in establishment of independent networks (Mathison et al. 
2012, 30). Many universities independently established their own education-related networks, such 
as USENET and BITNET, which were subsequently connected to their counterparts in Europe and 
Australia. These independent networks were eventually incorporated into the ARPANET's 
successor, the Internet (Leug and Fisher 2003, 23-24 and European Organization for Nuclear 
Research 2014).  
   In 1979, the US Defense Communications Agency, which then controls ARPANET, split it into a 
separate network for the American military called MILNET and the 'Internet' for other sites (Google 
Sites 2011). This paved the way for expanding scope of networks to be connected to ARPANET, 
especially with the ability of TCP/IP to connect networks with different modes of transmission. 
    With this potential expansion of ARPANET, Vinton Cerf, then ARPANET program manager, 
realized the necessity of establishing an organized entities to oversee the network's evolution and to 
address relevant technical and architectural issues. He created certain entities that provided strong 
structural support for the network users, which facilitated the smooth growth of the network 
(Lambert 2005, 67). The creation of those groups provided an institutional framework for the 
community of networking engineers that has emerged during the design of ARPANET. One of 
those entities was the IETF, which subsequently became the main independent body that addresses 
the Internet architectural issues and the dominant organization for setting its standards.  
   Furthermore, the growth of ARPANET made standardization of networking protocols essential 
for ensuring the smooth interconnection among independent networks. In 1983, ARPANET, and all 
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the networks linked to it, adopted the TCP/IP networking protocol. From then on, ARPANET and 
all affiliated networks that use TCP/IP became to be collectively known as the Internet. (Russell 
2006, 50). Today, TCP/IP is the networking protocol that enables communications among all the 
networks comprising the Internet, and is being maintained and upgraded by IETF.  
   In addition to establishment of TCP/IP and its standardization, another significant development 
that contributed to the growth of the Internet was the design of the Domain Name System (DNS) in 
1984 by Paul Mockapetris, a software programmer who subsequently served as a program manager 
for networking at ARPA during the early 1990s. DNS allows the resolution (translation) of IP 
numbers into words
7
 (Mockapetris 1983, 1-3). Like TCP/IP, DNS is a key architectural component 
that currently ensures the functioning of the Internet.   
   Despite those developments, access to the Internet was still limited to certain government agencies 
and specific communities of computer scientists and researchers. The independent networks of 
several universities were denied access to the Internet. In 1985, National Science Foundation 
(NSF)
8
 initiated a networking project aiming at linking educators and scientists nationwide to each 
other and with their counterparts worldwide. The project created new computer network known as 
NSFNET, which subsequently connected supercomputing centers and regional networks as well as 
ARPANET and all the networks linked to it. NSFNET established a 'network of networks' that 
became the backbone for the Internet evolution. All academic users and researchers throughout the 
United States had been allowed to have access to such network, which led to an explosion of new 
Internet sites, mainly universities (US National Science Foundation 2014a). By 1989, the Internet 
scope became increasingly international. United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Japan, 
Australia, New Zealand, Mexico, and Puerto Rico established connections to NSFNET 
(Moschovitis 1999, 126). In 1990s, ARPANET was decommissioned and its antiquated lines and 
nodes has been replaced by the faster NSFNET backbone, which laid the foundation for today's 
Internet (US National Science Foundation 2014a, 12).  
   While this stage of the Internet history saw some developments regarding the creation of 
independent networks, the Internet growth was mainly supported by the American government. The 
contribution of the above-mentioned epistemic community to the Internet growth had been 
significant with the creation of its architectural pillars, TCP/IP and DNS.  Therefore, the key actors 
at this stage were the Untied States' government and the Internet epistemic community. With the 
commercialization of the Internet, the private sector has emerged as additional key actor that largely 
                                                 
7 IP address is a unique sequence of numbers used to identify each computer connected to the Internet. Since IP addresses 
are not human-friendly and difficult to be memorized, words are being translated into their corresponding IP addresses 
through DNS. Further elaboration of such mechanism is provided in chapter 3. 
8 NSF is an independent federal agency created in 1950 to promote the progress of science in the United States.  
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contributed to the evolution of the Internet during the third phase as will be demonstrated in the 
following paragraphs. 
Third phase: The public and commercial Internet 
   In the early 1990s, several commercial computer networks could not be connected to the 
government-sponsored Internet due to the National Science Foundation's Act, a 1950 law, which 
restricted the Internet to the work of bureaucrats, academics, and scientists. This law has been 
amended in 1992 to give more flexibility for use of the Internet by the private sector opening the 
door to the commercial Internet (Moschovitis 1999, 155-157). As a result, about 100,000 networks - 
both public and private - have been established across the United States and connected to the 
Internet in 1995. In the same year, NSF decommissioned and privatized its backbone. (US National 
Science Foundation 2014a, 12).  
   Whereas the amendment of National Science Foundation Act provided the enabling legislative 
environment for the growth of the Internet, certain technological advancements significantly 
contributed to its evolution.  In 1991, Tim Berners-Lee, a vocal defender for open and free Internet 
and currently a key member of the Internet epistemic community, introduced the World Wide Web 
system, which was subsequently incorporated into the Internet revolutionizing its use. The system, 
consists of hypertext-interlinked documents that could be accessed via the Internet (Berners-Lee and 
Fischetti 2008). Then, the browsers, which are programs that enable programming-illiterate people 
to easily navigate the Internet, were invented. After release of several browsers, the first most 
successful browser, Mosaic, was released free of charge in early 1993. Mosaic, which was 
developed by two students from the University of Illinois, Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina, enabled 
incorporation of graphics, sound, and video clips into the World Wide Web (Andreessen 2014).  
   The technology was then transferred to the private sector, with Marc Andreessen and other 
Mosaic developers establishing Netscape Communications that released a beta version of its new 
browser, Netscape Navigator, in 1994. By mid-1995, Netscape dominated the market and began to 
license the software to more than 100 companies including Microsoft pushing University of Illinois 
to discontinue its support for Mosaic (National Center for Supercomputing Applications 2013).  
   In 1994, David Filo and Jerry Yang, then Ph.D. candidates at Stanford University, founded Yahoo 
search engine. They began simply by collecting and categorizing the links of their favorite sites into 
one page. Within few years, Yahoo became the most popular search engine on the Web as well as 
one of its most successful businesses (Santa Clara Valley Historical Association 2008).  In the same 
year, America Online (AOL) launched free downloadable software that allows a simultaneous 
browsing and editing of Web pages, AOLpress. AOLpress enabled nonprogrammers to create Web 
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pages without knowledge of the underlying HTML programming code, opening the creation of 
Web content to the public (Husted 1999). This allowed users to shape the information environment 
and content of the Internet. 
   While the investors initially realized the potential of the Internet as a new medium, they were 
confused about the ways of getting return of their investment where the service is offered free of 
charge. Netscape, Yahoo, and other start-up companies demonstrated during the early 1990s that the 
return of the investment could come from innovative business models such as licensing agreements 
and advertising (Moschovitis 1999, 155). With these successful examples, the Internet became a 
huge business opportunity not only for the start-up companies, but also for the big corporations such 
as Microsoft. In 1995, Microsoft began to be interested in the Internet business, which has been 
emphasized in Bill Gates' internal memo called “The Coming Internet Tidal Wave” (Gates 1995). 
With the involvement of Microsoft in the Internet business, it became clear how the Internet became 
a huge industry.   
   In 1995, a California-based company, Sun Microsystems, released Java, a programming language 
that allows the addition of audio, animation, and interactive features to the World Wide Web, which 
was followed by a rapid evolution of Java products (Oracle 2014). Furthermore, the technology of 
Internet telephony, which is known as Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP), was established and 
adopted by the industry allowing the delivery of voice communications and multimedia sessions to 
be delivered over the Internet (Hurley 1998, 6). This technology has been recently developed  into 
'unified communications' services that allow all communications –phone calls, voice mail, e-mail, 
faxes, Web conferences and more– to  be delivered via any means and to any handset, including 
mobile phones, as provided by today's Skype (Callahan 2008).  
   In 1998, Google has been established by Larry Page and Sergey Brin, then PHD students at 
Stanford University. Google became a multinational corporation specializing in the Internet-related 
services and products as well as the most widely used search engine of the Internet (Google 2014a). 
While the Internet was being used for social communications among computer scientists and 
researchers at its early stages, the spread of social networking features such as Facebook and Twitter 
made the Internet a revolutionary forum for social activities and information sharing. Moreover, it 
became a medium for exchanging political views as well as an instrument for political mobilization, 
which was clearly demonstrated by the Arab Spring uprisings.   
   With the above-mentioned technological developments and the spread of the Internet worldwide, 
the Internet became a significant commercial tool, medium for news delivery and information 
sharing, and content creation facility. This paved the way for huge profits for Internet-based 
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business that begin to encompass a spectrum of industry actors such as cable and infrastructure 
companies, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), content creation and media corporations, software 
companies, e-commerce and other Internet-based services firms. Moreover, it became a key means 
of communications for social and political purposes. 
   Along with such developments, the Internet epistemic community continued its efforts to maintain 
and upgrade the Internet architecture in order to ensure the smooth functioning and operation of the 
Internet. Moreover, this community established formal institutional frameworks for their activities.  
   By 1990, IETF members became concerned about the potential lack of governmental funding that 
had previously sustained its activities during ARPANET project. They decided to create 
internationally recognized non-governmental organization in order to mobilize support for IETF's.  
In 1992, Vinton Cerf and Bob Khan, the inventors of TCP/IP and the prominent IETF's leaders, 
established ISOC as a global non-governmental organization hosting and supporting IETF (Internet 
Society 2014). While IETF addresses the Internet architectural issues, ISOC focuses on policy and 
business issues.   Similarly, Tim Berners-Lee, the inventor of the World Wide Web, formed the 
World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), in 1994,  in order to ensure long-term sustainable growth of 
the Web. The mission of W3C is to develop open standards and guidelines that ensure 
interoperability over the Web. (W3C 2012). 
  With the formal establishment of IETF, ISOC, and W3C, the Internet epistemic community began 
to take a formal international character. As will be illustrated in chapter 4, this community became 
an influential non-state actor that seeks to promote non-governmental regulation of the Internet. Its 
role has extended beyond supporting the Internet technical infrastructure to include broader policy 
issues.  
Conclusion 
   The history of the Internet indicates that it has mainly evolved within the United States' boundaries 
and under sponsorship of its government. While each stage of the Internet history was characterized 
by emergence of certain non-state actors – some of them have developed to become transnational 
actors - that contributed to the Internet evolution, the American government had been the key player 
in the relevant dynamics. Moreover, the Internet history was characterized by extensive and 
complex mutual interaction among the United States' government and the Internet related non-state 
actors, which has been perceived by the former as key to the evolution of the Internet.  
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Chapter 3 
 The Internet Architecture    
   This chapter aims at investigating what the Internet is and how it operates through identifying the 
architectural components that ensures its functionality and operation. The chapter seeks also to 
conceptualize the 'Internet epistemic community' and to indicate how it has developed the Internet 
architecture as well as how it has established an effective system for its management. 
   In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter conceptualizes the Internet by using Robert 
Domanski's model that conceptually divides the Internet into four layers: physical infrastructure, 
technical protocols, software applications, and content. Building upon Domanski's model, we will 
indicate that the technical protocol layer is the architectural layer of the Internet that maintains its 
functionality and determines its structure. Moreover, the chapter conceptualizes the 'Internet 
epistemic community' as community of individuals, with technical knowledge, who work 
voluntarily to preserve the smooth operation of the Internet through maintaining and upgrading its 
architectural layer. 
  This chapter further identifies two main components of the Internet architectural layer: the TCP/IP 
and DNS, which together will be referred to as the Internet architecture. Through examination of the 
technical documents of IETF, we demonstrate how these components contribute to functionality of 
the Internet, as well as how they generate its critical resources: IP addresses and domain names.  
  Furthermore, the chapter indicates how IETF has established a de-facto regime for governing the 
Internet architecture, which became the basis for current system of the Interne administration 
conducted by ICANN. The chapter then indicates that the IETF embodies the Internet epistemic 
community according to this study's conceptualization of such community. 
 I. Complexity of governing the Internet 
   The Internet can be defined as "heterogeneous collection of interconnected systems that can be 
used for communication of many different types between any interested parties connected to it… 
[It] is a truly global network, reaching into just about every country in the world" (Alvestrand 2004, 
1). Thus, the Internet is characterized by a decentralized structure that consists of worldwide 
independent networks that are interconnected. This decentralized structure seems to challenge any 
system of governance especially with the existence of different jurisdictions across the world. The 
borderless cyberspace of the Internet overcome geographical barriers and circumvents states' 
boundaries. This unique structure raises questions about governability of the Internet and the 
possibility of regulating such dispersed networks. 
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   The Internet seems to be an anarchical space where control is impossible. It is the "space of no 
control" (Lessig 2006, 31) and the "modern Hydra" that is able to challenge regulation (Froomkin 
1999). Attempts to control the Internet content seems to be unfeasible due to its global nature that 
lead to different, or even conflicting, jurisdictions of regulation (Andrews 1999). The jurisdiction of 
regulation of public authorities falls within the geographical boundaries of each state, but the 
borderless nature of the Internet defies the geographical underpinnings of states (Holitscher
 
1999, 
115-116). The disparity between the Internet as a global network and regulation as a national 
responsibility undermines several endeavors for regulation (Froomkin 1997). 
   Moreover, the technological characteristics of the Internet add another barrier to regulation since 
there is no central channel for communication over the Internet. The messages routed over the 
Internet are divided into packets, which are subsequently distributed through several independent 
networks and may follow different routes from sources to destination (Cerf and Kahn 1974, 637). 
    However, the question of whether the Internet is governable could not be addressed properly 
without an elaborate investigation about what the Internet is and how it operates. Therefore, the 
following paragraphs seek to conceptualize the Internet with a view to identify the elements that 
allows functionality of the Internet over its decentralized structure. 
II. Conceptualizing the Internet and the Internet epistemic community 
   Seeking to understand structural media regulation, Yochai Benkler  has formulated a conceptual 
framework for the communications system, which break up such system into three levels: the 
physical infrastructure layer (wires, cable, radio frequency spectrum), the logical infrastructure – or 
the 'code' - layer (software), and the content layer (Benkler 2000, 561-562). Lessig has subsequently 
applied Benkler's conceptualization of communication systems on the Internet, where he employed 
the three-layer framework in order to analyze the Internet (Lessig 2002).  
  In a recent study, Domanski (2013) developed Benkler's and Lessig's framework through 
modifying the 'code' layer to create a new distinction. He divides the 'code' layer into two distinct 
layers: the 'technical protocols' and the 'software applications'. While the protocols are the standard 
common language that enables digital communication among the networks comprising the Internet, 
the software applications layer is the tool used to develop the software needed to create the 
applications that the end-user encounters. This distinction is useful since it helps differentiate 
between the actors who create technical protocols and those who create private, proprietary web 
applications. Thus, instead of Benkler and Lessig's three-layer framework, Domanski (2013, 13) 
categorizes the Internet into four layers: the physical infrastructure, the technical protocols, the 
software applications, and the content.  
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   Using Domanski's conceptual model, this study seeks to identify the most relevant components to 
the basic operation of the Internet, i.e., the elements that allow the functioning of the Internet over its 
decentralized structure. We call those components the architectural components of the Internet. 
    Examining the four layers of the Internet, this study argues that the 'technical protocols' layer is 
the architectural layer that is responsible for the operation of Internet as well as determining its 
structure. The protocols are the common language that enables communications to occur among the 
independent networks that comprise the Internet; they ensure the very functioning of the Internet. 
Without those protocols, the networks comprising the Internet can not communicate with each 
other. As will be further demonstrated in Chapter 4, the design of such protocols – namely TCP/IP - 
dictates the structure of the Internet. In other words, the current decentralized structure of the 
Internet lies in the very design of the protocols. This stems from the fact that TCP/IP has been 
created to allow interconnection among networks that use different modes of transmission. This 
means that TCP/IP makes it possible for any independent network, with any mode of transmission, 
to be connected to the Internet, which resulted in a proliferation of the networks connected to the 
Internet. This eventually led to the decentralized structure of the Internet. Any change of the 
protocols' design could have led to a dramatically different network than the current Internet. 
Therefore, the protocols represent the underpinnings of the Internet. It follows that the actors that 
'govern' the protocols layer have undeniable influence over the Internet's operation. 
   On the other hand, the infrastructure layer is the physical means (wires, cable, radio frequency 
spectrum) used to transmit data among the networks comprising the Internet. While this layer is key 
for data transmission over the Internet, it does not have any impact on the Internet's characteristics 
nor structure. For instance, the same infrastructure is used to transmit data for both telephone 
networks, with their centralized structure controlled by telephone companies, as well as for the 
decentralized networks of the Internet. The infrastructure has nothing to do with the network's 
operation or functions; it is just a means for data transmission. Thus, the infrastructure is not an 
architectural component of the Internet.  
   Furthermore, the other two layers, software applications and content, are the outcomes of the 
protocols' design. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 4, the protocols are designed in a way that 
allows functions (such as creating applications and adding content) to be done at end-points of the 
network (i.e. at the computers or devices connected to the network). If the protocols are designed in 
a different way, those two layers would not have even existed. To clarify this point, the comparison 
between telephone networks and the Internet is illustrative. Telephone networks are designed on the 
basis that all the network's functions are performed by the network itself - which are centrally 
controlled by telephone companies - not at the end-points. The end-user can not create a program or 
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add content to a telephone network; the telephone companies centrally perform all those functions. 
On the contrary, the Internet design - which is dictated by the protocols - allows end-users to do 
those functions at the end-points, while the network itself stays neutral and performs no functions. 
This is why end-users can create programs and add content freely at the end-points of the Internet's 
networks. Thus, the software applications and the content layers do not affect how the Internet 
operates and functions; they are instead the outcomes of the very design of the protocol layer. 
Therefore, the two layers can not be considered architectural components of the Internet. 
   This indicates that the protocols layer is the architectural layer of the Internet that determines how 
it operates. However, this does not mean that we presume any kind of hierarchy among the four 
layers. Our aim is to identify the essential foundations of the Internet, which if changed, the whole 
Internet structure and operation would have been dramatically affected. 
   While the protocols are the standard language that enables communications to occur among the 
networks of the Internet, they are also responsible for identifying the location, or address, of each 
host connected to the Internet. This task of addressing is a requirement for the proper functioning of 
the Internet since it guarantees that the information routed over the Internet is delivered to the right 
destination. Since the protocols use the machine language, there was a need for a complementary 
human-friendly system to perform the task of addressing; this system is known as the DNS. 
Therefore, the DNS is an additional architectural component, along with TCP/IP, which guarantees 
the functionality and operation of the Internet.    Accordingly, the architecture of the Internet that 
guarantees its operation consists of the TCP/IP and the DNS.  
   As demonstrated in chapter 2, the epistemic community, which emerged at the early stages of the 
Internet history, has been the real actor that set up and developed the core architecture of the Internet 
since ARPANET. Such community, which we call the Internet epistemic community, represents 
the individuals who work voluntarily to maintain and upgrade the Internet architecture with the goal 
of preserving the smooth functionality and operation of the Internet. Those individuals have 
acquired the technical expertise and knowledge necessary to undertake such task. The main 
distinction between the Internet epistemic community and other technical communities associated 
with the remaining three layers of the Internet (infrastructure, software applications and content) is 
the exclusive focus of the former on architectural issues of the Internet and the non-profit interest of 
preserving its functionality. On the other hand, other technical communities associated with 
Internet-related technologies of infrastructure, software applications and content are mainly 
industry-based and business-oriented consortiums. While those consortiums have an interest in the 
smooth functionality of the Internet for the sake of their businesses, they are not involved in the core 
architectural work of the Internet.   
35 
 
   As we have identified TCP/IP and DNS as the components that comprise the Internet architecture, 
the following paragraphs provides brief presentation on how those components contribute to the 
functionality of the Internet, which summarizes a more elaborate account presented in Annex II.     
III. How does the Internet operate? 
1. Transmission Communication Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
   As mentioned in chapter 2, the growing number of independent networks connected to the 
predecessor of the Internet, ARPANET, brought about the need to develop a standard routing 
protocol to serve as a gateway between networks to send and receive data. In 1983, ARPANET and 
all the networks linked to it, adopted TCP/IP as the standard networking protocols, which were 
developed in the 1970s by the Internet pioneers and IETF's leaders, Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn. 
From then on, ARPANET and all affiliated networks that use TCP/IP became to be collectively 
known as the Internet. Therefore, the Internet protocols
9
, TCP/IP, are the standardized 
communication language of the Internet that enables interconnectivity among different networks.  
   TCP/IP consists of two layers. The first layer, TCP, disbands a message (of the sender's computer) 
into small packets, which are subsequently transmitted over the Internet, and then received by a 
TCP layer (of the recipient's computer) that reassembles those packets into the original message. 
The second layer, IP, is responsible for routing those packets into the right destination - where they 
reassembled by TCP into the original message - through using IP address to route the data packets 
into the intended destination. 
   Since each host connected to the Internet is assigned unique IP address, the number of IP 
addresses determines to which extent the Internet can grow. Without an IP address, the existence 
over the Internet system is impossible. With their function as identifiers for each host connected to 
the Internet, IP addresses represent critical resource of the Internet. Significantly, the unanticipated, 
exponential growth of the Internet resulted in depletion of IP addresses, which means that new 
devices could not connect to the Internet due to such limitation of the addressing space. 
Interestingly, IETF has designed a new version of IP, called IPV6, in order to compensate for the 
rapidly diminishing of addressing space, early before the actual exhaustion of IP addresses. 
      It is clear that the engineers of IETF have played the main role in designing, maintaining, and 
upgrading the Internet protocols including expanding IP addresses space. In addition, IETF has 
established a system for administration of IP addresses allocation to the end-users, and assumed the 
                                                 
9
 Internet protocol is sometimes used to describe the standardized Internet networking protocols that consist of two 
elements, Transmission Communication Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). This study uses the plural format, 
Internet protocols, to refer to these two elements in order to avoid confusing them with Internet protocol as only one 
element.   
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responsibility of managing such system until the creation of ICANN in 1999. The guidelines for 
management of IP address space have been formulated in a series of IETF's technical documents
10
.  
    In this context, IETF has created what is known as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA), whose main task is the allocation of IP addresses in accordance with the prescribed 
guidelines. IANA is a "role, not an organization", for managing the top of IP addresses hierarchy 
(Housley et al. 2013, 4). Such system of IP addresses allocation is based on delegating responsibility 
to regional sub-administrators, called Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which have to satisfy 
specific criteria set by IETF. In 1999, administration of IANA was delegated to the newly created 
ICANN. Significantly, ICANN's policy regarding IP addresses allocation is based on the same 
system that has been initially established and administered by IETF.  
   Whereas IP addresses are the 'numerical' identifiers of each host connected to the Internet, domain 
names are the corresponding 'alphanumeric' identifiers. DNS combines both identifiers in order to 
achieve its role as 'naming' and 'addressing' system for the Internet as illustrated below.  
2. Domain Name System (DNS) 
    Since it is difficult to remember IP addresses, it was necessary to develop a more human-friendly 
readable format to facilitate communications among hosts connected to the Internet. The idea has 
emerged to register host names that correspond to IP addresses; so that each host can be located by 
its name through a 'name resolution' process, which converts such name into the corresponding IP 
address. IETF members wrote several RFCs aiming to establish an effective system for such 
process. Those efforts resulted in outlining the DNS, which had been elaborated in a group of RFCs 
documents
11
. 
   DNS is a distributed database that contains IP addresses and the corresponding host names. The 
database is distributed since one database containing all host names on the Internet can not be 
efficient. Instead of maintaining all host names and IP addresses in a single overloaded database, 
DNS divides the job across the Internet. In other words, instead of having a single 'name server'
12
 
containing one database of all host names and IP addresses, DNS distributes the task over many 
name servers where each of them has its own database that contains specific category of host names 
and their corresponding IP addresses.  In order to do this, categorization of host names had been 
required. IETF has conceptualized such categorization through classification of the Internet host 
                                                 
10 RFC 1466 (Gerich 1993), RFC 2050 (Hubbard et al. 1996), and RFC 7020 (Housley et al. 2013). 
11 RFC 882 (Mockapetris, 1983a), RFC 883 (Mockapetris, 1983b), RFCs 1034 (Mockapetris, 1987a), and RFCs 1035 
(Mockapetris, 1987b). 
12 'Name servers' refer to computers that implement the resolution (converting the names into their corresponding IP 
addresses). 
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names into categories called 'domains'
13
. Such classification follows a hierarchical structure where 
'Top-Level Domains' (such as .com, .org, .eg) are at top of the hierarchy. Such hierarchical 
subdivision is known as 'domain name space'. 
   The domains serve the purpose of dividing the labor regarding management of the 
Internet name space. They enable delegation of tasks to sub-administrators. IANA assumes 
responsibility of coordinating the delegation scheme for DNS management, along with its 
above-mentioned role in allocation of IP addresses. Performing such role, it is responsible 
for management of the DNS 'root zone'14 through assigning (selecting) the operators of 
Top-level Domains. Significantly, IETF – during its administration of IANA - has 
established the DNS structure as well as delegation system of domain names
15
, which 
continues to be the basis for the current system administered by ICANN. 
  Interestingly, the domain names management is based on the same principle of IP 
addresses allocation: the division of labor and delegation of responsibilities.  The delegation 
of Top-Level Domains' management to sub-administrators is similar to the delegation of 
subsequent IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  It is clear that delegation of 
responsibilities and division of labor is a distinguishing characteristic of the Internet 
ecosystem, where IANA is the single authority responsible of formulating the relevant 
policies. Apparently, the driver behind such principle of 'tasks delegation' is to achieve 
efficiency and resilience in the administration of the whole Internet system. Thus, technical 
and administrative efficiency is the value that characterizes IETF's decisions as to the 
design and administration of the Internet architecture.    
   Importantly, it is clear that domain names are another critical resource of the Internet along with 
IP addresses. Both domain names and IP addresses are the building blocks that compose the Internet 
architecture. They are the unique identifiers of each host connected to the Internet.  In other words, 
they are manifestation of existence over the Internet.  
   DNS operates through combination of those unique identifiers in the name space, which lists all 
hosts connected to the Internet. For a computer to exist on the Internet, it must be registered in the 
name space. Without such registration (without a domain name and corresponding IP address), a 
host cannot be found on the Internet. Elimination of a computer from the name space represents an 
expulsion from the Internet, since this computer disappears from the listing of addressable hosts 
(Klein 2002, 194-195). 
                                                 
13 RFC 920 (Postel and Reynolds 1984, 1). 
14 The root refers to the location of the authoritative servers for the DNS Top-Level Domains. 
15 RFC 1591 (Postel 1994). 
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   IETF claims that the domain name space must be unique and must be administered by a single 
entity. Only one name space includes the definitive listing of all hosts on the Internet should exist.  
While copies are permitted to coexist, independent name spaces are not allowed since they could 
end up having different contents. With the existence of several independent name spaces, a given 
domain name could be translated into different IP addresses based on which name space is used, 
which could make the communication unreliable. This accordingly requires a global unique 'root', 
which should be supported by a set of 'root servers' administered by a single authority (Internet 
Architecture Board 2000, 1-2). 
  The unique requirement of the name space indicates that the DNS is in fact a centralized system. 
The single unique root of the DNS is the central point within the system that rests at the top of the 
name space hierarchy. Thus, while the Internet structure is extremely decentralized, its addressing 
system, DNS, is centralized.   
   While the requirement of a unique DNS name space and a single authority to administer the 
system is a technical necessity, it is also a political arrangement for governing the system. The 
requirement that one entity should govern the system is inherently a political constraint. Moreover, 
the governance of the system can be exercised through the unique DNS name space, which 
determines who exists and who does not exist on the Internet. The control flows down the hierarchy 
from the root into the remaining elements of the name space. Here, the technical design defines the 
political parameters of the system. 
    In this regard, Klein (2002, 196-197)
 
argues that DNS is an effective instrument for governing the 
Internet and the point through which the Internet can be controlled. He concludes that the entity that 
controls the database of the name space controls the Internet. While we agree with Klein's argument 
that DNS is an effective instrument of governance, we argue that such governance is currently 
limited to the technical administration system of the Internet. The DNS neither regulate nor enforce 
policies regarding the Internet layers of infrastructure, software applications, and the content. 
However, this does not undermine the critical indirect role of the DNS in affecting these layers as it 
relates to the core operation of the Internet, which could affect all activities performed over the 
network.  
IV. Conclusion 
   The functionality of the Internet depends on two architectural components for communications 
and addressing: TCP/IP and DNS. The two components give the Internet its global status since the 
TCP/IP is the common global language that enables communications to occur among independent 
networks worldwide, and the DNS is the global system of addressing.  Any device connected to the 
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Internet must use TCP/IP and must be registered in the DNS name space. Without those elements, 
there is no global Internet. Furthermore, TCP/IP and DNS provides the two critical resources of the 
Internet: IP addresses and domain names. The expansion and growth of the Internet depends on the 
availability of IP addresses, which subsequently determines the extent to which the name space can 
be expanded over the global network. Operationally, DNS combines those two critical resources of 
the Internet. The uniqueness requirement of the domain name space and its policy authority makes 
the DNS an effective instrument to enforce policies related the Internet overall administration.  
   The technical efficiency has been the driver behind the design of both TCP/IP and DNS. TCP/IP 
has been developed in order to allow communications among networks that employ different modes 
of transmission. TCP/IP design ensured that any independent network can connect to the Internet, 
which resulted in a global and extremely decentralized structure. The DNS has been designed to 
facilitate the process of 'name resolution', which had been bottlenecked due to the rapid growth of 
the Internet. The domains have been created to enable division of labor in the domain name 
management. The delegation of IP addresses allocation as well as Top-Level Domains' 
management to sub-administrators has been envisaged to achieve efficiency and resilience in the 
day-to-day administration of the Internet system.  
   On the other hand, the technical design of TCP/IP and DNS dictates the governance structure and 
defines the political parameters of the Internet system. While the design of TCP/IP is permissive to 
the current decentralized structure of the Internet, the uniqueness of the name space and its 
regulating authority makes DNS a centralized system that can be used as a mechanism of 
governance. Thus, TCP/IP and DNS are not only technical systems, but also political arrangements.  
   It follows that the technical parameters can define the framework of governance and can 
determine the policy options in technology-based regimes such as the Internet.  Therefore, in order 
to understand the governance of a technology-based regime, a careful examination of the technical 
design and technological characteristics is needed.  In addition, this highlights the significance of the 
technical knowhow and knowledge, and to which extent it could shape governance structures and 
determine the range of possible policy options. 
   Since the United States' government provided an extensive operational autonomy for the 
community of researchers and engineers who have developed the Internet architectural components,   
it is necessary to examine the role of the latter in order to clarify whether their knowledge has an 
impact on the current governance structure of the Internet. As indicated above, IETF has the 
technical expertise and knowledge that significantly contributed in designing and maintaining the 
Internet architecture. IETF has designed and developed the two architectural components that 
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guarantee the smooth functionality of the Internet, TCP/IP and DNS. The Internet resources, IP 
addresses and domain names, have been created and expanded by the mere design of IETF. 
Moreover, IETF continues providing technical solutions for the problems that might counter the 
Internet growth as has been proved by upgrading TCP/IP to overcome the problem of IP addresses' 
exhaustion. Without this solution, the expansion of the Internet was impossible. IETF remains the 
principal body responsible for maintaining the Internet architecture and addressing the relevant 
issues of the Internet operation.  
   Furthermore, IETF has established the administration systems related to the Internet architecture; 
particularly, IP addresses allocation and domain names management that are called IANA 
functions. IETF has administered IANA throughout the Internet history until the establishment of 
ICANN. Doing so, it has formulated the fundamentals of the policy system of IP addresses 
allocation as well as the delegation scheme for sub-administrators of the domain names, which is 
the basis of the current policies of ICANN. Even with the creation of ICANN, IETF still play a 
significant role in maintaining the Internet ecosystem. In summary, IETF has established a de-facto 
regime for governing the Internet architecture, which is the basis for the current system of the 
Internet administration. Considering the parameters of the Internet epistemic community as 
indicated above, IETF embodies such community. Therefore, the following Chapter will further 
examine IETF and how it has evolved from a mere technical forum addressing architectural issues 
of the Internet into a transnational influential non-state actor and key player in the Internet 
governance dynamics. 
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Chapter 4 
The Internet epistemic community: The power of knowledge     
   This chapter aims at further clarifying the role of the Internet epistemic community on shaping the 
overall Internet system and its governance principles with a view to indicate the extent to which 
knowledge can be an instrument employed to impose specific values on the Internet architecture 
regime. The chapter indicates how the technical principles of such community have evolved into 
political values that shape the governance system of the Internet administration and thereby 
affecting discourse of the Internet governance. In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter 
examines IETF and its host organization, ISOC, which are the institutions that embody the Internet 
epistemic community.   
   The chapter examines four aspects of IETF: institutional structure, principles and values, 
policymaking model, and its capability to challenge governments through its de-facto authority over 
the Internet architecture. In this regard, the chapter firstly indicates how IETF represent an informal 
transnational community that shares common goals rather than being a formal international 
organization with a structured membership. Secondly, it demonstrates the architectural principles of 
the Internet design pointing out how they determine the parameters of the whole Internet system 
including its decentralized structure and its underlying characteristics that resist control and 
censorship. Moreover, it shows how these architectural principles reflect the values of the Internet 
epistemic community about how the Internet ought to be and how it should operate. Thirdly, the 
chapter presents the IETF's policymaking model (i.e. the process through which the Internet 
standards are formulated) with a view to demonstrate the political values of the Internet epistemic 
community, which apparently favor self-regulation and bottom-up governance. It provides an 
account for dominance of IETF over the formal official standards-setting institutions, particularly 
the International Standardization Organization (ISO), through comparative analysis between 
policymaking models of both institutions. This comparison reveals the extent to which political 
values of the Internet epistemic community are embedded in the current system of the Internet 
administration. The historical rivalry that took place between IETF and ISO over setting the Internet 
standards relatively exemplifies the ongoing international debate about whether the governance of 
the Internet should be based on self-regulation or enforced through intergovernmental organization. 
Fourthly, the chapter demonstrates how IETF is capable to challenge national governments through 
the design of Internet standards.   
   The chapter then moves to examine ISOC, which has been established by the Internet epistemic 
community to mobilize support for IETF's activities and to promote the community's principles and 
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values. The chapter demonstrates how ISOC has transformed the technical concepts of IETF, which 
aimed initially to achieve optimal technical efficiency, into set of policy objectives that promote 
self-regulatory governance and non-governmental control over the administration and content of the 
Internet. It indicates that whereas IETF seeks to maintain the community's values through the 
architectural design of the Internet, ISOC promotes them within policy and public circles through its 
broad outreach to governmental and non-governmental entities across the world. 
I. IETF: The technical knowledge shapes the overall Internet system 
1. The institutional structure of IETF: Unique form of international organization   
   IETF is mainly concerned with setting and maintaining the basic technical standards of the 
Internet protocols, which enable digital communications among the networks of the Internet. It is 
not the only technical forum related to the Internet with other entities setting standards for 
transmission hardware, software applications, etc. (Internet Engineering Task Force 2014a). Within 
Domanski's four-layer conceptual model of the Internet presented in Chapter 3, IETF is the 
dominant standards-setting organization of the 'technical protocols' layer. 
   IETF is an open international technical community of network designers, operators, researchers, 
vendors interested in the evolution of the Internet architecture and smooth operation of the Internet 
(Internet Engineering Task Force 2014b). Most participants of IETF are engineers with knowledge 
of networking protocols and software as well as networking hardware, who work together to 
improve technology of the Internet. IETF depends on voluntary participation; it has no formal 
membership and no membership fee, and is completely open to any interested individual (Internet 
Engineering Task Force 2014a). Although IETF members come from different backgrounds 
(academia, hardware industry, software industry…etc.), they share common interest in developing 
the core Internet architecture.  
   The individual-based structure of IETF and its open voluntary participation represent a distinctive 
institutional system and unique form of international organization.  IETF makes this clear 
throughout its technical documents: 
“Individuals who participate in the process are the fundamental unit of the IETF 
organization and the IETF's work. The IETF has found that the process works best 
when focused around people, rather than around organizations, companies, 
governments or interest groups.  That is not to say that these other entities are 
uninteresting - but they are not what constitutes the IETF” (Alvestrand 2004, 1)  
"There is no formal membership in the IETF.  Participation is open to all…. 
Participation is by individual technical contributors, rather than by formal 
representatives of organizations" (Bradner 1998, 2) 
   IETF established a dynamic, interactive and flexible working method. It conducts much of its 
work on daily basis via mailing lists, and its meetings are limited to three times per year (Internet 
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Engineering Task Force 2014b). The official products of IETF's work are technical documents 
entitled 'Request For Comments' (RFCs) and published free of charge. These documents include 
protocol standards, best current practices, and informational documents (Alvestrand 2004, 1).   
   Clearly, IETF is a transnational technical community that represents a unique form of 
international organization, which is based on open participation of any interested individual 
that has the relevant technical knowledge related to the Internet architecture. The very 
institutional structure of IETF reflects the Internet epistemic community's political 
preference for informal open governance structures.  
2. Values of the Internet epistemic community as reflected in the architectural principles of 
the Internet design  
   The Internet design can be traced to the principles adopted by the community of engineers and 
researchers that undertook its early development. Those principles and the resulting Internet 
architecture have been codified in a special set of IETF's RFCs documents and research papers that 
describe the Internet design. The Internet’s architectural principles reflect the political and ethical 
beliefs and embody some value judgments of the community of engineers and researchers who 
designed the Internet. Those values have been reflected in the architectural design, which is 
manifested in the voluntary Internet standards set by the dominant setting-standard body, the IETF. 
The Internet architecture reflects the willingness of such community for as much broad access and 
use, openness, and sharing of computing and communications resources as possible. This led them 
to place value on 'connectivity' favoring interconnections over restrictions on such 'connectivity' 
(National Research Council Staff, and Committee on the Internet in the Evolving Information 
Infrastructure 2001, 34).  
   IETF community explicitly indicates that they have specific values and principles, which are 
embodied in the current design of the Internet. Significantly, IETF made it clear that the current 
Internet architecture is not technologically deterministic or inevitable; rather it has been consciously 
and deliberately designed according to those values and principles. The possibility to create 
alternative Internet architecture existed, but IETF community chose to create the design that reflects 
its values and principles. In its mission statement, IETF remarkably indicates that 
"The Internet isn't value-neutral, and neither is the IETF.  We want the Internet to be 
useful for communities that share our commitment to openness and fairness. We 
embrace technical concepts such as decentralized control, edge-user empowerment and 
sharing of resources, because those concepts resonate with the core values of the IETF 
community.  These concepts have little to do with the technology that's possible, and 
much to do with the technology that we choose to create" (Alvestrand 2004, 3). 
   Those values and concepts are embodied by the design philosophy of the Internet that had been 
initially articulated in 1981 by three experts of ARPA-sponsored networking experiments, Jerome 
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Saltzer, David Reed, and David Clark. They identified what is called 'end-to-end' principle as the 
basic design principle of the Internet arguing that it had been applied for many years without explicit 
recognition. The end-to-end design principle technically means that the network function is limited 
only to interconnection and data transmission, whereas any other complex functions (such as 
authentication and processing) should be implemented at the end points - i.e., the devices that 
connect to the network (Saltzer, Jeromme, David Reed, and David Clark 1984). This end-to-end 
principle design has been emphasized in IETF's document RFC 1858, which is entitled 
"Architectural Principles of the Internet", as the fundamental principle of the Internet architectural 
design. The document offers simplified description of the end-to-end principle as follows: "The 
network's job is to transmit datagrams as efficiently and flexibly as possible. Everything else should 
be done at the fringes" (Carpenter 1996, 3).  
   The neutral 'end-to-end' design of the Internet allows innovative applications to be added at the 
end-points and to run over "stupid network". This makes the Internet fundamentally different from 
other communication networks, such as telephone networks, where the network is responsible of 
performing most of the functions and the end-points (telephones) remain "stupid". Telephone 
networks have been centrally developed and controlled by certain companies, which has limited 
what end-users can do. In contrast, the Internet 'end-to-end' design makes the network operations 
irrelevant and shifts the control to the end-user, which enables applications to be developed and run 
over the Internet without undertaking any changes within the network itself (Isenberg 1997). 
    From this 'end-to-end' design philosophy follows decentralized control, both over content of the 
network traffic and over its functionality (Russell 2006, 50). For instance, the network is not 
supposed to filter the data transmitted on the basis of their content, nor is it supposed to track them, 
alter them, or authenticate them (Mayer-Schonberger and Ziewitz. 2007, 202). The 'end-to-end' 
design principle constitute the core of the "conventional understanding of the “Internet philosophy”: 
freedom of action, user empowerment, end-user responsibility for actions undertaken, and lack of 
controls “in” the Net that limit or regulate what users can do" (Blumenthal and Clark 2001, 74). 
   Thus, the technical protocols that enable communication between independent networks of the 
Internet were deliberately designed - according to the 'end-to-end' principle - to disregard content of 
the transmission and to focus instead on efficient routing of data. This was the result of clear policy 
decision, which makes the content over the Internet proliferate so freely, to such a large degree. For 
the communication to occur through the basic Internet protocols, TCP/IP, two pieces of information 
are needed: the IP address of the device that is sending the data, and the IP address of the destination 
device. The protocol does not disclose much information about the content of the data being sent. 
Since IP addresses are virtual, TCP/IP does not reveal the identity of who is sending the data nor 
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where the data is coming from in a geographical sense.  The system has been designed to neglect 
the nature and the purpose of the data being transmitted, and to contain instead the minimum 
information required to enable the exchange of the data from one device to another (Lessig 2006, 
43-44). Thus, the principle is 'end-to-end' and the implementation instrument is TCP/IP. 
   The question arise about why the Interne architects of IETF chose to design the Internet as an 
open neutral decentralized network that provides anonymity for its users? Why they did not choose 
another design with different architectural principle other than 'end-to-end'? Did they envisage the 
impact of such design on public life? 
   As indicated in Chapter 3, the technical efficiency has been the driver of the design of both 
TCP/IP and DNS. As engineers, the Internet architects of IETF are expected to create the design 
that can achieve the highest technical engineering efficiency. Domanski (2013, 113-114) argues that 
the optimum technical efficiency is the fundamental value and prevailing ideology of IETF's 
community. This technical engineering efficiency has been the driver of the Internet protocols' 
design. Thus, TCP/IP has been designed with a view to achieve the optimal efficient routing of data. 
Nevertheless, while the design of the protocols focuses on the engineering goal of achieving 
network efficiency, it led to political, economic, and social consequences. Denardis argues that the 
Internet protocols are political. They govern the global flow of information and influence civil 
liberties online, access to knowledge, national security, national economic competitiveness, and 
innovation policy (Denardis 2009, 6).  
   The lack of additional information other than those required for efficient routing – as in the case of 
TCP/IP design - hinders potential forms of censorship and control. For instance, it will be very 
difficult, if not impossible, to impose regulatory oversight over the content of the Internet due to the 
anonymity feature of TCP/IP. Similarly, it will be more difficult for governments to determine the 
human sources responsible for online criminal behavior. Thus, the relative anonymity and openness 
available on the cyberspace is dictated by the 'code' of the Internet itself, through the architectural 
design of its protocols. If these protocols were designed and applied, conversely, to constrain that 
openness, which is a technical possibility, it would have dramatic ramifications on all of the relevant 
political issues. Therefore, the extent to which the content of the Internet can be regulated or not is 
basically determined by decisions about the design of the protocols (Domanski 2013, 93-96).  This 
reveals the extent to which the design of the protocols has shaped the entire Internet environment. 
The protocols can enable and constrain behavior on the Internet, such as enabling openness and 
anonymity and constraining centralized control and content censorship.  
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   However, during the early stages of the Internet, the Internet architects, who were mainly seeking 
to achieve the optimal technical efficiency, had not realized the political consequences of their 
design. As the Internet evolved from the realm of research into the commercial and public life, the 
impact of the architectural principles of the Internet design became evident. As elaborated below, 
those principles have evolved from being technical concepts aiming to achieve engineering 
efficiency into embraced ethical and political values associated with clear policy objectives. The 
'end-to-end' design principle has transformed into values such as openness, decentralized control, 
and anonymity. The sequence has been reversed; the values became the norm and the technical 
design is the instrument to maintain such norm.  
    Nevertheless, the environment in which the Internet was developed has reinforced the design 
values of the Internet. In its early development as research facility, the Internet was isolated from 
some of the strains and stresses associated with commercial market interactions. Today IETF is 
obliged to respond to the robust market forces. Whether the traditional design values of the Internet 
will be maintained is a significant issue regarding the Internet future (National Research Council 
Staff, and Committee on the Internet in the Evolving Information Infrastructure. 2001, 35).  
3. The process of setting Internet standards: Innovative model of policymaking 
   As indicated above, the decisions regarding how standards and protocols of the Internet are 
designed and which of them to be adopted are, in themselves, a significant form of policy that 
enable and constrain behavior on the Internet. The process of setting such standards and protocols is 
"the Internet version of a policymaking process" (Domanski 2013, 110). IETF community has 
developed an informal practical policymaking process in order to create the Internet standards. 
Examining how policies (standards) are formulated by IETF further reveals the political values of 
the Internet engineers; i.e., how they view decision-making and governance structure of the Internet.  
    IETF standardization process is referred to as 'rough consensus and running code', which 
originated from a quote by David Clark, one of the Internet pioneers, at IETF meeting in 1992: " 
We reject: kings, presidents, and voting. We believe in: rough consensus and running code" (Clark 
1992, 543). Domanski (2013, 104-107) indicates that 'rough consensus and running code' has 
constituted the guiding principle of governance over the course of Internet history, and it has been 
the de-facto approach of creating norms and standards in an environment, which historically lacks 
central regulating authority. In this context, standards are made on the basis of the collective 
engineering judgment of IETF's participants and the experience of implementing and deploying 
IETF's specifications (Alvestrand 2004, 1).  
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   According to such principle, the standardization process follows a decentralized bottom-up 
approach where any individual or group, including the newcomers, can introduce a proposal of 
standard, which will be subject to collective discussion and continuous refinement throughout 
several phases until it achieves the required consensus. Thus, there is no central authority that 
prepares standards and proposes them for adoption. This process is considered a "bureaucratic 
innovation" of the Internet engineers, along with their technical innovations (Russell 2006, 55). 
   Accordingly, the principle of 'rough consensus and running code' does not only characterize a 
technical process of standardization, but also the institutional system that governs it. It even reflects 
the open informal structure of IETF itself. In other words, the principle does not only reflect 
technical values of the Internet engineers about how standards should be set, but also their political 
values that are evident in the very political structure of IETF.   
   Therefore, the informal open decentralized governance structure and the self-regulatory bottom-up 
process of policymaking characterize the core political values of the Internet epistemic community, 
which are embodied in the open informal structure of IETF and its policymaking process. Those 
values shape this community's perspective about governance of the Internet architecture in 
particular and Internet governance in general. Remarkably, the current system of ICANN mirrors 
those values. As indicated in chapter 6, the policies related to the administration of the Internet 
architecture is formulated through a self-regulatory bottom-up process replicating that of IETF. 
    Significantly, the dominance of IETF's governance model has not been deterministic; it has 
competitively established its prevalence. Although the formal standards-setting organizations, such 
as ISO and ITU, are recognized worldwide, IETF has been the dominant standards-setting body of 
the Internet standards throughout the Internet history. IETF's dominance has been established after 
fierce competition with these rival organizations, particularly, ISO. The comparison between IETF 
and ISO regarding Internet standards does not only demonstrate competition between different 
standards, but also embodies a rivalry between two governance systems, new informal bottom-up 
decentralized system of IETF versus traditional official top-down centralized system of ISO. 
IETF versus ISO: Rivalry between two different systems of governance  
   ISO is the official organization for setting international standards with membership of 163 
countries represented by their national standards bodies (International Standardization Organization 
2015a). The institutional structure of ISO is dramatically different from that of IETF. While ISO is a 
country-based organization whose membership is limited to national authorities of the member 
countries, IETF is an individual-based organization open to all participants with no requirement of 
formal membership.  
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   ISO standards are initially developed by group of experts who subsequently submit draft standards 
to members for adoption through voting process (International Standardization Organization 2015b). 
Thus, standards are prepared by a central body (appointed group of experts), which are adopted  
through official process of voting by the member country representatives. This highly formalized 
top-down process, which stems from a centralized authority, is incongruent to the decentralized 
informal bottom-up standardization process of IETF. Moreover, while IETF process guarantees that 
standards are “the result of intense implementation discussion and testing”, ISO process puts 
forward theoretical model that is difficult to alter or to be fully implemented (Padlipsky 1985, 104).  
   Significantly, ISO introduced in 1977 the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI), a standard 
protocol for computer networking then challenging TCP/IP system of IETF. OSI was conceived as 
European alternative to TCP/IP since European Public Network Operators supported its adoption. 
Moreover, OSI concepts had permeated the work of ITU (Drake 1993, 643). Due to the strategic 
position of ISO as an official international standards-setting organization, OSI was endorsed by 
national governments around the world, including the American Department of Defense that 
historically sponsored IETF's activities. The rivalry between OSI and TCP/IP turned to a severe 
'war' between ISO and IETF. Eventually, users and corporations chose to adopt TCP/IP that proved 
to be more adaptive to the rapid changes of the Internet technology (Russell 2006, 52-56). Thus, 
IETF established its dominance as the standards-setting organization for the Internet, and TCP/IP 
has been recognized as the standard Internet protocol. 
   If OSI succeeded to prevail over TCP/IP during the 1970s, the Internet would have become much 
more different from today. The technical design of TCP/IP seeks to avoid central regulation; it 
fundamentally conceptualizes the Internet as decentralized structure that consists of similar units 
(networks), which just need common language (protocols) to communicate. On the contrary, OSI 
viewed the Internet as limited set of closed national centrally-controlled public networks, which 
need standardized external interface or "gateway translation" to enable communication among those 
closed hierarchies
 
(Drake 1993, 643-644). Furthermore, if OSI prevailed over TCP/IP, the formal 
top-down model that stems from a centralized authority would have become the mechanism for 
setting Internet standards, and the official standards-setting organizations, ISO and ITU, would have 
consequently assumed responsibility of creating Internet protocols and standards, much as they 
currently do for other areas. Thus, this does not only demonstrate efficacy of IETF's standards 
compared to those of ISO, but also effectiveness and resilience of IETF's policymaking model.  
   Adoption of TCP/IP established IETF's standardization process as the normative decision-making 
model for the Internet protocols layer. The open informal self-regulatory system became the 
dominant governance model over setting the rules of Internet architecture, while the traditional 
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official country-based governance system had been set aside. Hence, political values of the Internet 
epistemic community have constituted the governance principles of the Internet architecture.     
  While the result of the rivalry between IETF and ISO settled the competition between two 
different standards and two governance systems for the Internet protocols layer, such result seems to 
have broader implications for the Internet governance in general. When the issue of the Internet 
governance was raised two decades later as a main topic of the WSIS
16
, the issue has been relatively 
framed as there are two competing governance systems: the status quo self-regulatory bottom-up 
governance through the current ICANN's system versus traditional official governance through 
intergovernmental organization. 
4. The power of IETF as an independent non-state actor in the Internet governance dynamics 
   It is clear how technical design of the protocols affect the whole system of the Internet. The 
knowledge of IETF makes it influential behind-the-scene actor in establishing the Internet 
architecture and setting its rules. A very recent manifestation of such continuous influence has been 
demonstrated through IETF's plans to protect the Internet users from governmental intelligence 
agencies after revelations about mass Internet surveillance programs run by the American National 
Security Agency (NSA). 
   IETF is working to develop new Internet standard that integrate certain security features - by 
making the encryption mandatory - into the new version of the Internet protocol Hyper Text 
Transfer Protocol 2.0. IETF's objective is to enable encryption of the data transmitted over the 
Internet, which renders surveillance difficult or even impossible (Constantin 2013). When concerns 
were raised that companies and website operators might ignore the new standard, IETF's chair 
invoked the power of its standards affirming that they are "very widely applied" (Neagle 2013).  
   Countering Internet surveillance became one of the most important issues discussed within IETF's 
community (Internet Engineering Task Force 2013a). In its 88
th
 meeting (3-8 November 2013), 
IETF began to discuss how to put its plans into action (Internet Engineering Task Force 2013b) and 
created a working group dedicated to work on security of data transmissions over the Internet 
(Internet Engineering Task Force 2013c). This example illustrates the extent to which the power of 
IETF's knowledge enabled it to challenge authority of governments through standards regarding an 
international public policy issue, which is the encryption of the data over the Internet.  
   In conclusion, the technical knowledge of IETF community makes it de-facto influential actor in 
governance of the Internet architecture. It has deliberately designed the Internet according to 
architectural principles that aims at ensuring openness and limits control over content of the Internet.  
                                                 
16 Chapter 7 addresses WSIS in detail.   
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Such design dramatically affects the entire system of the Internet, and makes it an environment 
shaped by users rather than controlled by centralized authorities. IETF still has the de-facto power to 
affect basic features of the Internet and to manipulate its functionality through design of the 
protocols. Moreover, IETF community has established a unique form of international organization 
embodied by its open individual-based institutional structure. It has also developed an innovative 
form of policymaking, based on the community's political values that favors self-regulation and 
bottom-up governance, which eventually became a governance model for the Internet. 
  While the architectural principles and the governance model of IETF's community aimed 
initially to achieve optimal technical efficiency, they have evolved over time to become embraced 
values and ends by themselves. Over the course of Internet evolution, they have materialized into an 
'ideology' or 'belief system' about how the Internet ought to be and how it should be governed. The 
technical concepts turned into political and ethical views about the Internet, its function, and its 
governance. This evolution is embodied in establishment of ISOC, which was formed by IETF 
community to promote their principles about the Internet. ISOC represents the shift of IETF 
principles and values from the technical level into the public and policy domain. It has transformed 
the Internet epistemic community from behind-the scene actor into a remarkable key player that 
seeks to promote its own values and model of governance. While IETF is an epistemic community 
that governs the Internet architecture by the favor of its technical knowledge, ISOC is the political 
embodiment of IETF's values, as will be illustrated by the following paragraphs. 
II. ISOC: The political evolution of the Internet epistemic community  
   ISOC was established by number of individuals with long-term involvement in IETF's activities. 
The main rationale of ISOC was to provide institutional host and financial support for the process of 
creating Internet standards conducted by IETF. In 1990, it seemed that long-term support for 
standardization activities of IETF - which had been provided primarily by research-supporting 
agencies of the United States' Government - could not be sustained (Cerf 1995). There was a need 
for an institutional framework to support IETF's functions and activities on a sustainable basis. 
   In 1992, the two Internet pioneers that invented TCP/IP, Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn, formed 
ISOC as non-profit, non-governmental international organization. Although ISOC emerged out of 
IETF, it became its organizational host. Since then, IETF's documents  are copyrighted by ISOC. 
ISOC aims at promoting open development, evolution and use of the Internet. It provides leadership 
in developing Internet standards, protocols, policy, and education (Internet Society 2015a). While 
IETF is concerned with the architectural issues of the Internet from an engineering perspective, 
ISOC focuses on policy and business issues (Internet Engineering Task Force 2014a). As Annex III 
demonstrates, ISOC has established worldwide presence through 100 chapters across the world.  
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   Despite its worldwide membership, ISOC defines itself as a global cause-driven organization 
(Internet Society. 2015d), not a membership-driven organization. As indicated in Annex III, this 
distinguishes ISOC from other non-state actors including its profit-oriented members. Such global 
cause of ISOC is clearly articulated by its values and principles. Examination of these values and 
principles indicates that ISOC seeks to preserve decentralized structure of the Internet and to 
maintain its end-to-end architecture opposing any attempts to hinder some Internet users from 
utilizing the full range of Internet applications of all kinds. It supports freedom of expression over 
the Internet through private—and, where appropriate, anonymous—means of communication, and 
will resist efforts to restrict the type or content of information exchanged over the Internet. ISOC 
aims at preserving the open model of Internet connectivity and standards development opposing 
governmental and/or nongovernmental restrictions on evolution and use of the Internet technology. 
It also opposes legislations and technologies that would restrain freedom to develop and use the 
'open source' software. It considers both government regulation and economic power of incumbent 
telecommunication monopolies a barrier for growth of the Internet (Internet Society 2015e).  
   Clearly, ISOC's values and principles have originated from the values of IETF community. IETF 
values have evolved and moved from the technical level to the public and political domain through 
ISOC. The 'end-to-end' principle, decentralized structure, user-empowerment, and the bottom-up 
policymaking process have crystallized into policy goals such as openness, resistance to 
governmental control and regulation, freedom of expression, and the self-regulatory governance. 
The technical concepts that initially aimed at achieving technical efficiency have evolved into 
political and social values as well as policy goals that address public issues regarding the Internet. 
   While IETF seeks to maintain those values through the architectural design of the Internet, ISOC 
promotes them within policy and public circles through its broad outreach to governmental and non-
governmental entities across the world. ISOC, with IETF as its affiliate, has emerged as a major 
non-state actor representing the Internet epistemic community. It aims at limiting governmental 
control over the Internet, and keeping its de-facto self-regulatory governance. 
   In conclusion, examination of IETF and ISOC indicates that the Internet epistemic community, 
represented by both institutions, is an open transnational community that shares the common goal of 
resisting governmental interference in Internet affairs, and maintaining it as self-regulatory sector. 
The control of such community over the Internet architecture design enabled it to impose its ethical 
and political values on the overall Internet system and its governance principles. Moreover, such 
community has been able to promote its values in policy and decision-making circles through 
worldwide outreach strategy. 
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Chapter 5 
The United States and the Internet governance 
   It is difficult to dedicate a chapter on the United States and the Internet since all the dynamics 
demonstrated in the previous chapters took place within the United States and under patronage of its 
government. The establishment of the Internet, the emergence of its epistemic community, and 
evolution of such community's technical concepts into beliefs about the Internet governance 
occurred within the boundaries of the United States. Thus, while this chapter addresses the United 
States stance towards the Internet governance, other chapters of this study are also pertinent to the 
domestic dynamics of the country as well. 
   This chapter aims specifically at understanding the foundations of the United States' stance 
towards the Internet governance in general and the Internet administration in particular. The chapter 
seeks to account for the United States international position that opposes governmental control on 
the Internet as well as its quest to promote a self-governance model for it, and to indicate the extent 
to which the Internet epistemic community has contributed in shaping such position. 
    In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter examines the 1990s domestic dynamics through 
which the United States' preferences and interests have been identified as to the Internet. This period 
witnessed transformation of the Internet from an academic research facility into a public 
commercial medium, which triggered national debate about the Internet. This transformation has 
been accompanied by a transition from the informal ad-hoc administration of the Internet 
architecture, which had been monopolized by the Internet epistemic community, into a more formal 
and international framework that laid down the basis for a new Internet architecture regime with the 
establishment of ICANN. 
   In this context, the chapter begins with presentation of the state of affairs as to the administration 
of the Internet before establishment of ICANN in 1998. This is followed by a demonstration of the 
unsuccessful unilateral move of Internet epistemic community to form a new regime for the 
administration of the Internet, which provoked the reaction of the United States' government and 
pushed it to initiate an overriding process for forming such regime. In this connection, the chapter 
comparatively analyzes the relevant policy documents issued by both the Internet epistemic 
community and the American government regarding the new envisaged regime.  
   The chapter also indicates how the United States government identified the country's interests 
regarding the Internet, and how it promoted such interests internationally through establishing an 
international regime for electronic commerce over the Internet in order make the Internet an 
effective commercial medium.  
53 
 
   Furthermore, the chapter investigates the debate that took place over protection of civil liberties on 
the Internet, which significantly contributed in shaping the American perception of the Internet as a 
forum for published content rather than a telecommunication medium. It will further demonstrate 
the implications of such perception on the United States' policy concerning the Internet. 
I. The informal ad-hoc administration of the Internet  
   In 1992, Bill Clinton and his running mate Albert Gore won the presidential elections. One 
important aspect of Clinton's campaign strategy was Gore's project on how to transform the Internet 
into 'Information Superhighway'. Moreover, Clinton's administration was the first to deal with "a 
heavily trafficked, civilian-populated Internet" (Moschovitis 1999, 152). The Internet came under 
the attention of the high-level politicians in Washington.  
   This political interest in the Internet along with its exponential growth throughout the 1990s 
pushed the governance issues from the closed circles of the Internet epistemic community into the 
public scrutiny. At this time, administration of the Internet, which has been known as IANA 
functions, were mainly performed by the IETF through ad hoc informal arrangements with the 
American government.  
    IANA functions refer to central technical coordination of the essential operational elements that 
guarantees smooth functioning of the Internet. They include management of the global pool of IP 
addresses and their allocation, management of domain names including the DNS Root, and 
coordination of the assignment of the Internet Protocol parameters
17
. (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority 2015d). IANA is a "role, not an organization" (Housley et al. 2013, 4), as it describes a 
function more than entity (US Department of Commerce 1998b). Thus, IANA represent the 
functions related to administration of the core Internet resources: IP addresses and domain names. 
   Despite IANA functions had been performed as a government contract, it was not formally 
organized or constituted. IETF had been given considerable latitude in performing IANA functions 
(US Department of Commerce 1998b). IANA was originally performed by Jonathan Postel on 
behalf of IETF community (Cerf 1998). Despite the expansion of IANA functions that 
accompanied growth of the Internet, IETF continued to rely on Postel's work for implementing 
these functions, particularly maintaining the authoritative list of the rapidly increasing number of the 
Internet identifiers (IP addresses and domain names). However, these documentary and 
                                                 
17 The assignment of the Internet protocol parameters concerns the continuous development and modifications of the 
Internet protocols, which are performed by IETF. The role of IANA in this regard is to maintain the 'codes' and 'numbers' 
of the Internet protocols, and to coordinate with IETF to ensure that that any modifications for the Internet protocols will 
be implemented consistently in order to ensure the universal connectivity of the Internet.  
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administrative structures performed for and on behalf of IETF were not formally recognized in 
contractual language (ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee 2014, 7). 
   As indicated in chapter 4, while the United States government was sponsoring IETF activities, 
IETF was autonomously administering IANA functions. With the establishment of ISOC in 1992, 
which was initially motivated by securing financial support for IETF activities, IETF became 
officially independent from the patronage of the American government. As soon as ISOC was 
established, it formally chartered the Internet Architecture Board (IAB)
18
 of IETF with the 
responsibility of performing IANA functions (Huitema 1994, sections 2(d) and 2.4.). However, 
Jonathan Postel was still performing the administration of IANA functions on an ad-hoc basis.  
   This informal fashion of performing IANA functions began to be more formalized in 
contracts along with exponential growth and commercialization of the Internet during the 
1990s (ICANN Security and Stability Advisory Committee 2014, 9). This trend began with 
decision of the American government in 1993 to privatize the domain names registry
19
, 
INTERNIC, and registration services under cooperative agreement with private company 
Network Solutions (US National Science Foundation 1993). In 1995, the American 
government allowed Network Solutions to charge fees for assignment and registration of 
domain names (Dillon n.d.). It seems that the privatization of registration services was a 
response to the unprecedented increase in requests for domain names registration. 
   Several concerns had been raised by the Internet community due to preoccupations that 
privatization could jeopardize the domain names as public resources (Flash n.d.).  
Moreover, the monopoly of Network Solutions to domain names registration, as well as its 
registration policy
20
, was widely criticized by various stakeholders of the Internet. Since the 
contract with Network Solutions was due to expire in 1998, a debate had been initiated 
about the future of domain name registration (Mathiason 2009, 50). The technical elites of 
the Internet epistemic community, which was still assuming IANA functions, began to 
explore establishing a new regime for the administration of DNS.   
II. Endeavors of the Internet epistemic community to form new regime for DNS 
administration. 
                                                 
18 IAB is a committee that assumes the responsibility of architectural oversight of IETF activities. Since IAB is an organ of 
IETF's system, we will subsequently use 'IETF 'to cover both IETF and IAB.    
19
 Registry refers, in this context, to the entity that will provide registration services for the Internet users. 
20 Network Solution was applying a 'first come, first serve' policy for registration of domain names, whereby any domain 
name was granted to the first applicant as long as such domain had not already been registered. This policy led to many 
legal disputes between domain name holders and trademark owners. The problem arises when a trademark is used on the 
Internet as a domain name without the consent of the trademark holder, which could mislead the consumers about the 
source of the service or product offered. The trademark holders whose trademarks were registered as domain names 
without their consent litigated under the claim of intellectual property rights infringements.    
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   The board members of ISOC and then-administrator of IANA, Jonathan Postel, formed what was 
called the International Ad-Hoc Committee (IAHC) in order to develop a plan for the future 
administration of DNS (Internet Society 1996). On February 1997, IAHC issued a plan, which was 
developed under the 'rough consensus' model that had been traditionally used to formulate the 
Internet standards, with recommendations aiming at enhancing the DNS management. The 
significant component of this plan is the proposal to establish a self-regulatory framework for DNS 
policymaking, which was articulated in form of a Memorandum of Understanding, which is known 
as generic Top-Level Domain Memorandum of Understanding (gTLD-MoU). Both public and 
private sectors were invited to sign this document at the quarter of ITU (International Ad Hoc 
Committee 1996 and 1997).  
Analysis of the gTLD-MoU  
   The gTLD-MoU considers the DNS a fundamental component of the Internet's operational 
infrastructure, which should be administered in a stable, fair and equitable manner. It asserts that the 
Top-Level Domain name space is a public resource, and its administration and use should be carried 
out in the interests and service of the public. This characterization of the domain name space 
addresses the concerns raised - with privatization of registration services - about the risk of 
converting the Internet public resources (IP addresses and domain names) into tradable commercial 
private property. In this context, the gTLD-MoU identifies the problems challenging the 
administration system of the Internet that should be tackled by the proposed new regime, which 
include equitable allocation of the name resources, market supply and access to DNS registration 
services, and intellectual property concerns. 
   The gTLD-MoU presents substantive elements for the new regime of DNS administration, which 
had been envisaged to address these challenges. Firstly, it proposes creating new generic Top-Level 
Domains. This proposal reflects the Internet epistemic community view and interest of expanding 
the Internet resources. More generic Top-Level Domains leads to more growth of the Internet. 
   Secondly, it proposes practical and market-oriented approach for registration services of the 
domain names in order enable competition. In this regard, it proposes increasing the number of 
registries in order to overcome the monopoly of Network Solutions as the sole dominant registry.  
Moreover, it proposes introduction of a new type of service providers along with registries, which 
are called 'registrars', in order to diversify the players involved in registration services. Thus, the task 
of domain name registration will be divided among two categories, 'registries' and 'registrars', with 
each category assigned specific tasks. The gTLD-MoU establishes the criteria that should be the 
basis for selection of registries and registrars. Moreover, it proposes establishment of dispute 
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resolution mechanism that will be managed by WIPO in order to address the problems related to the 
infringement of intellectual property rights over the Internet. This presents a practical solution to the 
disputes that arise from the conflict between domain names and trademarks, which helps avoiding 
costly and time-consuming litigation and judicial proceedings. 
  Thirdly, the gTLD-MoU proposes a self-regulatory governance structure for formulation of the 
international policies related to the DNS management. The overarching decision-making authority 
within this framework is the Policy Oversight Committee, which is responsible for setting relevant 
policies to DNS management and monitoring their implementation. The Committee is responsible 
for enforcing the provisions of the gTLD-MoU as well as overseeing the entities that will be created 
within the new structure. The gTLD-MoU further echoes the epistemic community's approach of 
self-regulatory and bottom-up policymaking through proposing creation of subsidiary self-
regulatory entities that represent specific constituencies such as Council of Registrars (CORE), 
which is envisaged to represent recognized registrars in the relevant policy formulation processes 
and to ensure the proper implementation of the prescribed policies over its constituency. 
   Significantly, the Internet epistemic community secured itself a dominant status in the proposed 
governance structure with most members of the Policy Oversight Committee appointed by ISOC, 
IETF, and IANA. Furthermore, it provided itself with a veto power on any potential change of the 
envisaged regime through requiring that no amendments to the provisions of gTLD-MoU shall 
enter into force until it has been signed by both ISOC and IANA. Interestingly, the Internet 
epistemic community legitimized this overriding status by invoking the historical role of its 
institutions of, IANA, ISOC, and IETF, in the establishment and development of the Internet and 
administration of the DNS. 
  On the other hand, the ITU's role was limited to be depository of the gTLD-MoU without real 
substantive tasks as to the new regime. Although ITU is an intergovernmental organization, the 
gTLD-MoU does not envisage addressing any issue through its intergovernmental processes.  In 
fact, the governments are excluded altogether from the governance of the proposed self-regulatory 
regime. Apparently, the Internet epistemic community deliberately involved ITU in order to secure 
international legitimacy for the new regime, especially that no state actors are involved in the 
proposed governance system. Significantly, when the Internet governance was later discussed in the 
United Nations, the Internet epistemic community strongly criticized proposals to give 
responsibility of the Internet administration to ITU as will be further demonstrated in Chapter 7 This 
asserts that the ITU's involvement in the governance structure of the gTLD-MoU has been merely 
to provide legitimacy for the new system. 
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       In conclusion, the gTLD-MoU seeks to establish an international regime for administration of 
the DNS, whereby the Internet epistemic community will have a dominant role in the governance 
structure. The governance framework is based on self-regulation without any envisaged role for any 
state actor neither in policy formulation nor in governance arrangements. Clearly, the gTLD-MoU 
aggressively challenges the states' authority in formation of the nascent DNS regime. 
    Interestingly, the gTLD-MoU focuses only on administration of one element of the Internet 
architecture, the domain name space. It does not address administration of the remaining element of 
such architecture, IP addresses. However, there was no motivation for the Internet epistemic 
community to include administration of IP addresses in the gTLD-MoU since IANA, then- 
dominated by such community, was administering IP addresses allocation. As demonstrated below, 
the gTLD-MoU had great impact on the subsequent overriding process initiated by the American 
government to form a new regime for administration of the Internet architecture, which eventually 
led to the creation of ICANN.  
III. The United States government intervenes  
   The gTLD-MoU was signed, on May 1997, by 215 parties at ITU headquarters with the 
opposition of the United States government (Mathiason 2009, 52). The American government 
became concerned with the challenge posed by ISOC and IANA to its authority over the Internet. 
The unprecedented move of ISOC and IANA, which unilaterally created an international 
institutional framework to manage the Internet, was bold enough to raise the concerns of high-level 
governmental officials in Washington.  
   The US Secretary of State, Madeline Albright, wrote a memo condemning ITU Secretariat for 
acting "without authorization of member governments" to hold "a global meeting involving an 
unauthorized expenditure of resources and concluding with a quote international agreement 
unquote." Moreover, Other executive branches of the American government were instructed to 
investigate the issue (Mueller 1999, 502). This represented a declaration of the gTLD-MoU demise. 
   Furthermore, President Clinton issued Presidential Directive
21
 in July 1, 1997 that mandated the 
Secretary of Commerce to "support efforts to make the governance of the domain name system 
private and competitive and to create a contractually based self-regulatory regime." Remarkably, the 
Presidential Directive recognized the bottom-up approach to the Internet governance. The Directive 
puts it as follows: "the Federal Government should recognize the unique qualities of the Internet 
including its decentralized nature and its tradition of bottom-up governance" (US President 1997a).  
                                                 
21 The Directive includes Internet-related issues that go beyond DNS management, which are addressed below. 
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   Clearly, while the American government did not accept challenge of ISOC and IANA over 
authority of the Internet architecture, it explicitly recognized the Internet epistemic community's 
principles of self-regulation and bottom-up governance Thus, it decided to intervene in shaping the 
new governance framework without undermining the well-established principles of such 
community. 
   In order to formulate a concrete proposal, the American government resorted to the procedure 
used nationally when regulations are being contemplated, a period of public comment. The purpose 
of this procedure is to explore whether there is consensus about a proposed policy and to give 
opportunity for alternative proposals, if any (Mathiason 2009, 53). On July 2, 1997, the Department 
of Commerce's National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA), which 
assumes responsibility of telecommunication regulation, issued a Notice requesting public 
comments on series of enquiries about Internet governance in general and domain names in 
particular (US Department of Commerce 1997). 
   While the issuance of such Notice demonstrates that the American government affirms its 
stewardship of the DNS and the root zone file, it also indicates its willingness to delegate such 
authority in a manner that involves various stakeholders of the Internet. However, ISOC and the 
supporters of gTLD-MoU did not welcome that governmental intervention considering it an 
intrusive interference into a process that was traditionally based on self-governance of the technical 
community (Mueller 1999, 503-504).  
   IRA Magaziner, President Clinton's policy adviser, was nominated to lead the American 
government's discussions on this issue, and to prepare a proposal for administration of the Internet 
on the basis of the comments that would be received during the public period comment (Mathiason 
2009, 54). The only option available for ISOC was to be involved in the process initiated by the 
American government in order to lobby for maintaining the epistemic community's role and 
principles in the new regime. 
  Jonathan Postel attempted to influence the outcome of the process through his authority over 
IANA. The national debate that took place in this regard turned into a kind of "civil war" as several 
groups with varying interests and agendas put forward their own proposals (Moschovitis 1999, 
227).  
   The US Department of Commerce finally issued a preliminary proposal, so-called Green Paper. 
The Green Paper, as a draft policy statement, made the debate more focused. The paper 
recommends devolution of IANA functions and creation of an international non-profit entity to 
manage the Internet architecture as a whole, and to oversee the DNS management. Then, the 
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Department of Commerce submitted the Green Paper for public comments (US Department of 
Commerce 1998a).  
   After careful consideration of the comments received on Green Paper, the American government 
issued its final policy statement on June 1998 in what called the White Paper, which mandated the 
establishment of a new non-profit corporation to assume coordinating functions related to the 
Internet (US Department of Commerce 1998b), which eventually led to creation of ICANN. 
  Significantly, the coalition led by ISOC had been key player in the process, which produced the 
White Paper, through an intensive lobbying campaign that targeted Magaziner and Department of 
Commerce officials. It also pushed many of its members to submit comments in the Department of 
Commerce proceedings. These efforts resulted in convincing the American government that IANA 
of Jonathan Postel and the gTLD-MoU coalition is a proper vehicle for `private sector leadership.’ 
Interestingly, ISOC welcomed the White Paper with praise. Moreover, the major American Internet 
corporations, such as IBM, and e-commerce companies supported the White Paper due mainly to 
the personal influence of Vinton Cerf
22
, in addition to the belief that they would be privileged within 
any `private-sector-led’ regime for the Internet governance23 (Mueller 504-505). 
   On the other hand, several concerns were raised by groups of activists who criticized the decision 
of handing over the management of the Internet to a commercially oriented corporation with a 
potential "self-perpetuating board", which might undermine the democratic values, such as free 
speech and privacy, over the Internet (Miller1998). 
   The White Paper is the first policy statement of the United States government that presents its 
perspective about fundamentals of the Internet governance and the framework of its administration 
regime. It embodies a transition from an informal ad-hoc self-governing regime, which has been 
traditionally monopolized by the Internet epistemic community, to a more formal regime for 
administration of the Internet. It is the outcome of a complex process of domestic debate and two 
rounds of public comments on the relevant proposals.  
   The following paragraphs analyze the White Paper
24
 in order to shed the light on the American 
policy regarding the Internet governance. Firstly, the analysis aims firstly at clarifying the scope of 
governance envisaged by the American government in order to identify the parameters of the new 
regime targeted by the White Paper. Secondly, it seeks to investigate the impact of the Internet 
epistemic community on the United States' policy towards Internet governance and consequently on 
                                                 
22 As previously indicated, Vinton Cerf is a founding key member of the Internet epistemic community. 
23 Mueller indicates that many of the then key leaders of IETF had been employees of major American corporations, 
arguing that theses employees might have contributed in directing their corporations to support the White Paper. 
24 Since the White Paper uses the Green Paper as a reference document, the latter is  included in the analysis. 
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the newly forming regime for its administration, through exploring to which extent principles and 
views of such community has been incorporated into the White Paper. In this connection, a 
comparative analysis between the substantive elements of the White Paper vis-à-vis the 
corresponding elements of the gTLD-MoU is carried out. Thirdly, the analysis seeks to determine 
the extent to which the new regime is American-centric, through identifying the elements that 
favors the American hegemonic status as to the Internet. 
IV. The White Paper: Formation of a new regime for administration of the Internet 
architecture. 
   The White Paper begins with introduction of a brief background on the concept of domain names 
and the Internet Protocol numbers (IP addresses). The document cites each proposal of the Green 
Paper submitted for public comment followed by a summary of the corresponding comments 
received during the public comment period. Subsequently, the document provides responses of the 
American government to the comments received on each proposal followed by its final decision on 
the corresponding issues. The White Paper concludes with a revised policy statement and the 
American government's decision on the way forward. 
Scope of the Internet governance 
   The White Paper indicates that the scope of regulation intended by the United States' government 
is limited to the technical management of the Internet names and addresses. This is even reflected in 
the title of the document, "Statement of policy on the Management of Internet Names and 
Addresses."  The document mentions that the government policy does not seek to establish a system 
of Internet governance. Responding to some public comments that proposed additional principles 
for the new system, such as protection of human rights and free speech, the document indicates 
that:.  
"The U.S. Government policy applies only to management of Internet names and 
addresses and does not set out a system of Internet "governance." Existing human rights 
and free speech protections will not be disturbed and, therefore, need not be specifically 
included in the core principles for DNS management. In addition, this policy is not 
intended to displace other legal regimes (international law, competition law, tax law and 
principles of international taxation, intellectual property law, etc.) that may already 
apply." 
   The United States government doubts that the Internet can be governed by only one entity or even 
a series of entities. It perceives the Internet as too broad to be governed through specified structures. 
The only aspect that can be subject to governance is the technical administration of the Internet in 
order to ensure its smooth functioning. As the White Paper puts it:  
"The policy that follows does not propose a monolithic structure for Internet 
governance. We doubt that the Internet should be governed by one plan or one body or 
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even by a series of plans and bodies. Rather, we seek a stable process to address the 
narrow issues of management and administration of Internet names and numbers on an 
ongoing basis." 
   Clearly, the objective of the American government is to establish a regime for administration of 
the Internet architecture. The target is the management of the core Internet resources: IP addresses 
and domain names. Other issue-areas related to the Internet are excluded from the scope of 
governance targeted by the White Paper. It follows that the Internet governance is not limited to a 
sole regime; rather, it can include many crosscutting regimes. One of those regimes is the technical 
administration of the Internet, which is the subject of the White Paper.  
   Moreover, some of other potential regimes for regulating behavior on the Internet would overlap 
with the existing regimes that address the same issue-area. For instance, a potential regime for 
protection of human rights on the Internet would overlap with the existing international human 
rights regime. This raises questions about whether there is a need for human rights regime tailored 
specifically for the Internet, and how it could be reconciled with the existing regime. If not, how 
existing regimes can regulate the behavior on a cross-jurisdictional medium. This example is 
applicable to other issue-areas such as electronic commerce, competition, intellectual property, 
cyber-security, and prevention of criminal activities online etc. Therefore, the international 
cooperation as to the Internet can vary depending on which issue-area will be subject to such 
cooperation. In other words, the configuration of actors and channels of cooperation can vary from 
an issue-area to another. For instance, an international regime for prevention of criminal activities 
over the Internet might be formed through intergovernmental channels where the state actors are 
the key players, as opposed to other regimes that might be formed and administered by non-state 
actors or by both state and non-state actors. This indicates the complexity of the Internet 
governance and the multiplicity of issue-areas that can be placed under such label. Therefore, it is 
useful for Internet governance studies to specify the issue-area/s that will be subject to investigation. 
   Accordingly, administration of the Internet architecture is a specific regime concerning only one 
issue-area of the Internet governance, which is management of the core Internet resources: IP 
addresses and domain names. We can call this regime as the Internet architecture regime. Since 
Internet resources determine the extent to which the Internet can expand and grow, the Internet 
architecture regime concerns also expansion of the Internet. Therefore, we can define the Internet 
architecture regime as the regime related to the overall operation, functioning, and expansion of the 
Internet. Despite the Internet architecture regime concerns only one issue-area of the Internet 
governance, it is at the core of the Internet governance. The administration of the Internet 
architecture can have great impact on all activities related to other issue-areas on the Internet. This 
renders the Internet architecture regime key to understanding the Internet governance issues.  
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The influence of the Internet epistemic community on the White Paper  
   The White Paper emphasizes the role and efforts of the Internet technical community in 
establishment and management of the Internet architecture. Particularly, it highlights the role of 
Jonathan Postel in administration of IANA functions (on behalf of IETF) as well as the role of IETF 
in developing the Internet protocols and standards. The document asserts that the role of IETF in 
development of the Internet technical parameters will be preserved affirming that the functions of 
the envisaged new corporation will not encompass such role. Thus, IETF has been formally 
recognized as the main standards-setting organization for the Internet technical parameters. 
   Likewise, the document illustrates attempts of the Internet technical community to develop DNS 
management mentioning Postel's proposal to create multiple competing Top-Level Domain 
registries in 1996, as well as formation of IAHC in order to establish a new framework for DNS 
administration. Nevertheless, the document mentions that despite support for the IAHC's proposal 
(the gTLD-MoU), the IAHC process was criticized for being dominated by the Internet engineering 
community, and for lacking input from business interests and other stakeholders of the Internet 
community. Hence, whereas the document recognizes all the efforts made by the Internet epistemic 
community, it indicates that establishing a new framework for governing the Internet architecture 
can not be monopolized by such community. 
   However, the document explicitly recognizes that those efforts put a pressure to change the then 
status quo. This recognition indicates that the bold endeavors of the Internet epistemic community, 
which is reflected in the gTLD-MoU, forced the American government to undertake the required 
changes regarding administration of the Internet architecture. The Internet epistemic community set 
the agenda for the change and forced the government to proceed in this direction.  
   Interestingly, the Green Paper did mention neither the role nor the efforts of the Internet epistemic 
community as opposed to the White Paper. The gTLD-MoU led to a tension between the American 
government and the Internet epistemic community, which seemingly discouraged the former to 
recognize the role of the latter in the Green Paper.  As the process of consultations moved forward 
with the extensive involvement of ISOC in the relevant proceedings, the relationship between the 
two parties had apparently improved, which is reflected in the recognition of the White Paper to the 
epistemic community's role in developing and administering the Internet architecture.   
    Furthermore, examination of the substantive elements of the White Paper reveals that most of the 
proposals of the gTLD-MoU have been adopted. The White Paper recognized the need for creating 
new generic Top-Level Domains, which had been always on the top agenda of the Internet 
epistemic community and one of the reasons that led to establishment of gTLD-MoU. While the 
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gTLD-MoU proposed creation of additional specific set of generic Top- Level Domains beyond the 
existing '.com', '.org' and '.net', the White Paper referred this decision to a self-regulatory process to 
be later conducted by the new corporation. Thus, the American government recognized the need to 
expand Internet resources as previously envisaged by the Internet epistemic community. Moreover, 
the epistemic community would influence this self-regulatory process due to its extensive expertise.  
   Besides, the White Paper adopts the model of registry/registrar for undertaking registration 
services of domain names with the same rationale of creating more competitive environment for 
domain names registration Therefore, the pressure of the epistemic community to end Network 
Solutions monopoly of registration services successfully led to adoption of its proposal to establish a 
new competitive model. Additionally, the White Paper mentions that a transparent process should 
be initiated by WIPO, with participation of trademark holders and other stakeholders, in order to 
establish a uniform approach to resolving disputes between trademark owners and domain name 
holders
25
. This is almost the same proposal of the gTLD-MoU, which envisaged dispute resolution 
mechanism to be managed by WIPO. 
   Significantly, the White Paper clearly recognizes that the bottom-up governance has characterized 
the evolution of the Internet and will accordingly continue to be the basis of the new forming 
regime. The document affirms that bottom-up governance is preferable to government control and 
more flexible to adapt to the rapidly changing needs of the Internet and Internet users. It even asserts 
that the nominations of the new corporation's Board of Directors should preserve the tradition of 
bottom-up governance of the Internet. As previously indicated, the principle of bottom-up 
governance through self-regulatory framework has historically characterized the decision-making 
process of setting the rules of the Internet architecture. It has also been the basis for the proposed 
governance framework of the gTLD-MoU. Therefore, the United States' government recognized 
and adopted the Internet epistemic community's well-established approach to governance of the 
Internet architecture: bottom-up governance through self-regulatory framework.  
   This approach of bottom-up and self-regulatory governance has been affirmed throughout the 
White Paper. The document mentions that the United States government preferred to issue a general 
statement of policy, rather than to define or impose a substantive regulatory regime asserting that 
this policy statement "is not a substantive rule, does not contain mandatory provisions and does not 
itself have the force and effect of law." This affirmation indicates that the substantive rules and 
policies of the new regime will be set through a bottom-up self-regulatory process.  
                                                 
25 The result of this process is demonstrated below. 
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    Likewise, self-regulatory governance has been instituted by the mere fact that the White Paper 
did not prescribe any direct action to be taken by the United States government regarding the 
substantive issues of the new regime. All the issues were left to a self-regulation process to be 
subsequently undertaken by the new corporation.  For instance, selection of registries, authorization 
of new Top-Level Domains, and even composition of the corporation’s Board were left to a self-
regulatory process. 
   Furthermore, the White Paper affirms the necessity of maintaining a unique domain name space 
as well as a single coordinating authority to administer the Internet names and numbers. It refused 
proposals to create two entities, one for administration of the domain names and the other for IP 
addresses, deciding to create only one entity to implement all the required functions. Clearly, the 
document adopts the uniqueness requirement, which has been established by the Internet epistemic 
community as a technical necessity, and has been constituted in the gTLD-MoU. This goes in line 
with our argument, presented in chapter 3, that the uniqueness requirement is not only a technical 
constraint, but also an inherently political arrangement for governing the system. The uniqueness 
requirement defined the parameters of the new governance structure as it did with its predecessor. 
   In this context, the White Paper concludes with explicit identification of four principles that should 
guide the new management system of the Internet: stability, competition, private bottom-up 
coordination, and representation. The first three principles embody the principles and agenda of the 
Internet epistemic community. Regarding the principle of 'stability', the document affirms that the 
new system must not disrupt the current operations of the Internet or causing creation of competing 
roots. Again, the uniqueness of the domain name space is one of the basic principles for the new 
system; creation of competing roots is perceived as jeopardy to the universal nature of the Internet, 
which would lead to its fragmentation. Regarding the principle of 'competition', the White Paper 
adopted all the Internet epistemic community proposals to create competitive environment as 
indicated above. The principle of 'private bottom-up coordination' embodies the principle of self-
regulation and bottom-up governance of the Internet epistemic community, but under the label of 
'private bottom-up coordination.' The governmental oversight is excluded from the new regime, 
which had been a demand of the epistemic community.  
   Regarding the principle of 'representation', the White Paper indicates that the diversity of Internet 
users and their needs should be reflected in the technical management of the Internet, and 
mechanisms should be set up to enable international input in the decision-making. This principle is 
the only one that had not been on the agenda of the Internet epistemic community, which was 
seeking to monopolize the administration of the Internet architecture. However, wider 
representation in the administration of the new regime is not harmful for the epistemic community 
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that has been capable of securing itself a significant role by the favor of its knowledge and expertise. 
Evidently, the four principles of the new forming regime reflect the views, principles, and practices 
of the Internet epistemic community.  
   Finally, examination of proposed functions of the new corporation reveals that they are identical to 
those of IANA. Responding to concerns raised by some comments about the future of the current 
arrangements within the new regime, the White Paper explicitly indicates that functional 
responsibilities of the new corporation will not expand beyond those exercised by IANA. This 
means that IETF will continue its role in creating and developing the Internet standards. 
Significantly, the White Paper emphasized that IANA staff should be involved in creation of the 
new corporation recognizing their expertise in the technical management of the Internet. Hence, the 
American government not only adopted principles and views of the epistemic community, but also 
ensured that it will have a key role in shaping and administering the new governance framework.  
   In conclusion, the analysis demonstrates that the Internet epistemic community has been a winner 
from the process initiated by the United States' government to form a new regime for administration 
of the Internet architecture. The American government has initially acted due to the pressure exerted 
by the Internet epistemic community for changing the administration system of Internet 
architecture. Moreover, it recognized the problems identified by the such community and approved 
its substantive proposals to address these problems as presented in the gTLD-MoU. Furthermore, 
the government formally adopted the Internet epistemic community's principles of bottom-up and 
self-regulatory governance. In addition, the new regime is premised on the existence of a unique 
name space and single coordinating authority as required by the epistemic community. Besides, the 
American government maintained the Internet epistemic community supremacy regarding 
development of the Internet protocols, and secured it significant role in formation and 
administration of the new regime.  
   The United States government left the critical decisions of the new regime - such as the 
nomination of the new corporations' board of directors, the number of new generic Top-Level 
Domains, and the number of registries – to a self-regulation process. It is logic that the epistemic 
community can easily influence this process through its knowledge in creation and administration of 
the Internet architecture. As will be demonstrated below, the Internet epistemic community had 
great influence on the subsequent proceedings that took place to establish the new corporation. 
  Apparently, this impact of the Internet epistemic community on the United States' policy as to the 
Internet governance stems from the success achieved by such community in developing and 
administering the Internet architecture throughout history of the Internet. While the government was 
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originally sponsoring the activities of such community, great leeway had been given to such 
community. This latitude enabled the epistemic community to develop its successful self-regulatory 
model, which eventually led to the unexpected growth of the Internet. Such success was an 
important factor in convincing the United States' government that direct governmental intervention 
in administration of the Internet architecture is not required. Moreover, the impact of the Internet 
epistemic community's views and values on the American governmental agencies have 
accumulated throughout the Internet history, especially with the continuous recruitment of such 
community's members into the government as indicated in chapter 2.  This allowed principles of 
self-regulation and bottom-up governance to be easily accepted by the American officials.  
The Internet architecture regime: US-centric international regime  
   Although the United States government recognizes the need form more international 
representation in the administration of the Internet, the process that led to the White Paper  
demonstrates that the government has been dealing with the Internet governance as a national issue. 
This drives from the fact that the Internet emerged as an American project funded and sponsored 
originally by the American government, and developed under its patronage. This perception of the 
Internet as an American product led to US-centric regime, which has subsequently been subject to 
international criticism.   
   Throughout such process, the government followed the same national procedures when a new 
national regulation or policy is to be formulated. The government published the proposed policy 
about the Internet administration in the Green Paper requesting public comments on such policy. In 
the light of the comments received, the government revised the proposed policy and issued its final 
decision in the White Paper. 
    Although the United States government allowed international inputs to feed in the process
26
, it 
did not enter into the traditional intergovernmental negotiations to form the new regime. The White 
Paper clearly indicates that the United States' government believes - as do most comments 
submitted during the public comments proceedings - that "neither national governments acting as 
sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should 
participate in management of the Internet names and addresses." It explicitly limits the policy 
authority of national governments over their own country code Top-Level Domains
27
. Therefore, 
while other governments have been excluded from the process of forming an international regime 
for the Internet administration, the United States' government was leading such process.  
                                                 
26  Mathiason (2009, 54) indicated that the comments received from national governments throughout the public 
comments proceedings accounted only for 1% of the total comments received. 
27 Examples of country code Top-Level Domain is '.eg' for Egypt and '.uk' for United Kingdom. 
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   Throughout the White Paper, the United States' government asserted its historical role and 
responsibility of the Internet administration, which justified producing US-centric regime. The 
White paper mentions that the headquarter of the new corporation will be in the United States due to 
the presence of significant domestic expertise, including IANA staff, affirming that this will 
preserve stability of the Internet. Therefore, the new corporation, which will administer a global 
sector, will be subject to the American domestic laws and regulations. 
   Moreover, the White Paper indicates that United States will continue to have policy oversight 
function during a transition period to be completed no later than September 30, 2000, with a 
commitment to eventually allow the private sector to take leadership for DNS management. Hence, 
the United States government preserved a supervisory role to ensure the stability of the new 
regime's framework. While the formation of the new regime is decided to be through a self-
regulatory process, this oversight function gives the Untied States government an ultimate authority 
over the proceedings of such process.  As will be indicated in Chapter 6, the transition period was 
extended many times, and the United States government still preserves such oversight function.  
   Another substantive example that advantages the United States is the establishment of litigation 
jurisdiction over disputed domain names. The White Paper proposes that at the time of registration 
of a domain name, the registrants should agree to submit a contested domain name to the 
jurisdiction of a court where the root server is kept, where the registry is headquartered, where the 
registry database is located, or where the registrar is domiciled. While determining the jurisdiction 
in advance is a practical solution to the borderless nature of the Internet, this solution gives 
preference to the United States' courts over those of other countries, since most of the root servers 
and registries are located within United States boundaries. 
    Clearly, since the United States government has been dealing with the Internet as a national 
regulatory issue, the outcome of the regime formation process advantaged the United States over 
other countries. As will be demonstrated in Chapter 7, the dominating position of the United States 
in the administration of the Internet architecture regime led to raising the Internet governance issues 
within the intergovernmental processes of the United Nations; particularly, the United Nations 
World Summit on Information Society.  
V. Identifying the interests: The United States commercial-oriented policy for the Internet 
   It is clear that the Internet architecture regime is very specific to the operation of the Internet; 
however, the Internet is a broad medium that provides lot of opportunities.  While the previous 
analysis sheds the light on the United States policy regarding the administration of the Internet 
architecture, there is a need to clarify how the Untied States' government identified the country's 
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interests and preference as to the Internet, which goes beyond the administration of the Internet 
architecture.  
The Internet as a global marketplace: Making the Internet a duty-free trade zone 
   Examination of the White Paper from a broader perspective than the architectural issues 
demonstrates that the Untied States adopts pro-market policy towards the Internet. This market-
oriented policy features prominently throughout the White Paper. The document recognizes that the 
Internet has evolved from US-based research vehicle to become an international medium for 
commerce, communication and education; hence, the traditional means of managing its technical 
functions need to evolve as well. 
   In this context, the White Paper identifies six reasons to change of the administration system of the 
Internet; five of them are market-related concerns. Firstly, there is a widespread discontent about the 
absence of competition in domain name registration. Secondly, there is a need for practical and less 
expensive mechanisms to resolve the increasingly frequent conflicts between trademark owners and 
domain name holders. Thirdly, several commercial interests, whose future depends on the 
successful and sustainable growth of the Internet, call for a more robust and formal management 
structure. Fourthly, the commercial value of the domain names is increasing, so the decision to add 
new Top-Level Domains can not be made on an ad hoc basis, and should instead be taken by an 
entity that is formally accountable to the Internet stakeholders. Fifthly, it became less appropriate for 
the Untied States research agencies to fund and manage the technical functions of the Internet as the 
Internet becomes commercial. The sixth reason for change, which is not market-related concern, is 
the increasing number of the Internet users outside the United States who seek participation in the 
coordination activities related to the Internet.   
  For the Untied States government, it is evident that market-related concerns overwhelm the need to 
internationalize administration of the Internet.  The change aims at establishing an effective system 
that responds to the market needs. The domain names registration needs to be more competitive, 
and the interests of trademark holders need to be preserved. A formal entity should be established to 
maintain the operational stability of the Internet in order to preserve the commercial interests on the 
Internet, as well as to manage the addition of the commercially valuable generic Top-Level 
Domains. Clearly, the American government sees the Internet as valuable commercial medium, 
which should be preserved through establishing a robust formal regime to ensure its smooth 
operation.  
   This commercial-oriented approach of the White Paper reflects the view of the United States 
regarding the Internet, which began to crystallize since the early 1990s. The United Sates' 
69 
 
government realized that the Internet could be a vehicle for boosting national economic growth as 
well as a forum that presents huge commercial opportunities for the American companies. This was 
initially reflected in the 1992 amendment of the National Science Foundation's Act to allow 
commercial activities to take place over the Internet.  
   With the exponential growth of the commercial activities over the Internet, the commercial 
significance of the Internet became more apparent for the United States' government leading to 
formulation of concrete policies in this regard.  In 1997, President Clinton approved and released a 
report entitled "A Framework for Global Electronic Commerce", which articulates his 
Administration's vision for the emerging digital marketplace. The report outlines a set of principles, 
presents a series of policies, and establishes an agenda to be pursued internationally in order to 
facilitate the growth of electronic commerce over the Internet. Examination of this Framework, as 
will be demonstrated by the following paragraphs, asserts that the United States' government views 
the Internet as a very promising commercial medium that can achieve unprecedented benefits for 
the American companies.  
   The Framework affirms that commerce on the Internet could total billions of dollars by the turn of 
the century. For this potential to be realized, it asserts that governments must respect the unique 
qualities of the Internet and its decentralized structure as well as its tradition of bottom-up 
governance. It invites governments to adopt a non-regulatory, market-oriented approach to 
electronic commerce. It affirms that the electronic commerce can flourish in a market-driven arena, 
not in an environment that operates as a regulated industry, and the governments accordingly should 
encourage industry self-regulation. 
   Hence, the Framework asserts that governmental involvement should be limited to securing a 
minimalist legal environment based on a "decentralized, contractual model of law rather than one 
based on top-down regulation." This non-regulatory market-oriented approach reflects the 
American long-standing policies of liberal free market. Simultaneously, it indicates that the United 
States' government considers the Internet as a global market that should not be regulated and instead 
should remain free and liberal.  
   Moreover, the Framework affirms that the regulatory frameworks established for traditional 
telecommunications, radio, and television is not appropriate for the Internet. This clear 
differentiation between the Internet and traditional means of telecommunications has broad 
implications on the United States' policy regarding the Internet. The Internet is not a 
telecommunication means; it is instead a unique medium with different characteristics. The 
conventional means of telecommunications are traditionally subject to national governmental 
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regulation, but the Internet is different
28
. This view constitutes the American policy and stance as to 
the Internet. 
   Then, the Framework presents clear policies that should be pursued domestically and 
internationally. The Framework urges national governments across the world to refrain from 
imposing bureaucratic procedures, new regulations, or taxes and tariffs on commercial activities that 
take place via the Internet. In this context, the Framework identifies nine areas where international 
agreements are needed in order to preserve the Internet as a non-regulatory medium. These areas are 
categorized into three main subgroups: financial issues that includes taxation and electronic 
payments; legal issues that includes Uniform Commercial Code' for electronic commerce, 
intellectual property protection, privacy and security; and market access issues that include 
telecommunications infrastructure and content. Under each issue, policies have been identified to be 
followed. 
   Examination of the provisions of each issue as presented by the Framework reaffirms that the 
United States' government perceives the Internet as a vehicle for economic growth that could be 
harnessed to boost its domestic market. Besides, the focus on international cooperation is 
emphasized throughout these provisions. Thus, contrary to its policy in forming the Internet 
architecture regime, the United States' government seeks cooperation with other governments in 
order to make the Internet a non-regulated medium for commercial activities. Unlike the Internet 
architecture that can be administered autonomously, the governmental commitment is needed to 
ensure that excessive regulations on electronic commerce will be avoided.   
   In order to operationalize the policies presented by the Framework, President Clinton issued the 
Presidential Directive of July 1, 1997 (US President 1997a). The Directive instructed heads of 
executive departments and agencies to implement the policies elaborated in the Framework. It 
directed all executive departments and agencies to promote efforts domestically and internationally 
to make the Internet an enabling environment for commerce. It directed the U.S. Trade 
Representative to work with foreign governments to secure new agreements in order to make 
electronic commerce a global marketplace. It directed the Secretary of the Treasury to work 
domestically and with foreign governments to ensure that no discriminatory taxes are imposed 
against the Internet commerce. It also directed the Secretary of Commerce to work domestically and 
internationally to support the development of a uniform commercial legal framework that facilitates 
electronic transactions worldwide. 
                                                 
28
 Chapter 7 will address the international debate that took place over whether the Internet is a 
telecommunication means.  
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   Implementing instructions of the Presidential Directive, the United States' government launched 
an international initiative to promote its electronic commerce agenda. The American government 
intensified efforts with its major economic partners in order to achieve a consensus on an agreement 
that requires all the WTO members to deal with the Internet as a "duty-free trade zone" (Kiggins 
2011, 87-143). 
   The American efforts have succeeded. In 1998, the WTO members adopted a declaration on 
global electronic commerce, which stipulates a moratorium on imposing customs duties on 
electronic commerce. The declaration states that “members will continue their current practice of 
not imposing customs duties on electronic transmission” (World Trade Organization 1998). This 
moratorium is renewed each two years by the WTO Ministerial Conference; the last renewal was 
decided by the Ninth Ministerial Conference in 2013. Besides, the WTO Conference instructed 
elaboration of a Work Program on Electronic Commerce, which is currently under discussion in the 
relevant bodies of the organization (World Trade Organization 2013).  
   Thus, the United States' government succeeded to establish an effective international regime on 
electronic commerce that makes the Internet a 'duty-free trade zone.' Unlike the Internet architecture 
regime, the electronic commerce regime has been formed and governed by state actors through an 
intergovernmental organization, the WTO. 
Protection of intellectual property rights over the Internet   
   The United States' government has realized that infringement of the intellectual property rights is 
one of the challenges posed by the Internet, which could undermine the commercial value of those 
rights. Clinton's Administration established the Working Group on Intellectual Property Rights in 
order to examine the intellectual property implications of the Internet and to make recommendations 
on any appropriate changes to the American intellectual property law and policy. In 1995, the group 
presented extensive report focusing primarily on the protection of copyright on the Internet. The 
report concluded that the spread of the digital networks connected to the Internet rendered the 
existing law and policy insufficient to protect copyright.  The report recommended amendment of 
the copyright law as well as policy in order to adapt to the new technology and to enforce stronger 
protection of copyright over the Internet (US Department of Commerce 1995).  
   Seeking to promote this agenda at the international level, the United States' government 
endeavored to establish an international legal framework for protection of copyright over the 
Internet. In 1996, the members of WIPO adopted two treaties that establish global standards for 
protection of copyright in the digital environments: WIPO Copyright Treaty and WIPO 
Performances and Phonograms Treaty, which are known together as WIPO Internet treaties.  
72 
 
(International Bureau of the World Intellectual Property Organization 2015, 2). Similar to the 
international regime of electronic commerce over the Internet, the regime of copyright protection on 
the Internet has been formed by state actors and is being managed by intergovernmental 
organization, the WIPO. 
   Subsequently, the above-mentioned Framework on Global Electronic Commerce has appraised 
the WIPO Internet treaties. The Framework considers them a step towards achieving one of its 
objectives, which is the establishment of international agreements in order to provide clear and 
effective intellectual property rights protection on the Internet and to prevent piracy and fraud. The 
Framework required more steps to be taken in that regard.  
   In line with the Framework, the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which contains stronger 
provisions than WIPO treaties, was passed into law in 1998. The law initiated debates over “U.S.-
centric approach to an international issue” (Moschovitis 1999, 194).  
   Another area of the intellectual property rights is the protection of trademarks over the Internet, 
which has been addressed by the White Paper as presented above. The WIPO-led process, which 
was initiated by the White Paper, led to adoption of Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution 
Policy (UDRP), which is currently applied by ICANN in order to resolve disputes that arise 
between trademark owners and domain name holders (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers 2014b).  WIPO assumes responsibility of administrating dispute cases under this 
UDRP through its Arbitration and Mediation Center. This provides cost- and time-efficient 
mechanism to resolve domain name disputes, without a need for court litigation. Under the UDRP, 
WIPO has processed over 30,000 cases (World Intellectual Property Organization 2015).  
   Moreover, ICANN subsequently developed mechanism, known as Trademark Clearinghouse, 
which enables trademark holders to protect their rights in advance during the DNS expansion. The 
mechanism simply functions by authenticating information submitted by the trademark holders and 
providing this information to registries and registrars in order to prevent abusive registrations of 
domains names that infringes on these trademarks (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers 2015a). 
    Evidently, the American policy regarding establishment of effective system to protect trademarks 
online - as reflected in the White Paper and the Global Framework on Electronic Commerce - has 
been carried out. Similar to protection of copyright on the Internet, the protection of trademarks has 
been promoted internationally through an intergovernmental organization, the WIPO.  
   In conclusion, the United States' government has a broader policy towards the Internet that goes 
beyond the mere administration of the Internet architecture. It views the Internet as a commercial 
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medium that can be used to expand and boost the American domestic economy. This has been even 
reflected by the government's decision to transfer the Internet's responsibility from NSF to the 
Department of Commerce, which symbolizes transformation of the Internet from a research facility 
into a public commercial medium.  
   While the administration of the Internet architecture was left to self-regulation, the Untied States' 
government exerted efforts through the relevant intergovernmental organizations, particularly the 
WTO and WIPO, in order to regulate international behavior on the Internet in a manner that protect 
its perceived economic interests. The governments and intergovernmental organizations have been 
involved in forming international regimes to make the Internet duty-free trade zone and to ensure 
legal protection for the intellectual property rights on the Internet. On the other hand, the 
governments have been excluded from the process of forming the Internet architecture regime, 
which has been mainly formed by the Internet epistemic community under procedural supervision 
of the United States' government. This reaffirms that the Internet governance is a broad concept that 
encompasses many crosscutting regimes of various issue-areas. 
VI. Constructing perception for the Internet: The Internet as a medium of published content 
   With the growth of the Internet in the 1990s, the concerns over networking security has increased. 
Theses security concerns forced the Untied States' government to seek disciplining the Internet. As a 
response to the concerns of the corporate sector as well as national security agencies, the 
government undertook a nationwide crackdown on computer hackers through a major operation 
known as Operation Sundevil (Sterling 1990, 105).  
  The arrest of several suspected hackers accused of computer fraud triggered a debate about the 
protection civil rights over the Internet. Many groups considered such crackdown by the 
government a violation to the civil liberties, which eventually led to initiation of legal cases against 
the measures taken by the government (Charles1990).  
   The debate over the governmental crackdown resulted in establishment of the Electronic Frontier 
Foundation (EFF) in 1990, as a non-profit organization that aims to protect civil rights, including 
free expression and privacy, on the Internet (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2015a).  EFF was the 
first to set a precedent by filing a lawsuit against the governmental crackdown, which eventually 
established that "it is illegal for law enforcement to access and read private electronic mail without a 
warrant" (Electronic Frontier Foundation 2015b). 
   This debate concerning protection of civil liberties over the Internet has significant implications 
for the American perception of the global network. The mere initiation of such debate revealed that 
the Internet is not perceived as a telecommunication and broadcast medium like radio or television, 
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which are subject to regulation by the government. Instead, the Internet is perceived as a forum for 
content, like the newspapers content, which is protected against governmental interference in line 
with the American civil liberties. Nevertheless, such perception was still debatable at that time due 
to the vague legal status of the Internet.  
  The perception of the Internet as a forum for content has crystallized and become clearer with the 
debate that took place over the Communications Decency Act (CDA). In 1996, the CDA, which is 
part of the larger Telecommunications Reform Act, was passed into law. The Act criminalizes 
indecent content and transmission - to people less than eighteen years of age - through the Internet 
of any message “that, in context, depicts, or describes in terms patently offensive as measured by 
contemporary standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs”. Seeking to secure the 
constitutional rights and civil liberties over the Internet, the EFF and the American Civil liberties 
Union (ACLU) and other organizations criticized the CDA. Lisa Kamm of ACLU’s criticized the 
law saying that “things which would be protected, were they published in a newspaper, or said over 
the telephone, were suddenly illegal acts [under the CDA], simply because they occurred over the 
Internet.”  The EFF and ACLU and other groups challenged the CDA and filed a lawsuit claiming 
that it is unconstitutional. Significantly, their claims were upheld by the United States' Supreme 
Court that found the law unconstitutional (Moschovitis 1999, 207 and Weber 2004, 55). 
   Therefore, the domestic debate within the United States resulted in stabilizing the perception of 
the Internet as a forum for published content that should not be subject to governmental 
interference. This perception reflects the liberal values of the American society. Such perception, 
along with the view of the Internet as deregulated free marketplace, have constituted the American 
policy and stance towards the Internet and its governance. This accounts for the American position 
internationally that resists any governmental control over the Internet, which will be further 
demonstrated in chapter 7. 
VII. Conclusion   
   The transition of the Internet from a research facility into a commercial global public network 
triggered national debate within the United States on the status of the Internet and how it should be 
governed. This led to formulation of a national policy regarding the Internet based on the relevant 
domestic dynamics that took places. Due to the hegemonic status of the Untied States on both the 
Internet administration and content, such dynamics has have great impact on the formation of the 
Internet architecture regime for administration of the Internet as well as the Internet governance as a 
whole.  Examination such dynamics does not only indicate how the United States' policy and stance 
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regarding the Internet have been constructed, but also reveal certain complexities regarding the 
Internet governance as a whole.  
  The United States domestic dynamics revealed that the Internet governance is a broad label that 
encompasses many issue-areas, which includes, but not limited to, the technical administration of 
the network. From the perspective of the international regimes, the Internet governance includes 
many crosscutting regimes of various issue-areas. The international cooperation regarding the 
Internet can take different forms depending on the issue area of such cooperation. Likewise, the 
configuration of actors that can influence formation of an international regime related to the Internet 
can vary from an issue-area to another. The Internet architecture regime, which concerns technical 
administration of the Internet and its core resources, is one issue-area that falls under the broad label 
of the Internet governance. The Internet architecture regime is at the core of the Internet governance 
since it is related to the overall operation, functioning, and expansion of the Internet, which can 
affect all the activities performed over the network.  
   The Internet architecture regime has been historically formed and administered by the Internet 
epistemic community on an informal ad-hoc basis under the patronage of the United States' 
government. When the United States' government decided unilaterally to form a more formalized 
regime, its policy has been largely affected by the Internet epistemic community's principles and 
values. The epistemic community has been the key influential actor in the formative process that led 
to establishment of the new regime, which has been embodied in creation of ICANN's, by the favor 
of its accumulated knowledge and historical experience in developing and administering the 
Internet architecture. The United States' government embraced the epistemic community's 
principles of self-regulatory bottom-up governance for the Internet administration as well as the 
opposition of governmental control over the network's resources, which successfully characterized 
the development of the Internet architecture.  
   Moreover, the United States' government has developed a conscious policy towards the Internet, 
which goes beyond the mere administration of the Internet architecture. This policy considers the 
Internet a valuable commercial medium that can be used as a vehicle to boost and enhance the 
American economy. In order to achieve this policy, the United States government launched 
international initiatives through the relevant intergovernmental organizations in order to establish 
international regimes that promote such policy. This led to establishment of international regime, 
administered by the WTO, which made the Internet a duty-free trade zone. Similarly, an 
international regime concerning the protection of intellectual property rights over the Internet has 
been established and administered by the WIPO. This substantiates our argument that the 
international cooperation regarding the Internet can take different forms with various configurations 
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of actors based on the issue-area of such cooperation. While the Internet architecture regime has 
been formed through United States' national process that was associated with extensive influence of 
the Internet epistemic community, the international regimes related to electronic commerce and 
protection of intellectual property rights have been mainly formed by state actors within the relevant 
intergovernmental organizations. Additionally, this also clarifies that self-regulatory arrangement of 
the Internet administration is a constructed preference of the United States; it is not an indicator for 
'diminishing state role.' 
   Furthermore, the national debate and the relevant domestic dynamics that took place regarding the 
legal status of the Internet led to stabilizing the American perception of the Internet as a forum for 
published content and free expression where civil liberties should be protected. The Internet content, 
like newspapers content, should not be subject to governmental interference. 
  In summary, the United States domestic dynamics resulted in transforming the de-facto ad-hoc 
informal regime for managing the Internet architecture into a formal regime for technical 
administration of the Internet. The new regime is based on principles and values of the Internet 
epistemic community, which embrace non-governmental self-regulatory bottom-up governance. 
Moreover, the Internet has been perceived nationally as a medium that should reflect and promote 
liberal values of openness and freedom of expression. It is a medium for published content where 
civil liberties should be protected from governmental interference. The non-governmental control 
and interference in both administration and content of the Internet has materialized as the preference 
of the United States regarding the Internet. As we will indicate in chapter 7, such preference shapes 
the United States international stance towards the Internet governance, which is clearly reflected in 
its position that seeks to promote the model of non-governmental self-regulation governance for the 
Internet. While the United States oppose non-governmental interference on the Internet, it has 
consciously resorted to intergovernmental organizations, as the case in the WTO and WIPO, to 
establish international regimes in order promote its commercial interests over the Internet. However, 
those international regimes aim at providing the minimum regulatory environment to keep the 
Internet a free and credible commercial medium, which does not contradict with the American 
preference of self-regulatory Internet. 
   This indicates that states, particularly Untied States, are still the main player in formation of the 
international regimes related to the Internet. The self-regulatory administration of the Internet by 
delegated non-state actors has been a preference perceived by states as the most convenient 
arrangement that ensures the network's smooth operation, which is not the case for other Internet-
related regimes such as e-commerce and intellectual property.  
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Chapter 6 
ICANN: From self-regulation to mulistakeholdeirsm  
   This chapter aims at exploring the governance framework of the new Internet architecture regime 
with a view to foresee whether it could be sustained as a model of international governance. The 
chapter analyzes the ICANN's system and its evolution since the inception of ICANN until now.   
   The chapter provides a brief demonstration of the process that took place after adoption of the 
White Paper to create ICANN indicating the role of the Internet epistemic community in this regard. 
It then examines the ICANN's bylaws in order to demonstrate how ICANN's system is functioning 
through a self-regulatory bottom-up process that replicates the IETF policymaking model. It also 
examines the role of the national governments in the new regime through investigating the role of 
ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee in the governance structure of ICANN. Moreover, 
the chapter examines the reform process that was undertaken by ICANN in its quest for acquiring 
broader international legitimacy.  
   Moreover, the chapter investigates the relationship between ICANN and the United States' 
government. In this connection, the chapter examines the contractual agreements signed between 
ICANN and the American government regarding the administration of IANA functions. 
Furthermore, the chapter foresees the future of ICANN's model in light of the United States' recent 
decision to relinquish its control over the DNS root. 
   Finally, the chapter presents a brief review of certain well-established international regimes, 
particularly 'satellite telecommunication', 'security communications' and 'labor standards', in order to 
investigate whether ICANN multi-stakeholder format is a unique model of global governance. 
I. Establishment of ICANN 
   As indicated in chapter 5, the White Paper mandated the establishment of new corporation 
envisaged to administer the Internet architecture. The White Paper requested proposals from the 
stakeholders regarding the form and structure of this corporation. There were two main proposals 
came out of two different processes. The first process, which was open discussion organized by 
what is called the Internet Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), proposed a form of trade association 
for the new corporation. The second process, which was exclusive for the technical elites led by 
Jonathan Postel, proposed a form like IETF's model (Mueller 2002, 176-177).  
   The two alternatives gave different weights to different stakeholders.  Although the White Paper 
recommended a consensus-based approach to determine the shape of the new corporation, the 
compromise between competing interests of the two alternatives was not possible. Eventually, the 
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United States government decided to accept the proposal of Postel's group (Mathiason 2009, 73). On 
October 2, 1998, Postel sent draft of the bylaws of the new corporation to the Untied States' 
Secretary of Commerce suggesting the name for the new corporation to be the Internet Corporation 
for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) (Sonbuchner 2008, 192). Clearly, the name of 
ICANN reflects its responsibility of managing the dual components of  Internet resources, IP 
addresses and domain names.  
   Postel's proposal was faced by criticism from various groups over variety of issues including the 
accountability of ICANN, the unbalanced representation of the Internet users in the ICANN's board 
of directors, the absence of civil liberties questions in the proposal. Due to this criticism, Magaziner 
and the officials from United States' Department of Commerce revised the proposal aiming to create 
greater accountability and openness through requiring ICANN to cooperate with the Department of 
Commerce. Nevertheless, the concerns remain that ICANN "is simply entrenching the preexisting 
Internet elite" (Moschovitis 1999, 229). 
   Significantly, the first CEO of ICANN was Mike Roberts, who was the first director of ISOC and 
fierce supporter for the gTLD-MoU (Mueller 1999, 499). Since its inception, ICANN was viewed 
as dominated by the technical engineering community. This reaffirms the influence of the Internet 
epistemic community on the formation of the new Internet architecture regime as well as its 
dominance over the relevant governance structure. 
II. The evolution of ICANN: Multistakeholderism as a model for global governance  
   Examination of ICANN's 1998 bylaws (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
1998) demonstrates that ICANN's policymaking process replicates IETF's model of setting Internet 
standards. ICANN's policies are developed through a bottom-up process, which is initiated and led 
by what is called Supporting Organizations and Advisory Committees. The Supporting 
Organizations are responsible for developing and recommending substantive policies and 
procedures regarding issues that fall within their individual scope. Those policies and procedures 
shall be adopted upon approval by ICANN's Board.  
   The bylaws stipulate that there shall be at least three Supporting Organizations; each of which is 
entitled to nominate three directors to the Board. Firstly, the Address Supporting Organization shall 
be composed of representatives from Regional Internet Registries. It shall establish the Address 
Council with a mandate to make relevant recommendations to the Board regarding the operation, 
management and assignment of Internet IP addresses. Notably, IETF has maintained its influential 
role in formulating policies relevant to IP addresses. As indicated in chapter 3, despite delegation of 
IANA functions to ICANN, IETF still a key player in the current system of IP addresses 
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administration. The creation of IPV6, which expanded the depleted pool of IP addresses, is a clear 
example of IETF's ongoing influence in this regard.  
   Secondly, the Domain Name Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from 
domain name registries and registrars of Top-Level Domains in addition to businesses and any other 
entities that are users of the Internet. It shall establish the Names Council with a mandate to make 
relevant recommendations regarding Top-Level Domains, including operation, assignment and 
management of DNS. Significantly, IETF still assumes the responsibility of the technical 
maintenance and development of DNS.   
   Thirdly, the Protocol Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from the 
Internet protocol organizations. The Protocol Supporting Organization shall create a Protocol 
Council to make recommendations regarding the operation, management and assignment of 
protocol parameters. Significantly, the Protocol Supporting Organization is largely influenced by 
IETF due to its dominant status in setting the Internet protocols and standards.  
   Apparently, the three supporting organizations correspond to the three major IANA functions; 
each supporting organization addresses the relevant issues related to one of these functions.  
Address Supporting Organization addresses policies related to allocation of IP addresses, and thus 
Regional Internet Registries represent the main constituency of this organization. Domain Name 
Supporting Organization addresses the issues of Top-Level Domains and domain names 
registration; therefore, registries and registrars of domain names represent the principal constituency 
of this organization. Protocol Supporting Organization addresses the issues related to the Internet 
standards and protocols; hence, IETF is the key constituency due its de-facto status as dominant 
standards-setting organization for the Internet. Evidently, the provisions of ICANN's bylaws 
regarding the Supporting Organizations provides a more formal framework for already-existing 
constituencies, such as Regional Internet Registries and IETF, as well as new constituencies that has 
been created such as new domain names registries and registrars.  
   It is clear that despite delegation of IANA functions to ICANN, the Internet epistemic community, 
represented by IETF, has maintained a significant influential role in ICANN's system by the favor 
of its knowledge of the Internet architecture. Nevertheless, ICANN's system provides for wider 
representation of other Internet stakeholders. 
   In addition to the Supporting Organizations, ICANN's bylaws created Advisory Committees 
whose role is to provide advices to the board. Significantly, one of those committees is the 
Governmental Advisory Committee. Members of such Committee shall be representatives of 
national governments, intergovernmental organizations and treaty organizations, each of which 
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could appoint one representative to the Committee. The Governmental Advisory Committee 
embodies the role of the national governments in ICANN's system. The Committee should consider 
and provide the relevant advices on ICANN's activities as they relate to governments' concerns, 
particularly regarding issues where there may be an overlap between ICANN's policies and the 
international agreements. The creation of the Governmental Advisory Committee adds national 
governments to the spectrum of the Internet stakeholders represented in ICANN's system.  
Ironically, the role of governments in this system is limited to an advisory role, since the advices of 
the Governmental Advisory Committee might be approved or rejected by the Board.  
   Clearly, the governance structure of ICANN follows a bottom-up pattern, whereby policies are 
mainly developed through the Supporting Organizations to be submitted to the Board whose 
directors represent the spectrum of the Internet stakeholders. The role of national governments is 
limited to providing advices on specific issues, which emphasize the self-regulatory nature of 
ICANN's system. Furthermore, the United States' government does not directly intervene in the 
policy formulation process of ICANN despite its oversight function over the system. Obviously, 
ICANN embodies the governance model and the principles that have been developed by the 
Internet epistemic community throughout the Internet history.  
   Nevertheless, ICANN was subject to severe criticism since its inception. It was viewed as being 
dominated by the American government, technical elites, and multinational communications 
companies (Mueller 2002). It was accused of lacking democracy and accountability (Goldsmith and 
Wu 2006, 170). ICANN has been considered as institutionalizing a tension between "private 
technical management and public communication governance" (Shtern 2009, 82). 
   Seeking to acquire broader legitimacy, ICANN conducted a review process
29
 in order to 
undertake the reform needed to enhance its legitimacy. On November 2001, ICANN established a 
committee entitled Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform
30
. Such committee was originally 
created as a response to the debate that took place during that time within the Internet community 
regarding possible changes for ICANN's structure, including possible new Supporting 
Organizations and revised or new mechanisms for selecting ICANN's board. After reviewing the 
performance of the existing structure and processes of ICANN in relation to its mission, the 
committee concluded, on February 2002, that the existing structure and processes are not sufficient 
to achieve ICANN's mission recommending considerable evolutionary reforms. After extensive 
discussion of these recommendations, the committee was instructed to recommend a reformed 
                                                 
29 Links to all the archival documents related to such review process are compiled on the following website of ICANN: 
https://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/links.htm 
30 This committee was initially entitled Committee on Restructuring 
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framework for the structure and functioning of ICANN (Internet Corporation of Assigned Names 
and Numbers 2002a). 
   On May 2002, the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform issued extensive 
recommendations for a new structure and functioning of ICANN. The committee recognized that 
ICANN has a global policy function, which should be limited to policy areas related to its technical 
functions. The committee proposed several structural changes that aim at broadening the scope of 
representation and enhancing governmental involvement without undermining the private-sector 
nature of ICANN (Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform 2002). Subsequently, new 
structure of ICANN has been approved and new bylaws has been accordingly adopted. The new 
bylaws became effective on December 2002 (Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform 2003). 
   The 2002 bylaws (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 2002b) clearly 
provided the governments a more enhanced role in the new structure of ICANN through 
strengthening the institutional status of the Governmental Advisory Committee. The Governmental 
Advisory Committee became entitled to appoint one non-voting liaison to ICANN's Board as well 
as one delegate to the ICANN's Nominating Committee. Moreover, the Governmental Advisory 
Committee can designate a non-voting liaison to each of the Supporting Organization Councils as 
well as the Advisory Committees.  
   Notably, the current ICANN bylaws further strengthened the role of the Governmental Advisory 
Committee. The advice of the shall be 'duly' taken into account, both in formulation and adoption of 
the policies. If the ICANN's Board determines to take an action that is not consistent with the advice 
of the Governmental Advisory Committee, it shall so inform the committee and cites the reasons for 
its decision to refuse that advice. In such case, the committee and the Board will then try to find a 
mutually acceptable solution through a mediation process. Moreover, The Governmental Advisory 
Committee can recommend actions, development of new policy, or revision of existing policies 
directly to the Board (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 2014a). 
    Interestingly, the Governmental Advisory Committee submits its advices to the Board based on 
consensus among its membership, where consensus is understood to mean the practice of adopting 
decisions by general agreement in the absence of any formal objection.  If consensus is not possible, 
the Chair of the committee shall convey the full spectrum of views expressed by members to 
ICANN's Board (Governmental Advisory Committee 2011). Therefore, any collective advice 
issued by the Governmental Advisory Committee will be a compromised outcome that came out of 
deliberations and negotiations among its members. Thus, if there is a wide divergence among the 
members regarding any issue, submission of advice to the Board will not be possible.  
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  Furthermore, the current ICANN bylaws have created two Supporting Organizations to replace the 
Domain Names Supporting Organization: Country Code Names Supporting Organizations and 
Generic Names Supporting Organization. Since the country code Top-Level Domains are managed 
by the respective national authorities designated by the countries' national governments, creation of 
specific Supporting Organization strengthens the governments' role in the policy development 
process regarding the country code Top-Level Domains. Clearly, strengthening the governmental 
role has been an instrument to enhance the international legitimacy of ICANN's system. 
   Moreover, the reform process of ICANN aimed at broadening the representation of the Internet 
stakeholders. The current ICANN bylaws created what is called At-Large Advisory Committee, 
which is the primary institutional host within ICANN for individual Internet users. Its role is to 
provide advice on ICANN's activities, insofar as they relate to the interests of individual Internet 
users. In addition, the bylaws created what is called Regional At-Large Organizations. Each 
Regional At-Large Organization serves as the coordination point and the main forum for public 
input to ICANN in its geographic region. According to ICANN (2015b), At-Large community 
includes more than 180 groups in 75 countries and regions. Obviously, ICANN was seeking to 
broaden the scope of representation to all the Internet stakeholders. 
   Furthermore, members of the Board are nominated by the Supporting Organizations, Advisory 
Committees, and IETF in order to achieve the most balanced representation for the Internet 
stakeholders. The following diagram presents ICANN's organizational chart
31
. 
Figure 2: ICANN organizational chart. 
 
                                                 
31 This chart is available at the following ICANN's website: https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/chart-2012-02-11-en 
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  In conclusion, ICANN embodies the epistemic community's values and principles of self-
regulation and bottom-up governance. The policymaking model of ICANN replicates that of IETF's 
process of setting the Internet standards. ICANN has sought to acquire international legitimacy 
through enhancing the institutional role of national governments within its system as well as 
enlarging the representation scope for other Internet stakeholders including organizations 
representing the Internet users. The multi-stakeholder governance of ICANN became a model for 
global governance whose legitimacy is based on the participation of all the Internet stakeholders in 
the policymaking process. Nevertheless, the relationship between ICANN and the American 
government still undermines credibility of ICANN as illustrated by the following paragraphs.  
III. The relationship between ICANN and the United States' government  
  The relationship between ICANN and the American government is reflected in the contractual 
documents signed between the two parties. ICANN had been initially established through a 
Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and the United States' Department of Commerce 
(US Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 1998). 
Examination of this Memorandum of Understanding indicates that it was envisaged to guide the 
transition of the Internet architecture administration to the private sector. Its objective is to ensure 
that the private sector, represented by ICANN, has the resources and capability to assume the 
responsibilities related to the technical management of the DNS. This assurance has to be 
guaranteed before complete transition of the DNS management to the private sector. 
    In this context, the Memorandum of Understanding requires collaboration on what is called 'DNS 
Project'. This project aims at designing and developing the mechanisms and procedures that should 
be established before transitioning the administration responsibility of DNS functions
32
 that was 
then performed by, or on behalf of, the United States' government to the private sector. Once these 
mechanisms and procedures are successfully established, the DNS functions will be completely 
transitioned to the private sector. 
   Since then, ICANN has performed the functions of IANA, which involves three interdependent 
technical coordinating functions for the Internet domain names and addressing system. These 
functions include, administration of certain responsibilities associated with the DNS root zone 
management, allocation of IP addresses, and coordination of the assignment of technical protocol 
parameters (US Department of Commerce 2006a).  
                                                 
32 Although the Memorandum of Understanding did not provide clear definition the DNS functions, they are understood to 
encompass IANA functions, in addition to any other functions related to the DNS management such as addition of new 
generic Top-Level Domains and creation of multilingual Top-Level Domains. 
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   Although the transition was envisaged in the White Paper to conclude before 2000, the process 
continued without termination until now. The United States' government did not hand over the full 
DNS functions to the private sector. Throughout this period, the contractual relationship between 
the American government and ICANN has continued to be the basis of ICANN's mandate 
regarding administration of the Internet architecture. The Memorandum of Understanding between 
the Department of Commerce and ICANN was extended many times and became to be known as 
Joint Project Agreement (JPA), whereby ICANN has been contracted to continue performing the 
DNS functions. With each extension, the United States' government followed the same procedure 
that led to formulation of the White Paper: issuance of notice of inquiry seeking public comments 
on the extension of its contract with ICANN
33
. 
   The last contract between the United States' government and ICANN was signed on September 
30, 2009, entitled "Affirmation of Commitments." The document cites the commitments of both the 
American government and ICANN regarding administration of the DNS and formulation of the 
relevant policies. Remarkably, the United States' government reaffirmed its commitment to a multi-
stakeholder, private sector led, bottom-up policy development model for the DNS management (US 
Department of Commerce and Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 2009). 
   Examination of the contractual documents,  JPA and Affirmation of Commitments, indicates that 
the transition process was guided by the same principles of the White Paper. The documents 
represent the framework that guides the policy formulation, in accordance with the White Paper's 
principles, without detailing these policies that have been actually formulated and developed 
through a bottom-up and self-regulatory process conducted by ICANN.  The role of the American 
government has been limited to be a facilitator for this process without direct intervention.   
   Nevertheless, the United States government maintained its authority over the DNS root, whereby 
any change or modification of the root requires authorization of the government.  Controlling the 
root gives the United States extensive influence over the Internet. It enables the United States' 
government to be the ultimate authority that can exercise veto power over ICANN’s decisions. For 
instance, the American government vetoed ICANN’s decision to create a new generic Top-Level 
Domain for adult websites (.xxx). The governments worldwide were concerned about the American 
veto power to approve or reject ICANN's decision of creating a new domain. The national debate 
on the issue of .xxx domain indicated that the United States’ domestic politics have greater impact 
                                                 
33 This account is based on review and examination of the documents archived by the US National Telecommunication 
and Information Agency (NTIA), which contain the proceedings conducted by the United States' government as well as its 
consecutive contractual agreements with ICANN. Theses archived documents are available at the following NTIA's 
official website: http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/docicann-agreements 
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over the DNS root's related policies than the international input. Moreover, the lack of transparency 
regarding communications between the United States' government and ICANN makes it difficult to 
determine the level of influence exerted by the former over the latter, which further contributed to 
the concerns regarding such influence (Sonbuchner 2008, 199-200). 
   With the accelerating growth and internationalization of the Internet, the governments worldwide 
became more concerned about the United States’ rejection to relinquish its authority over the root. 
The contractual relationship between ICANN and the United States' government was subject to 
increasing international criticism, which eventually pushed the Internet governance as key issue on 
the agenda of the United Nation's WSIS. Apparently, such International pressure eventually pushed 
the United States' government to announce its decision to relinquish control over the root, which 
will be addressed by the following paragraphs. 
IV. Legitimizing ICANN: Decision of the American government to relinquish control over 
the Internet 
   In a recent significant development, the United States' government declared its intention to 
relinquish control over the Internet. On March 14, 2014, the Department of Commerce's NTIA 
announced its decision to transition the DNS functions completely to the private sector The 
announcement mentions that this transition marks the final stage of the DNS privatization as 
previously outlined by the Untied States government in 1997 (US National Telecommunications 
and Information Administration 2014). 
   The announcement of NTIA identifies responsibilities of the American government in the DNS 
management, which will be transferred to the global multi-stakeholder community. Those 
responsibilities include the procedural role of administering changes to the authoritative root zone 
file
34
 and serving as the historic steward of the DNS.  The announcement mentions that the United 
States' government currently contracts with ICANN to carry out the IANA functions, and has a 
cooperative agreement with VeriSign (successor of the Network Solutions) under which the latter 
implement the functions related to the root zone management. This is a clear identification of the 
responsibilities that should be transferred to the multi-stakeholder community. Thus, the transition 
process will focus on how to replace the United States' oversight function with new arrangements.  
   Furthermore, NTIA's announcement recognizes that ICANN has matured as an organization and 
taken steps recently to improve its transparency and accountability as well as its technical 
competence. It affirms that ICANN is the appropriate entity to lead the process of transition 
                                                 
34 According to NTIA's announcement, the root zone file is the database that contains the lists of the names and addresses 
of all Top-Level Domains 
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highlighting its unique position as both the current contractor of IANA functions and the global 
coordinator of the DNS. This indicates that ICANN will be the candidate institution to host the new 
arrangements that will result from the transition process. 
   The announcement mandates ICANN to convene a global multi-stakeholder process in order to 
develop a transition plan.  It instructs ICANN to develop this plan in collaboration with the directly 
affected parties, including IETF, ISOC, Regional Internet Registries, Top-Level Domain Name 
Operators, VeriSign, and other interested global stakeholders. During the transition process, the role 
of the United States' government will remain unchanged taking into consideration that current 
IANA functions contract expires on September 30, 2015. Clearly, the Internet epistemic community 
is indispensible to the process envisaged to establish new arrangements regarding administration of 
the Internet architecture.  
  Significantly, NTIA's announcement asserts the support of the United States to the multi-
stakeholder model of the Internet governance. It affirms that the United States' government will not 
accept any proposal that replaces its role with a government-led or an intergovernmental 
organization solution. Obviously, the United States' government defines the parameters of the 
potential outcome from the transition process; the ICANN's multi-stakeholder model will continue 
as a model of the Internet administration. The traditional intergovernmental governance through 
intergovernmental organization is no option.  
   Additionally, the announcement provides the framework that should guide the transition proposal. 
It indicates that the transition proposal must enjoy broad community support and address the 
following four principles: enhance and support the multi-stakeholder model; maintain the openness 
of the Internet; maintain the stability of the DNS; and meet the needs and expectations of the 
relevant stakeholders. 
   Evidently, the American decision to relinquish its oversight function over ICANN strengthens 
legitimacy and credibility of the latter as a global governance organization. The decision generally 
addresses the international skepticism about the neutrality and transparency of ICANN. Moreover, 
it specifically addresses the concerns of the state actors that supports the self-regulatory governance 
of ICANN but are simultaneously concerned with the American hegemony over the Internet such 
as the European Union. In summary, the American decision has contributed to stabilizing its self-
regulatory and multi-stakeholder system of ICANN as a model of global governance.   
V. The Future of ICANN 
      Based on the NTIA's announcement, ICANN launched a process whereby the Internet 
stakeholders will introduce their proposals about the arrangements required for transitioning the 
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DNS functions to the multi-stakeholder community. The Stakeholders have organized two major 
tracks in order to develop the overall plan.  One track focuses on IANA stewardship transition and 
the second focuses on enhancing the ICANN's accountability to the global community of the 
Internet stakeholders in the absence of its contractual relationship with the United States 
government (US National Telecommunications and Information Administration 2015b and Internet 
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 2015c).  
   While ICANN's process has not yet finished, the above-mentioned proceedings of formulating a 
transition proposal clearly follows the same bottom-up approach employed in ICANN's model. 
Moreover, it is evident that the multi-stakeholder approach, which is based on self-regulation and 
bottom-up policymaking, will remain as a model of governing the Internet architecture. Obviously, 
ICANN will continue as the institution responsible for the administration of the Internet 
architecture. The expected outcome from the ongoing transition process may come up with a new 
arrangement but within ICANN's multi-stakeholder model. 
   In conclusion, the self-regulation and bottom-up policymaking as well as multi-stakeholder 
governance, embodied by ICANN's system are expected to continue characterizing the parameters 
of the Internet architecture regime. As will be indicated in Chapter 7, which addresses the tension 
between self-regulation versus intergovernmental governance, multi-stakeholder approach to the 
Internet governance has been legitimized by the United Nations' intergovernmental processes. 
VI. Is ICANN a unique model of global governance?  
   Moreover, review of certain well-established international regimes, particularly 'satellite 
telecommunication', and 'security communications' and 'labor standards', indicates that ICANN's is 
not the first multi-stakeholder model to be adopted as a global governance framework for an 
international regime. Without prejudice to the peculiarities of each of these regimes, they have been 
historically developed and currently managed by both states and non-state actors. 
   The regime of 'satellite communication' was formed through the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT), which was originally established as an 
intergovernmental consortium owning and managing a constellation of communications satellites. 
In 2001, the organization has been privatized and converted into a service provider company 
(Intelsat 2015). Accordingly, the management of the regime has been completely shifted to the 
private sector. 
   The regime of 'security communication' services was established through the International Mobile 
Satellite Organization (IMSO), which is an intergovernmental organization that oversees certain 
public satellite safety and security communication services. The organization has a form of public-
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private partnership contract with Inmarsat Ltd company through a Public Services Agreement, 
which sets out the obligations of Inmarsat Ltd in respect of the relevant public services, as well as 
defining the oversight mechanism that exists between Inmarsat and IMSO (International Mobile 
Satellite Organization 2015). Here, the regime is managed through a partnership between state and 
non-state actors. 
    Remarkably, both 'satellite communication' and 'security communication' systems are 
technologically based regimes. Simultaneously, they are common in delegating the operational 
management of their respective regimes to the private sector. This indicates a preference to delegate 
the management of technology-based regimes to non-state actors, which could be applicable as well 
to the Internet architecture regime.  
   Furthermore, the 'labor' regime is administered by the International Labor Organization (ILO), 
which was created in 1919. ILO, which became the first specialized agency of the United Nations in 
1946, is composed of tripartite membership that represents the three parties related to labor: 
governments, employers, employees. Those three parties, through ILO, are collectively responsible 
of setting the international labor standards as well as monitoring the compliance with those 
standards (International Labor Organization. 2015).  Clearly, the labor regime, which is one of the 
oldest international regimes, is premised, developed, and managed by both state and non-state 
actors. 
   Therefore, the multi-stakeholder model is not a unique example in global governance. There are 
well-established international regimes that are based on similar models. This indicates that ICANN's 
system is not an anomaly, and can sustain as global governance model for the Internet 
administration, where non-state actors are indispensable players. 
   Moreover, it is clear that multi-stakeholder approach to global governance, including the Internet 
administration, is a conscious preference of states, rather than an indication of a 'diminishing state 
role' in formation and administration of international regimes.  
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Chapter 7 
The International debate on Internet governance 
   This chapter aims at investigating the intergovernmental dynamics that took place on the Internet 
governance and whether the outcomes of such dynamics could lead to formation of international 
regimes related to the Internet. The chapter seeks also to indicate the extent to which such dynamics 
could affect the self-governance model of the Internet architecture regime administered by ICANN. 
Moreover, the chapter indicates how the interests and preferences of the United States, which have 
been identified domestically as indicated in chapter 5, were reflected in the intergovernmental 
negotiations conducted over Internet governance. Furthermore, it demonstrates the stance of other 
state actors, in particular the European Union, as to the Internet governance. Additionally, the 
chapter seeks to indicate how the international debate on Internet governance has evolved and how 
the relevant issues have been framed. 
   In order to achieve these objectives, the chapter examines the key international events that 
addressed the Internet governance; namely, the United Nations' WSIS, which was held on two 
phases in 2003 and 2005, and the World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT), 
which was recently held by the ITU in 2014. The chapter also provides a brief review of the 
dynamics and progress made within the two processes created by WSIS to address Internet issues; 
namely, Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and 'enhanced cooperation.'     
   WSIS is the first United Nations' summit that addressed Internet governance issues, and its 
outcome documents -which were adopted by consensus - represent the possible international 
concurrence that could be achieved in this regard. IGF and 'enhanced cooperation', which are 
created by WSIS, are the only forums that currently discuss the Internet issues within the United 
Nations' machinery. In addition, WSIS adopted a pluralistic approach that ensured a remarkable 
effective participation of non-state actors.  On the other hand, WCIT is the most recent international 
conference that addressed Internet-related issues, where the consensus on the outcome document 
was not possible due to divergent views over the Internet. Moreover, the divergence over the 
Internet throughout WCIT led certain states, particularly western states, to refrain from signing the 
outcome document.  Examination of the dynamics that led to such failure of achieving consensus 
reveals the controversial issues that continue to plague the international debate on the Internet 
governance. Moreover, WCIT is very relevant to the Internet technical administration, rather than 
Internet governance, due to its technical nature.  
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   Thus, while examination of WSIS demonstrates the scope of international consensus over the 
Internet governance, investigation of WCIT clarifies the controversial issues that have not yet 
settled. Moreover, while WSIS is a politically driven United Nation's summit, WCIT is a 
technically driven conference of a United Nations' specialized agency, the ITU. Therefore, 
examination of both WSIS and WCIT demonstrates how the Internet governance has been 
addressed politically and technically at the international level.   
    The methodology of examining WSIS follows two-tiered approach. Firstly, we analyze the 
dynamics and interactions that took place among the involved actors during the process that 
eventually resulted in the outcome documents approved by the summit. This will be achieved 
through analyzing variety of documents as well as written transcripts and online streamed audio 
recordings for each meeting held throughout the preparatory process of the two phases of the 
summit. This analysis demonstrates various stances of the main actors and the rationale provided in 
defending their positions. It also reveals how the international debate on the Internet governance has 
evolved within an interactive process of negotiations that took place on the outcome documents. 
Secondly, we analyze the outcome documents approved by the two phases of WSIS with a view to 
indicate the level of the collective agreements reached among the relevant actors, which will guide 
the future international debate on the Internet governance.  
   The same methodology of examining WSIS is applied to examination of WCIT, but with a 
reversed order. Firstly, we analyze the outcome documents of WCIT in order to identify the 
Internet-related issues throughout the text. Secondly, we investigate the dynamics of the 
negotiations that led to this outcome document through analyzing of the official proposals and 
archived transcripts of the conference's sessions. 
I. World Summit on Information Society (WSIS)   
   The ITU, in its Plenipotentiary Conference held in Minneapolis, Minnesota 1998, launched the 
idea of holding an international summit on information society sponsored by the United Nations 
(International Telecommunication Union 1998). The United Nations General Assembly endorsed 
holding of the WSIS in two phases (UN General Assembly 2002). The first phase took place in 
Geneva from 10 to 12 December 2003, hereinafter referred to as 'Geneva summit', and the second 
phase took place in Tunis, from 16 to 18 November 2005, hereinafter referred to as 'Tunis summit'. 
   The objective of the first phase was to develop a statement of political will that could lead to 
concrete steps in order to set up the foundations for "an Information Society for all".  Geneva 
summit adopted the Geneva Declaration of Principles and Geneva Plane of Action on December 
12, 2003 (International Telecommunication Union 2006a). 
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   The objective of the second phase was to review and evaluate the progress of Geneva's Plan of 
Action as well as to find solutions for the issues of Internet governance, financing mechanisms 
needed to establish the Information Society, and follow-up and implementation of WSIS's 
decisions. Tunis summit adopted the Tunis Commitment and Tunis Agenda for the Information 
Society on November 18, 2005 (International Telecommunication Union 2006). 
WSIS pluralistic approach 
   The organizer of the Summit, the United Nations and ITU, built upon recent practices of involving 
non-governmental stakeholders in various meetings of the United Nations. They adopted a 
pluralistic approach where intergovernmental organizations, civil society and non-governmental 
organizations, and the private sector entities were invited to participate and provide their inputs and 
views on the relevant issues of WSIS. Procedures for participation and modalities for receiving 
inputs of these entities have been developed throughout the WSIS preparatory process (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2002d). 
   Senior officials from 175 states as well as high-level representatives from international 
organizations, civil society, and private sector attended the two phases of WSIS (World Summit on 
the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2004).  Approximately half of 11000 participants attending 
Geneva summit were official delegates from 175 states, about 1000 participants represented 87 
United Nations bodies and agencies, 200 represented 50 international organizations, 3000 
represented 481 non-governmental organizations, 500 represented 98 business entities and 1000 
from 631 media entities (World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2005). Two 
years later, the participants had nearly doubled in Tunis summit reaching nearly 20000 individuals. 
Of those participants, about 6000 officials represented 175 countries, 1500 represented 92 
international organizations, 6000 represented 606 NGOs and civil society entities, and 5000 
represented 226 business entities (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2006a).  
   Servaes and Carpentier (2006, 39) analyzed participation of non-state actors in WSIS concluding 
that the summit has produced new or perpetuated "inter-actor relationships, patterns of behavior and 
discourses on participation." Putting WSIS in an historical context, they also indicated that the 
summit has made substantial progress, related to the participation of non-state actors, as compared 
to other United Nations' summits. Similarly, Numminen (2005, 65) argues that non-state actors 
involvement in WSIS activities was remarkable and unprecedented in United Nations summits. 
   This indicates a growing tendency to involve non-state stakeholders into intergovernmental 
processes of the United Nations. While involvement of non-state stakeholders in the United Nations' 
conferences and summits had preceded WSIS, the summit established a precedent by enabling these 
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stakeholders to provide their inputs into the intergovernmental negotiations that took place over the 
outcome documents of the summit. Moreover, the extensive participation of those non-state actors 
has been remarkable compared to previous United Nations' summits. 
   As indicated below, the Coordinating Committee on Business Interlocutors (CCBI) was 
established to represent the private sector businesses. ISOC represented the Internet technical 
communities. This indicates how those non-state actors have been able to organize and lobby at the 
international level.  
Geneva Summit, 2003: Unanticipated emergence of the Internet governance issues  
   The preparatory process leading to the Geneva phase of WSIS was long and complicated. It began 
by establishing Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) consists of all member states of the United 
Nations as well as all invited entities, as observers, from United Nations organs and specialized 
agencies, intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental and civil society organizations, and 
business sector entities (World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2002a
 
). 
  The PrepCom held three meetings and intersessional meeting throughout 2002 and 2003 in order 
to prepare the draft document to be adopted by Geneva summit. Regional conferences and other 
events related to the summit were held in order to provide inputs for the work of the PrepCom 
(World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2006). 
   The Internet governance did not feature prominently in the initial agenda of the summit, which 
was prepared by the ITU (International Telecommunication Union 2007). The ambiguity of the 
'information society' concept, the chaotic process of identifying the relevant issues, and involvement 
of magnitude of stakeholders with different interests and views contributed to the emergence of 
unanticipated issues, particularly the Internet governance. The concerns related to obstacles faced by 
the developing countries regarding exercising their sovereign rights over Internet resources pushed 
the Internet governance agenda into the front. The debate initially focused on the unilateral control 
of the United States and ICANN over the administration and management of DNS and then 
broadened to include other issues such as cybersecurity, cybercrime, Internet multilingualism, and 
developmental aspects of the Internet (Shtern 2009, 67-81). 
   The concerns around the lack of transparency and accountability of ICANN that were being raised 
before convening the WSIS made the WSIS "a logical venue to raise the issue of Internet 
governance" (Shtern 2009, 84). During the first meeting of the PrepCom, the delegation of Brazil 
expressed its concern about administration of the Internet by non-state actors as follows: 
 "Democratic and representative governments should not be replaced by arbitrary 
groupings of private business and non-governmental institutions in decisions regarding 
93 
 
the economic space brewing within powerful digital networks, such as the Internet. 
Organizing this new environment to the satisfaction of all, and ensuring the beneficial 
participation of developing countries and their societies is central to our work" (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase  2002b, 2)
 
 
In the same meeting, the European Union explicitly called the WSIS 
"to indicate a set of common principles underlying future actions and initiatives 
[regarding] participation and new mechanisms for governance at global and national 
levels encompassing issues related to … electronic communications regulatory 
frameworks, data protection, network security and cyber-security, legal aspects of e-
commerce and Internet governance " (World Summit on the Information Society, 
Geneva Phase 2002c: 13) 
   The issue of the Internet governance was also raised through several declarations issued by 
regional WSIS preparatory meetings held between the first and second meeting of the PrepCom 
(Kleinwachter 2004, 31). For example, the declaration of the Pan-European regional conference for 
WSIS
35
 (Bucharest, 7-9 November 2002) mentions that "management of domain names" is among 
the issues that "should be addressed with the active participation of all stakeholders" (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2003a: 4). Clearly, the European countries are 
specifically concerned with the administration of the Interne architecture.   
   Since the PrepCom II meeting (Geneva, February 2003), administration of DNS and ICANN 
related-issues were controversially raised between delegations calling for reforming the existing 
governance structure through replacing ICANN with a more traditional intergovernmental 
organization, namely the ITU, and others supporting the existing non-governmental institutional 
framework of ICANN. 
   During the intersessional PrepCom meeting (Paris, 15-18 July 2003), Brazilian and Cuban 
delegations proposed that intergovernmental organization, particularly ITU, should administer and 
manage DNS instead of ICANN. While the developed country delegations, the private sector, and 
the Internet technical community supported the status quo, their responses were varied. Certain 
delegations such Australia, Canada, Japan proposed general terms –such as 'broad', 'suitable', 
'international' organization – instead of referencing 'intergovernmental' or any specific institutional 
label. Other comments were more rigid and restrictive. The United States, the Internet technical 
community represented by ISOC, and the private sector represented by CCBI rejected any 
intergovernmental oversight over the Internet (World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 
Phase 2003b). The controversy was framed as a competition between two models of governance: 
governance through intergovernmental organization versus non-governmental self-regulation 
governance; more specifically, the ITU versus ICANN. 
                                                 
35  Regional conferences were held to provide regional inputs for WSIS preparatory process. 
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   The interventions and comments of the United States and ISOC emphasized that the calls for 
reforming the existing governance structures neglect the extent to which the Internet technology 
characteristics constrain the spectrum of policy alternatives (Shtern 2009, 89). The United States 
delegation commented as follows: 
"the management of the Internet domain name and address system should take place via 
a public-private partnership that operates in an open and transparent manner to preserve 
and enhance the necessary global interoperability and coordination of the Internet's 
unique identifier system while recognizing its technical limitations and requirements" 
(World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2003c, 4) 
ISOC expressed deep concern by: 
"…statements in the draft documents that imply the need for new, intergovernmental 
organizations to “manage” the Internet.  In particular, proposals to replace ICANN and 
create a new mechanism for managing root servers, domain names and IP addresses is 
unnecessary, will lead to significant disruption, and is unlikely to succeed.  The 
unprecedented growth and innovation that we have seen in the Internet sector is due in 
large part to the lack of regulation and constraints on technology development.  In 
addition, the processes employed have been open, democratic and inclusive and it’s hard 
to see how these could be improved by a new intergovernmental body…we should 
continue to support the decentralized, bottom-up innovation that has made the Internet 
the powerful tool it is today.  Non-governmental organizations such as the Internet 
Engineering Task Force, ICANN, and the World Wide Web Consortium, have proven 
very flexible and nimble and have enabled the global Internet community to quickly find 
consensus on how best to adopt and use new Internet technologies. Individual 
governments can and should support such organizations and ensure the full participation 
of their citizens in their activities" (World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva 
Phase 2003d, 3). 
   The private sector has also supported the current governance structure rejecting any 
intergovernmental intervention in the management of the Internet, which is conducted by the private 
sector as embodied  in ICANN. As CCBI puts it: 
"CCBI supports private sector leadership of the management of Internet names and 
numbers as embodied in ICANN. Therefore, business cannot accept any reference to an 
intergovernmental organization engaging in such management" (World Summit on the 
Information Society, Geneva Phase 2003e, 7). 
   The stance of the United States and ISOC reveals that power of knowledge, embodied in the 
Internet technology, has been used to justify specific trajectory of the Internet administation, which 
is the maintenance of the existing governance structures represented in ICANN's system. The 
architectural design and technological characteristics of the Internet have been employed by those 
actors to justify exclusion of alternative governance systems, particularly governance based on 
intergovernmental oversight. The architectural design is claimed to restrict the policy options and 
accordingly the framework of governance. 
   Shtern insightfully argues that, "by asserting that the power dynamics of global Internet 
governance simply preclude the possibility of dramatic calls for reform, the US, the ISOC and their 
sympathizers underline how, in the absence of a more intrusive legal framework, the ability to 
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control and define technology is power…technological power was being wielded alongside political 
economic power by the chief beneficiaries of the status quo in the effort to use their capacity 
leverage to bully the debate over meaningful reform of internet governance right off the WSIS 
agenda before it even got off the ground." (Shtern 2009, 90). This clearly illustrates how the 
knowledge can turn into power in the processes of forming international regimes.  
   Remarkably, the callers for reform did not present counter arguments to the claimed technological 
constraints that dictate the current governance system; the power of knowledge and technology 
seems to be irrefutable.  Their focus was instead centered on the lack of legitimacy and 
inclusiveness of the existing structures. This inadvertently implies that the current structures can be 
adjusted to be more legitimate and inclusive without a need for radical change since dramatic 
overhaul is no option from the technical point of view.  
   Moreover, the bottom-up decentralized process of decision-making – which has been developed 
by IETF as indicated in chapter 4 - had been presented by ISOC as a successful model of 
governance that is based on self-regulation and lack of governmental control. This indicates how the 
Internet epistemic community has promoted its own model of governance internationally. The 
technical concepts that evolved into embraced values of such community had been advanced not 
only to defend maintaining the status quo, but also to provide a new non-traditional framework for 
establishing the international principles and norms related to the Internet. 
  Furthermore, it is clear that the United States, ISOC, and CCBI have formed a lobby to defend 
principles of the current system of ICANN. As indicted below, such lobby has continued its 
endeavors throughout WSIS to enshrine those principles into the outcome documents of the 
summit. Significantly, while the European Union did not question the principles of the current 
governance model of ICANN, it focuses on the need to address the management of the DNS 
without suggesting concrete alternatives to the status quo. On the other end of the spectrum, 
delegations from developing countries that called for reform provided intergovernmental 
governance as an alternative to the current arrangements.   
   The polarization over the Internet governance continued throughout the meetings of PrepCom III 
(September 15-26, November 10-14, December 5-6, and December 9, 2003 in Geneva). The 
proposition that intergovernmental organization should govern the Internet remained the most 
difficult issue of the negotiations. As it became clear that the consensus couldn't be achieved 
between the two ends of the spectrum (Kummer 2007, 7), the compromise was eventually achieved 
on a proposal to subsequently convene a follow-up study group, led by the United Nations 
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Secretary General, to examine Internet governance issues and propose recommendations for the 
second phase of the summit (Kummer 2005, 246). 
   Moreover, another compromise has been achieved by agreement on recognizing that the Internet 
governance include both technical as well as public policy issues, and while the private sector 
should assume the leadership at the technical level, the governments should be involved in 
coordinating public policy issues with other stakeholders (Shtern 2009, 91). This implies that the 
technical administration of the Internet represents only one element of the Internet governance. 
Moreover, it is clear that while the label of the Internet governance had been used throughout 
Geneva summit to characterize the debate over the Internet issues, such debate had actually focused 
on the administration of the Internet architecture with the attempts to reform the current regime. 
Analysis of the outcome document adopted by Geneva phase of WSIS 
   The outcome document adopted by Geneva summit includes two parts. The first is a 
'Declaration of Principles', which is a political statement towards establishing information 
society for all (World Summit on the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2003f) , and the 
second is 'Plan of Action', which includes action-oriented commitments (World Summit on 
the Information Society, Geneva Phase 2003g).  The document includes four paragraphs 
related to Internet governance
36
. The Internet governance has been addressed for the first 
time in an official international document. 
   The document recognizes that multi-stakeholder approach is the basis for international 
management of the Internet, which should be "multilateral, transparent and democratic" with the 
involvement of all stakeholders. The enshrinement of the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet 
governance in an official document adopted by the United Nations' states significantly indicates that 
the relevant future processes of forming an international regime for the  Internet administration will 
not be confined to state actors. It is a formal recognition by the states on the non-state actors' 
indispensable role in forming such regime.  
   Moreover, the document recognizes that the Internet governance includes two categories of issues, 
technical and international public policy issues. While the private sector should continue its role in 
the economic and technical fields, the states have the sovereign right in international public policy 
issues. This distinction among the issues of the Internet governance (technical and public) has been 
in fact a step towards legitimizing the status quo arrangements of the Internet administration. 
Identifying that the technical domain falls outside the realm of the governments implies their 
exclusion in matters related to the management of architecture and resources of the Internet, which 
                                                 
36  Paragraphs 48, 49, and 50 of Geneva Declaration of Principles, and paragraph 13 (b) of the Plan of Action.  
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is currently handled by ICANN's system and IETF. The defenders of the status quo consider the 
management of root zone servers, IP addresses allocation, and DNS is merely technical, where the 
governments should not accordingly have any role. Although there is no definition of either the 
technical or public policy issues in the document, this categorization itself implies such tendency for 
maintaining the status quo, while it opens the door for a potential role of governments in other 
specific issues to be defined.  
   While the document recognizes that the role of the Internet technical community in developing the 
Internet standards and the relevant policies
37
 should continue, it limits the role of intergovernmental 
organizations to the coordination of Internet public policy issues. This represents an additional 
indicator of the tendency to maintain the current arrangements of the Internet administration, 
whereby the Internet standards are formulated and adopted by the organizations established by the 
Internet epistemic community; particularly IETF, and industry consortiums such as W3C. The 
intergovernmental organizations have been ambiguously granted a non-defined role in coordinating 
unidentified public policy issues. 
   Due to the lack of consensus on any substantive issues, the document created a follow-up process 
by asking the Secretary General of the United Nations to set up a working group on Internet 
Governance (WGIG) in order to formulate proposals for action to be considered by the second 
phase of WSIS in Tunis. It stipulates that this working group should consist of representatives of all 
stakeholders. The mandate of WGIG is to develop a definition of the Internet governance; to 
identify the Internet-related public policy issues; to develop a common understanding of the 
respective roles and responsibilities of the relevant stakeholders, and to present a report on its 
activities by Tunis summit. Thus, there was an agreement that the basis for discussion on the 
                                                 
37 The document does not refer directly to the Internet technical community, and refers instead to 'international 
organizations' that develops Internet standards and relevant policies as distinct from intergovernmental organizations. 
Although there is no indication in the document about the difference between intergovernmental and international 
organizations, it is clear that international organizations are meant to be 'international non-governmental organizations'. 
 Although this issue is outside the scope of this study, it is worthy to note the view of the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council (ECOSOC) concerning intergovernmental organizations is implicit in its Resolution 288 (X) of February 
27, 1950. The resolution indicates that "any international organization which is not established by intergovernmental 
agreement shall be considered as a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements." Thus, the 
Yearbook of International Organizations, which aims to identify and list all intergovernmental organizations, defines such 
bodies as: "being based on a formal instrument of agreement between the governments of nation states; including three or 
more nation states as parties to the agreement; possessing a permanent secretariat performing ongoing tasks" 
(http://www.uia.org/archive/types-organization/cc).  
The ECOSOC defines International Non-Governmental Organization as "any organization which is not established by 
inter-governmental agreement" (Resolution 288 (X) of February 27, 1950), "including organizations which accept 
members designated by government authorities, provided that such membership does not interfere with the free expression 
of views of the organizations" (Resolution 1296 (XLV) of 25th June 1968)  
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Internet governance during Tunis summit will be based on the inputs and recommendations 
developed by a multi-stakeholder group.  Multi-stakeholderism has been operationalized through 
the composition of WGIG. 
   Clearly, the unanticipated emergence of the Internet governance and the lack of clarity of what 
could constitute this governance made it difficult to achieve consensus on any relevant substantive 
issue in Geneva summit. The compromise was to defer the discussion of this controversial topic to 
Tunis summit.  
Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) 
   Pursuant to the mandate of Geneva phase of WSIS, the United Nations Secretary General set up 
the WGIG on November 11, 2004, which composed of 40 members from governments, private 
sector, and civil society, who "all participated on equal footing and in their personal capacity."
38
 To 
fulfill its mandate, the group held four meetings in Geneva that led to its final report, which had 
been presented to the second phase of WSIS in Tunis (Working Group on Internet Governance 
2005). In addition to the open consultations conducted by the WGIG, certain regional and sub-
regional meetings submitted inputs to the WGIG's work (Drake 2004). 
   Since ITU considers itself the legitimate United Nations' agency that should administer the 
Internet instead of ICANN, its Secretary General attempted, during the first formal meeting of 
WGIG, to direct the WGIG's agenda to focus on the international management of the Internet 
architecture as follows: 
"The focus of the group's work should be the managing of names, addresses and 
protocols. The rest was illusory…. the group should concentrate on discussing proposals 
for the worldwide management of Internet's logical infrastructure" (Afonso 2005, 9). 
   This was interpreted as an effort to set the WGIG's agenda to go in line with ITU's apparent 
interest in international management of the Internet. Taking into consideration this ITU's interest 
and the contention over its role in the management of the Internet throughout Geneva phase of 
WSIS, the WGIG was able to take a broader look at the issues (Shtern 2009, 101).  
Analysis of the WGIG's report    
   The WGIG's report (Working Group on Internet Governance 2005), which was released on July 
14, 2005, introduced a definition for the Internet governance, a list of international public policy 
issues related to the Internet, an accounting of the roles of each stakeholder, and proposals for 
reforming the existing governance structure of the Internet. Since the WGIG's report had been a 
basis for the discussions and negotiations on Internet governance over the course of Tunis phase of 
                                                 
38 For a list of WGIG members, consult 'Working Group on Internet governance 2005: 20-22.' 
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WSIS, the following paragraphs analyze the main elements of this report highlighting some of key 
issues addressed in this regard.  
    The WGIG's definition of Internet governance, which was subsequently adopted by Tunis 
summit, affirms that multi-stakeholderism is a basic principle in forming the Internet-related 
regimes as follows: 
"Internet governance is the development and application by governments, the private 
sector, and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, 
decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the 
Internet"  
   It is worthy to note that this definition derives from Krasner's definition of international regime as 
"a set of explicit or implicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which 
actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations" (Krasner 1982, 186). 
However, whereas Krasner's definition is state-centric, the WGIG's definition of Internet 
governance identifies set of various actors: governments, private sector, and civil society. WGIG 
adopts a pluralistic approach to the definition of the Internet governance.  
   The report adopts a broad scope for Internet governance, which goes beyond the Internet names 
and addresses that is being handled by ICANN. It identifies public policy issues that are relevant to 
the Internet governance categorizing them into "four key public policy areas"
39
. One of those 
categories, entitled "issues relating to infrastructure and the management of critical Internet 
resources", addresses ICANN's functions. The administration of DNS and the root servers system as 
well as IP addresses is remarkably one of a series of issues identified under such category. Thus, for 
WGIG, administration of DNS, root servers, and IP addresses are not considered only technical 
issues as being claimed by the defenders of ICANN's status quo; they are claimed instead to be 
public policy issues.  
   Among the issues identified, the report recommended thirteen issues as priority for consideration 
by the Tunis Summit
40
. Additionally, it determines the relevant challenges to each issue. Among 
those issues, three are related to ICANN's functions: administration of the root zone files and 
system, allocation of domain names, and IP addressing. Under 'administration of the root zone files 
and systems', two challenges have been further identified. The first is the unilateral control of the 
United States government regarding authorization of changes to the root zone file. The second is the 
                                                 
39 The four categories are: a) "issues relating to infrastructure and management of critical Internet resources";  b) "issues 
relating to the use of the Internet;  c) issues relevant to the Internet but have an impact much wider than the Internet for 
which existing organizations are responsible, such as intellectual property rights or international trade; and d) issues 
related to the developmental aspects of internet governance, in particular capacity-building in developing countries." 
(WGIG report, 5) 
40  Those issues are: administration of the root zone files and systems; interconnection costs; Internet stability, security and 
cybercrime; spam, meaningful participation in global policy development; capacity building; allocation of domain names; 
IP addressing; Intellectual property rights; freedom of expression; data protection and privacy rights; consumer rights; and 
multilingualism. 
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lack of formal relationship with root server operators. Under 'the allocation of domain names', the 
challenge is the need for further development of policies and procedures for generic Top-Level 
Domain names (gTLDs). Under 'IP addressing', there is a need to develop allocation policies for IP 
addresses that ensure the balance in the distribution of resources. Significantly, none of those issues 
have been tackled by the Tunis summit despite being among the priorities identified by the WGIG's 
report. As indicated in chapter 6, most of these issues had been subsequently addressed through a 
self-regulatory process of reforming ICANN as well the United States announcement to relinquish 
its control over the Internet. 
   The report provided an account for the respective roles and responsibilities of the government, 
civil society, and the private sector. Significantly, it mentions that the role of governments include 
"oversight functions", which became one of the most contentious issues in the Tunis summit. The 
report also adds the Internet academic community as well as the Internet technical community to the 
stakeholders relevant to the Internet governance recognizing their role in the evolution, functioning, 
security and stability of the Internet. 
   The WGIG report concluded that some adjustment needed to be made to bring the current Internet 
governance arrangements "more in line with the WSIS criteria of transparency, accountability, 
multilateralism and the need to address all public policy issues related to Internet governance in a 
coordinated manner." In response to this, the report recommended creating a global mulit-
stakeholder forum in order to enable policy dialogue among all stakeholders "on equal footing" on 
Internet-related public policy issues. It proposes that the forum be linked to the United Nations, 
open to all stakeholders from all countries, modeled on the WGIG open consultations, supported by 
a lightweight structure, and guided by a multi-stakeholder coordinating process. The Tunis summit 
approved this proposal and created the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) as elaborated below. 
   Moreover, the report proposed four different organizational models that would serve as a basis of 
reforming the existing governance mechanisms with the objective of establishing a proper system of 
"global public policy and oversight". Three of those models propose major changes of the existing 
structures of the DNS and root servers' administration, either replacing ICANN or transferring the 
Internet oversight functions from the United States' government to a new international institution. 
The remaining model limits the reform to enhancing ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee 
in order to meet the concerns of some governments on specific issues. Remarkably, the report 
recommends that any institutional structure of the proposed model should not involve "in day-to-
day operational management of the Internet that does not impact on public policy issues." 
Significantly, Tunis summit did not endorse any of these models. 
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  In summary, the WGIG's report is a comprehensive document that identifies the relevant issues to 
the Internet governance. Besides the definition of the Internet governance, it extends the scope of 
the relevant issues to the Internet governance beyond the technical administration, which indicates 
the inherent complexity of setting international principles, norms, or rules for the Internet. The 
diversity of the issues identified and their crosscutting nature with other domains reveals the 
difficulty associated with forming an international regime for a sector that has historically evolved 
without central regulating authority. On the other hand, the report recognizes that the administration 
of the architecture and resources of the Internet are among the international public policy issues, and 
make it a priority issue to be tackled by the Tunis summit. 
Tunis summit, 2005: Pushing Internet governance to the front 
  As was the case in the Geneva phase of WSIS, several meetings and events were held over the 
course of the preparatory process of the Tunis phase of WSIS. WSIS regional and sub-regional 
conferences as well as thematic meetings and other related events were organized to provide inputs 
for work of the PrepCom
41
(International Telecommunication Union 2006b).  
   Examining the comments received from all stakeholders on the WGIG's report
42
, which was 
complied in a long document (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005a) 
indicates an emerging consensus on the definition of the Internet governance. There is also minor 
opposition to include some public policy issues mentioned in the report - such as multilingualism, 
interconnection costs, combating spam, and states' sovereignty over their country code Top-Level 
Domains - in the outcome document to be approved by Tunis summit. One the other hand, 
divergence of views was clear over the institutional issues; in particular, replacement of the existing 
governance arrangements by alternative structure based on governmental oversight. 
   The United States and CCBI argues that the status-quo should be maintained affirming the 
effectiveness of the existing structures, and calling for market-oriented Internet with leadership of 
the private sector.  ISOC criticized the focus of the report on policy issues as it gives the impression 
that regulation and international treaties are the best solutions to the Internet-related issues, 
contending that more effective and global solutions could be provided by new technologies and 
standards as well new Internet services. ICANN claimed that any improvement should be within the 
existing structures explaining how its bylaws require continuous improvement. Significantly, the 
                                                 
41 The PrepCom held three meetings: PrepCom I on June 2004, PrepCom II on February 2005, and PrepCom III on 
September 2005 followed by resumed session on November 2005. Two Subcommittee of the PrepCom were created: 
Subcommittee A was dedicated to the Internet governance and Subcommittee B for the other issues. 
42  The United Nations Secretary-General transmitted the report of WGIG to the WSIS the chair of PrepCom and ITU 
Secretary-General on July 14, 2005 (http://www.wgig.org/WGIG-Report.html). Two informal consultation meetings on 
the Internet governance were subsequently held (Geneva, July 20 and September 6, 2005 respectively) in order to discuss 
the WGIG's report. See http://www.itu.int/wsis/wgig/index.html. 
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European Union insisted that internationalization of Internet governance lie in the management of 
the Internet's core resources, namely the DNS and the root server system, calling for a new public-
private cooperation model. 
   The early discussion that took place in September's meeting of the PrepCom III indicated that 
despite the continuous divergence of views over the institutional issues related to the Internet, the 
difference of opinions had evolved. There was little discussion over the role of ITU as a potential 
alternative to ICANN in the Internet governance as compared to the discussion that took place over 
the course of the Geneva phase of WSIS. Instead of ICANN versus ITU, the discussion was mainly 
over "'the current system" versus "a different system with a larger role for governments" (Shtern 
2009, 110). The lack of reference to ITU's role in the four governance models proposed by the 
WGIG's report seems to be a significant factor in such evolution. 
   Spectrum of proposals on the Internet governance were further submitted by many delegations. 
These proposals ranged from either focusing on creation of new intergovernmental body, following 
progressive approach towards more internationalization of the existing governance arrangements, or 
creating a policy dialogue forum for Internet governance issues. 
   For instance, Iran (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005b) and Saudi 
Arabia, on behalf of the Arab Group (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 
2005c),
 
proposed explicitly a new intergovernmental organization to assume the oversight functions 
over the Internet. Russia proposed that adjustment to the current governance structure is needed and 
that no single government – referring to the United States - should dominate the international 
Internet governance, which should involve all the stakeholders including governments (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005d). Argentina recommended revolutionary 
approach to the existing governance structures proposing continued internationalization of ICANN, 
and reinforcement of the role of governments in its decision-making with regard to public policy 
issues (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005n). The African countries 
proposed progressive approach that can lead to a more internationalized multi-stakeholder oversight 
functions of the Internet public policy (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 
2005e).  The proposals of Brazil (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005f), 
Japan (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005g), and Canada (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005h ) centered only on creating a forum to 
discuss the Internet governance issues. 
   While this divergence continued over the course of September meeting of PrepCom III, the 
European Union introduced a new proposal regarding future arrangements of the Internet 
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governance on September 28, 2005. The proposal mentions that the existing institutional 
arrangements for the Internet governance are not adequate and need to be adjusted into a "new 
model for cooperation." According to the proposal, this model should involve governments in 
developing and applying global public policy principles over "naming, numbering, and addressing-
related matters
43
". Additionally, the proposal suggested creation of forum for Internet governance in 
a separate process parallel to a simultaneous transition process for the proposed new model of 
international cooperation (World Summit on the Information Society Tunis Phase 2005i). This 
proposal represents an elaboration of the European Union's views communicated during Geneva 
phase of WSIS. 
   On the other hand, the European proposal identified some guiding principle of the new model, 
affirming that it should not replace the existing structures of Internet governance, and should instead 
build on them with the involvement of all stakeholders. In addition, the role of governments should 
mainly focus on the public policy issues without any involvement in the day-to-day operation of the 
Internet. Significantly, the proposal asserts that the suggested model should respect the "the 
architectural principles of the Internet, including interoperability, openness, and the end-to-end 
principle." (World Summit on the Information Society Tunis Phase 2005i). 
   Recognizing the architectural principles of the Internet, the European proposal clearly 
demonstrates Europe's adherence to fundamentals of the current Internet structure established by the 
Internet epistemic community. Moreover, the proposal supports multi-stakeholder governance. 
Simultaneously, it criticizes the current state of affairs regarding administration of the Internet 
architecture: naming, numbering, and addressing-related matters. Whereas there is no explicit 
reference in the European proposal to the hegemony of the United States in the current governance 
arrangements, the criticism about the current state of affairs implicitly reflected the European 
concerns about such hegemony.  Despite this concern, the European proposal neither seek to change 
the principles nor the fundamentals of the current system, it just aimed at adjusting the system to 
bring about the balance against the American hegemony. 
   Affirming the hegemonic status of the Untied States in the current governance arrangements, the 
American delegation immediately rejected the European proposal as follow: 
"We want to make perfectly clear once again [the distinction] between public policy and 
the day-to-day operations of the Internet. The day-to-day operations of the Internet, of 
which any changes or modifications to the authoritative root zone file is a part, is essential 
to the trust and confidence that the world may have and should have in the Internet. It is a 
responsibility that the US takes with great seriousness and we will not do anything to 
                                                 
43  These matters, according to the proposal, such as allocation of IP number blocks, procedures for changing the root zone 
files, rules regarding DNS system, contingency planning in order to ensure the continuity of DNS functions, and 
establishment of dispute resolution mechanism and arbitration based on international law. 
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adversely impact that responsibility. On the other hand, there are many issues that we 
would say fall in the domain of the public policy realm. That includes: spam, viruses, 
cyber security, cybercrime all of the issues that we are very much concerned with and 
that we wish to engage in actively on a dialogue that will lead to the resolution of those 
issues" (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase. 2005j ) 
   Notably, many delegations expressed either support or interest in the European proposal. The 
supporters included the delegations who had been vocal in calling for reform of the existing 
mechanisms of governance throughout WSIS such as China and Brazil; governments such as Saudi 
Arabia whose perspective regarding regulation of communication has historically been different 
from that of most European states; and other states such as Cuba, Iran and Venezuela that engage at 
the time in diplomatic hostilities with the United States. However, when some of these supporting 
delegations – which had already submitted their own proposals - were asked by the chair to consult 
with the European Union to explore merging those series of proposals into one, the consultations 
revealed no common ground (Shtern 2009, 114). This reaffirms that the Europeans did not seek 
dramatic overhaul and revision of the fundamentals of the current system as those countries do. 
  The media attention to the WSIS had subsequently increased framing the issue as a clash between 
the Untied States and European Union over control of the Internet. The period between the closing 
of PrepCom III session on September 2005 and its resumed session on November of the same year, 
the United States was claimed to have exercised extreme pressure over the European Union to give 
up its proposal (Shtern 2009, 116). 
   In the resumed PrepCom III session on November 2005, the discussion over creating new model 
of governance, including the European proposal, was unproductive. The discussion then turned to 
whether reforming ICANN's Governmental Advisory Committee - in order to reinforce the role of 
governments in the current governance structures - or to create a new body. Eventually, the 
discussion did not lead to any progress regarding this issue (World Summit on the Information 
Society, Tunis Phase 2005k
 
). 
   On the other hand, the discussion over creating Internet governance forum revealed an emerging 
consensus. The focus was on the institutional nature of the potential forum and the host 
organization. While the United States and Australia delegations called for a multi-stakeholder non-
binding forum hosted by ISOC, the reform seekers called for the United Nations or ITU to be the 
host of the forum. The compromise reached was to create multi-stakeholder non-binding forum 
linked to the United Nations. Moreover, the European Union proposed a parallel process, which is 
called 'enhanced cooperation', in order to enable governments to carry out their roles and 
responsibilities in international Internet-related public policy issues. The proposal satisfied status-
quo defenders, since there is no intergovernmental oversight, as well as reform callers as it creates a 
105 
 
process dedicated to examine the role of governments in the Internet governance (World Summit on 
the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005k
 
). 
   The above-mentioned dynamics revealed dissatisfaction, with varying degrees, among certain 
states about the current governance structure of the Internet, albeit it derives from different sources. 
Some states are concerned about the principles of the current governance structures, embodied in 
ICANN, due to domestic political reasons such as China, Iran and Saudi Arabia. For those states, 
lack of governmental control in the current structures restricts their abilities to censor the Internet. 
Other states, mainly from developing countries, view the principles of the current system are 
illegitimate since they do not reflect the traditional state-centric mechanisms of governance 
embodied in governance through intergovernmental organizations, let alone the United States 
hegemonic global status over the Internet. Those two categories sought radical overhaul of not only 
of the current governance structure but also of its underlying pluralist, self-regulatory, non-
governmental principles and norms. They aim at replacing the current structure by the traditional 
state-centric governance through intergovernmental organization. 
    Other states, mainly the European Union states, are concerned that the status quo privileges the 
United States. The unilateral control of the United States over the DNS and root servers as well as 
its influence on ICAAN's decisions create disequilibrium in the current governance structure in the 
favor of the Americans, which had apparently been a source of concern for the European Union 
throughout WSIS.  The focus of the European contributions to WSIS was centered on the need to 
adjust the current administration of Internet resources. The European aim was limited to adjustment 
of the current institutional structure in order to bring about the balance in governance of the Internet 
architecture against the American dominance 
   Nevertheless, the European Union embraces the principles of the current system: self-regulation, 
non-governmental, and multi-stakeholder governance; it rejects control of the Internet through 
intergovernmental machinery. Moreover, the European Union affirms its willingness to maintain 
the Internet's decentralized structure through emphasizing the adherence to the architectural 
principles of the Internet, particularly the end-to-end principle. This significantly demonstrates the 
attachment of the European states to the values of the Internet epistemic community. This is clearly 
the impact of the Internet epistemic community through its transnational network. In addition, the 
values of the Internet epistemic community reflects the Western values in general including that of 
the European Union. Clearly, the European Union consciously prefers self-regulatory approach to 
Internet administration, much as the United States does. 
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 Thus, the European Union does not seek radical change of the status quo; it aims instead to rectify 
the balance. The difference over principles of the current governance system between states calling 
for radical overhaul and the European Union was manifested by the failure to reach a common 
position regarding merging their proposals on the Internet governance as demonstrated above..   
Analysis of the outcome document adopted by Tunis phase of WSIS 
   The outcome document of the Tunis summit includes two parts, 'Tunis Commitment' (World 
Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005L) and 'Tunis Agenda of the Information 
Society" (World Summit on the Information Society, Tunis Phase 2005m). The document includes 
considerable part dedicated to Internet governance making it a reference document in this regard. 
Since the document is an outcome of tough negotiations, its language is a compromised one that 
reflects, with varying degrees, spectrum of different views and interests. This consensus-based 
international document satisfies, to the extent possible, all the concerned parties. Regardless of the 
differentiated capabilities among those parties in reflecting their own views and interests in the 
document, the rule of consensus renders the document an expression of the collective agreement 
over the issues at question. Thus, examination of such document clarifies the scope of international 
consensus on Internet governance and the potential international cooperation in this area. 
   Examination of this document indicates that the principles of the current governance system of the 
Internet architecture; particularly multi-stakeholderism, self-regulation, and non-governmental 
intervention, will continue as the underpinnings of the Internet technical administration. The 
involvement of all stakeholders in governance arrangement is emphasized throughout the 
document. The existing non-governmental governance structure will remain without change since 
the document recognizes their effectiveness affirming that the private sector should take the lead in 
the day-to-day operations of the Internet. Throughout the document, administration of the Internet 
architecture and the relevant technical issues are explicitly excluded from the future debate on the 
Internet governance. This implies that administration of the Internet architecture is considered a 
settled issue where the current status quo will continue.  
   The document adopts the WIGIG's approach to the Internet governance, which goes beyond the 
Internet architectural issues of naming and addressing. It recognizes the need for international 
cooperation on cybersecurity, fighting cybercrime, combating spam, countering terrorism on the 
Internet. It calls for respect of freedom of expression and privacy as basic human rights. The 
document committed to work towards multilingualisation of the Internet, the participation of 
stakeholders from developing countries in the Internet governance decision making, and the 
achievement of affordable international interconnection costs for the developing countries. While 
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such approach to the Internet governance reaffirms the tendency to exclude administration of the 
Internet architecture from potential intergovernmental processes that may address Internet 
governance issues, it also opens the door for intergovernmental cooperation on other areas related to 
international public policy issues. Ironically, the document stipulates that even the international 
cooperation on those public policy issues should be addressed in a multi-stakeholder settings.   
   The main operational outcome of WSIS is the creation of the IGF as a multi-stakeholder policy 
dialogue forum in order to discuss the Internet governance issues with five years renewable 
mandate. According to the document, IGF is a non- binding forum without any oversight functions. 
It will not involve in day-to-day or technical operations of the Internet and will not replace any of 
the existing governance structures. It should have a lightweight and decentralized structure, and will 
be convened by the United Nations Secretary General. Such mandate renders IGF a multi-
stakeholder forum limited to exchanging views on the Internet-related issues. 
   Another operational outcome is the creation of an ill-defined multi-stakeholder process, called 
"enhanced cooperation", to be started by the United Nations Secretary-General in to order to 
"enable governments to carry out their roles and responsibilities in international public policy issues 
pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical and operational matters." Again, the 
document reaffirms that operational administration of the Internet should be excluded from any 
process that involves the governments. While the document mentions that such cooperation should 
include the development of global principles on public policy issues related to the management and 
coordination of critical Internet resources, it does not identify the spectrum of issues that will be 
subject to such cooperation. 
   In summary, the international debate on the Internet governance throughout WSIS did not 
produce or even envisage any real substantive change to the status quo; it instead affirmed its 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Moreover, WSIS has legitimized the 'multi-stakeholderism' as a 
fundamental principle of governing the Internet, which subsequently dominated the discourse of the 
United Nations' discussions on Internet governance. The operational outcomes of WSIS are limited 
to creation of processes – IGF and enhanced cooperation - in order to continue discussion on the 
Internet governance, which was a compromise to the reform seekers that provides an opportunity to 
bring about evolutionary or progressive reform for the current governance structure. The following 
paragraphs address the recent developments that took place within the two processes.    
IGF 
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   IGF is an embodiment of how states departed from traditional state-centric forms of International 
organization to a new multi-stakeholder model. It reflected a compromise between 
intergovernmentalism and self-governance approaches to the Internet governance.  
   The IGF structure comprise  a secretariat and  a group called Multi-stakeholder Advisory Group 
(MAG). MAG consists of fifty-five  members from governments, the private sector and civil 
society, including representatives from the academic and technical communities, who are appointed 
by the United Nations Secretary General. MAG's purpose is to advise the United Nations Secretary 
General on the agenda and program of the Forum's meetings. It holds annual meetings, which are 
organized in the form of parallel sessions and workshops dedicated to discuss various topics related 
to Internet govenance (Internet Governance Forum 2015). The five years mandate of IGF’s was 
extended by the United Nations General Assembly for from 2011 to 2015 (United Nations General 
Assembly 2011, 6). 
   One of the main challenges of IGF effectiveness is its inherent inability to produce concrete 
outcomes of its meetings since it is not entitled to issue resolutions, guidelines, or even 
recommendations about Internet governance issues.  
   Summarizing the dynamics within IGF, Mueller (2010) categorized the actors in IGF as 'hawks' 
and 'doves'. He explains that hawks seek to leverage the forum for a tangible outcome in the form of 
resolutions or policy recommendations. Some 'state-actor hawks', such as Brazil, try to use the 
forum as preparatory phase to reach intergovernmental convention on the Internet principles. 
Others, such as China and Russia, look for transforming the forum into traditional 
intergovernmental entity. 'Civil society hawks' seek to harness IGF to achieve a multi-stakeholder 
consensus on the Internet policy issues and to institutionalize the practices of the bottom-up process 
of the forum, which could secure their participation in formulation of policy recommendations. On 
the other hand, the 'Doves' consider the forum as informational body rejecting any attempt to 
produce a concrete outcome of its meetings in form of resolutions or policy recommendations. 
Those doves include western developed countries, status quo organizations including ICANN and 
ISOC, multinational business interests, and major European country code Top-Level Domains 
(ccTLDs). Nevertheless, the IGF turned to be a forum for promoting the Internet self- governance 
and maintaining the status quo. Mueller argues that with the maturity of the forum, some 'doves' 
started to leverage it to promote their ideas of Internet self-governance, which led to a proliferation 
of national and regional IGFs (Mueller 2010, 110-111). The significance of IGF to self-governance 
and status quo defenders is reflected by the fact that IGF activities is financed by the donors 
belonging to the stakeholder groups (governments, private sector, and the civil society) of Western, 
liberal nations, where many of them are viewed as affiliated with status-quo defenders of Internet 
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governance (Epstein 2012, 141). Thus, the IGF, which was ironically created to satisfy the reform 
seekers, ended up as an instrument for promoting the status quo. 
    Furthermore, in a comprehensive study about IGF dynamics using theory of structuration and 
critical discourse analysis, Epstein (2012, 202-207) concluded that the main contribution of IGF to 
Internet governance is mainstreaming the values of the Internet community into the United Nations' 
system. Therefore, IGF became a tool employed to infuse values of the Internet epistemic 
community into the United Nations' system.   
   While IGF failed to address the controversial issues of Internet governance including ICANN's 
oversight and internationalization of the Internet administration, the controversy continued over the 
process of setting the forum's agenda as well as the stakeholders' representation in MAG (Shtern 
2009, 130-132). The increasing dissatisfaction over IGF performance led to establishment of 
'United Nations Working group on improvements to IGF', which is mandated to formulate 
recommendations for improving the forum's performance (United Nations Economic and Social 
Council 2010, 7). 
  Examination of the report of this working group (United Nations General Assembly and Economic 
and Social Council 2012) reveals that the recommendations do not address the key challenges that 
paralyze IGF from producing tangible outcomes. For example, the recommendation of the report 
regarding the inability of IGF to produce tangible outcome does not envisage any change in the 
form of the current outcome, which is limited to a mere reporting about IGF activities. Instead of 
recommending a change of such outcome to 'resolutions' or 'policy recommendations', the report 
focuses on how to improve the current reporting exercise. In fact, the report was a compromised 
outcome of tough negotiations among representatives of certain member states of the United 
Nations - with the participation of other stakeholders - which include both 'hawks' and 'doves'. 
Clearly, there was no possibility to issue recommendations that tackle the real problems, which 
undermines the functioning of the IGF, due to the ongoing divergence in this regard.  
   The inability of IGF to tackle the controversial issues of Internet governance and the lack of 
tangible outcomes of its meetings undermines the forum's prospect to affect the status quo.  is still 
short of being an effective entity in Internet governance.  However, IGF is being employed by the 
status quo defenders to promote the principles and values of the Internet's self-governance model. 
Enhanced cooperation 
   Fulfilling the mandate given to the Untied Nations by the WSIS regarding initiation of a process 
of 'enhanced cooperation' in order to help governments carrying out their roles in the Internet 
governance, the United Nations' secretariat held open consultations in 2010 seeking inputs from all 
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the stakeholders about the framework and nature of such cooperation. The United Nations Secretary 
General presented a report in 2011 summarizing the inputs received during these consultations 
(United Nations General Assembly and Economic and Social Council 2011). 
   Examination of this report indicates that there are divergent views over the procedural aspects as 
well as the substantive issues that should be tackled through enhanced cooperation. The 
stakeholders' inputs identified a different, wide range of issues that should be addressed through this 
track. With this divergence, the report did not provide clear guidance about the framework and 
substance of such cooperation.  
   Due to the lack of progress, the United Nations General Assembly established multi-stakeholder 
Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation with a task to make recommendations on how to 
implement WSIS mandate regarding enhanced cooperation, through seeking, compiling and 
reviewing inputs from all stakeholders (United Nations General Assembly 2013). The group, which 
consists of 22 representatives of governments and 20 participants from private sector, civil society, 
and technical and academic communities, held four meetings from May 2013 to May 2014 (United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development 2015a). The group failed to formulate 
recommendations for operationlizing enhanced cooperation due to the political sensitivity of the 
topic and the significant divergence of views on the relevant issues (United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development 2015b, 144). 
   The deliberations within this working group was based on the responses of the stakeholders on a 
questionnaire submitted by its chair, which includes questions about the institutional framework of 
enhanced cooperation and the substantive issues needed to be addressed under such framework. 
Such deliberations reflect continuity of the tension that prevailed throughout the two phases of 
WSIS: competition between intergovernmentalism and multi-stakeholderism as a basis of Internet 
governance. Some members see that 'enhanced cooperation' was not implemented arguing that it 
should be dedicated to explore the governments' role as to the Internet governance; accordingly, 
there is a need to establish an intergovernmental platform to enable governments carrying out such 
role. Other members view that enhanced cooperation has already been in implementation arguing 
that the ongoing processes in various forums, including many international organizations, embody 
such cooperation. They further argue that even IGF represents a model of enhanced cooperation. 
Moreover, there is a divergence over identification of the public policy issues that needed to be 
tackled through enhanced cooperation
44
. 
                                                 
44 This account depends on the analysis of the interviews that were conducted in Geneva (30 April -2 May) with 10 
delegations of various stakeholders participating in the meetings of the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation, who 
expressed their willingness to be anonymous. 
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   Ironically, the enhanced cooperation, which was envisaged to identify the role of governments in 
Internet governance, is conducted through multi-stakeholder process where non-state actors are key 
players. This indicates the extent to which multi-stakeholderism has been stabilized and embedded 
as principle of Internet governance. Furthermore, enhanced cooperation did not lead to any progress 
regarding the role of governments in Internet governance due to significant divergence on the topic. 
Clearly, the ill-defined enhanced cooperation was just a 'forum shifting' solution of WSIS, which 
faced the same dilemmas of the summit. 
II. The World Conference on International Telecommunication (WCIT) 
   The treaty of the International Telecommunication Regulations (ITRs) was signed in 1988 by 
member states of the ITU with the objective to establish an international regulatory framework for 
international telecommunications (International Telecommunication Union 1989).  ITU held WCIT 
in Dubai, from 3 to 14 December 2012, in order to revise the treaty of ITRs. The conference aimed 
at updating the ITRs in order to keep pace with the contemporary developments in the 
telecommunications technology through adopting a new treaty that will establish contemporary 
regulatory framework for international telecommunications.  
   Among 144 countries that participated in the conference, 89 countries signed the outcome 
document that includes the new treaty of ITRs. The United States, the European Union countries, 
Canada, and Japan are among the states that rejected to sign the treaty. The United States and the 
European Union did not sign the agreement due to the divergence and impasse over the Internet 
(Pfanner 2012).  
   The following paragraphs investigates the dynamics that took place among member states 
throughout WCIT with the objective to demonstrates how the international debate on the Internet 
has evolved almost after 10 years of WSIS, how the relevant issues have been framed, as well as the 
reasons that led western states to refuse signing the Final Acts of the conference. 
Analysis of the Final Acts of WCIT  
   The Final Acts of the WCIT (International Telecommunication Union 2012a) includes the text of 
the ITRs treaty and two appendices attached to it as well as separate five plenary resolutions 
adopted by the conference. Examination of the ITRs treaty reveals that most of its provisions are in 
the form 'best-endeavors', which reduces the legal commitments to 'endeavoring' to comply with the 
substantive obligations of each provision
45
. This means that most of the substantive obligations of 
                                                                                                                                                     
 
45 Examination of the ITR text indicates that most of its provisions use the formulation "member states shall endeavor 
to…" Despite this issue is beyond the scope of this study, it is worthy to note that this formulation is legally weaker than 
the formulation "member states shall..." For example, the legal commitment of the formulation "members shall endeavor 
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the treaty are not compulsory. Moreover, most of the treaty's provisions give extensive discretion to 
the member states regarding implementation of the obligations. Thus, the treaty represents a sort of 
framework or guidelines for regulation of the international communications, which does not require 
strict measures to be taken by the member states in this regard. 
    Article 1 of the ITRs provides that the regulations "do not address the content-related aspects of 
telecommunications." This means that the regulations apply only to the operation of 
telecommunications, not to the content. However, Article 5b calls on ITU member states to take 
necessary measures to prevent propagation of the "unsolicited bulk electronic communications", 
which is known as spam. Since the spam is a form of content transmitted over the Internet, it 
represents the only Internet-related issue mentioned in the text of the treaty.  
   Additionally, one of the five plenary resolutions, entitled "To foster an enabling environment for 
the greater growth of the Internet" addresses the Internet issues, calls on the ITU to play an active 
role in the development of the multi-stakeholder model of the Internet. As mentioned above, the 
resolutions are not part of the ITRs' text; rather, they separately belong to the Final Acts of WCIT. 
Significantly, the multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance has been ironically affirmed 
within ITU that had been - throughout WSIS - the candidate intergovernmental organization to 
replace ICANN. This does not only indicate that multi-stakeholderism is embedded into the 
international discourse of the Internet governance, but also demonstrates the increasing legitimacy 
of ICANN's system.  
Examination of the official documents and transcripts of WCIT 
   Seeking to reveal the actual dynamics that took place during the negotiations on the draft text of 
the Final Acts, the following paragraphs examine the proposals and comments submitted by the 
member states of ITU on the draft text of Final Acts of WCIT, which has been complied in 223 
pages document (International Telecommunication Union 2012b). In addition, we also examine the 
official transcripts of the plenary sessions of the conference (International Telecommunication 
Union 2012c), which demonstrates the interactive debate that took place among the member states. 
Moreover, we demonstrate the reactions of the key actors regarding the failure of achieving 
consensus on the Final Acts. 
    Our examination reveals that a group of states led by Russia, including China and the host 
country, the United Arab Emirates, argued throughout the negotiations on the draft of the Final Acts 
that the Internet falls within the scope of the envisaged regulatory framework of ITRs treaty because 
                                                                                                                                                     
to ensure…" is limited to the obligation of trying to ensure the compliance, while the legal commitment  of the 
formulation "member states shall ensure…" means the obligation to take the necessary measures 'to ensure' the 
compliance.    
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the Internet traffic passes through telecommunication networks. They proposed to include a clause 
regarding the Internet in the actual treaty text. The original proposal calls for equal rights for all 
governments to manage "Internet numbering, naming, addressing and identification resources". 
Presenting the proposal during the third plenary session of the conference, the Russian delegation 
made it clear that the proposal aims at emphasizing the rights of ITU member states to participate in 
the Internet governance (International Telecommunication Union 2012e, 31-32). Clearly, these are 
the same concerns that had been raised during the two phases of WSIS, which focused on the 
Internet administration under the label of Internet governance.  
   Due to the severe opposition by the United States and the European countries, Russia and its allies 
agreed to compromise by withdrawing that proposal and to settle for a lesser measure. They 
accepted a separate resolution on the Internet, which is not officially part of the treaty wording. 
Moreover, the wording of the proposal was just limited to calling on the ITU to play an active role 
in the development of the multi-stakeholder model of the Internet. However, this was even 
unacceptable to the United States and its supporters, which considered the resolution an attempt to 
bring the Internet governance under the regulatory framework of the ITU. 
   When the draft of the Final Acts of the conference seemed to have been approved by a majority of 
member states in the thirteenth plenary session, the United States' delegation declared promptly that 
it is unable to sign the agreement in its current form. In the fourteenth plenary session of the 
conference, the American delegation intervened as follows: 
"It's with a heavy heart and a sense of missed opportunities that the U.S. must 
communicate that it's not able to sign the agreement in the current form.  The Internet has 
given the world unimaginable economic and social benefit during these past 24 years, all 
without UN Regulation. We candidly cannot support an ITU Treaty that is inconsistent 
with the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance.  As the ITU has stated, this 
conference was never meant to focus on Internet issues.  However, today we're in a 
situation where we still have text and resolutions that cover issues on spam and also 
provisions on Internet governance…..the United States continues to believe that Internet 
policy must be multi-stakeholder driven.  Internet policy should not be determined by 
member states, but by citizens, communities, and broader society, and such consultation 
from the private sector and civil society is paramount.  This has not happened here…" 
(International Telecommunication Union 2012f, 29
 
)     
   The United States' intervention was revealing; it will not accept addressing the Internet issues 
through any intergovernmental channel of the United Nations. The United States clearly indicates 
that states are not entitled to formulate the Internet-related policies. 
  The United States' stance was supported by the European Union countries, Australia and Canada. 
Accordingly, the consensus could not be achieved after nearly two weeks of tough negotiations 
between western governments on one hand and Russia, China and several developing countries on 
the other. Like most of the United Nations' specialized agencies, the ITU resorts to a majority vote 
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when the consensus can not be achieved. Eventually, the Final Acts including ITRs treaty has been 
adopted by a majority vote. 
   Interestingly, the United States, before refusing to sign the Final Acts, succeeded to dilute and 
limit the Internet-related issues into an article on countering spam in the treaty text and non-binding 
resolution on the Internet as mentioned above. The resolution even acknowledges the multi-
stakeholder model promoted by the United States and its supporters.  Moreover, the United States 
was similarly able to remove other critical proposals from the treaty. Such proposals, sought by 
some African and Asian states as well as European telephone companies, require Internet 
companies to pay telecommunication companies for the traffic on the latter's networks, which was 
unacceptable for the United States. Nevertheless, the United States refused to sign the treaty. This 
indicates that even a minor reference to the Internet in an intergovernmental regulatory framework 
is very sensitive to the United States. Moreover, the technical nature of WCIT, which makes it the 
most convenient forum to address Internet administration issues, exacerbated the American 
sensitivity. Clearly, deregulation and non-governmental intervention in the Internet affairs is the 
only feasible option for the Untied States. 
   Significantly, the debate on the Internet throughout the conference has been framed on whether 
the Internet is a medium for content or just a telecommunication service similar to other 
telecommunications such as telephony. This added another complexity to the international debate 
on Internet governance. The United States, supported by western governments, considers the 
Internet a medium for content that should not subject to governmental regulation and must remain 
open in order to allow freedom of expression. On the contrary, other states, such as Russia and 
China, view the Internet as a telecommunication service that should be regulated by governments as 
it is the case for other telecommunication services
46
. The justifications provided by the parties 
concerned on the reasons of failure to achieve consensus further highlights this issue as will be 
demonstrated by the following paragraphs.   
Reactions to failure of achieving the consensus 
   The Unites States delegation held a press conference to explain the reasons for rejecting the ITRs 
treaty. Similarly, the European Union Commission issued a memo explaining its view regarding the 
treaty. ISOC issues a statement supporting rejection of signing the treaty. On the other hand, 
                                                 
46  The issue of content was raised throughout the negotiations on the Final Acts. The interventions of western delegations 
during closing plenary session of the conference were revealing. For instance, The United Kingdom delegation justified its 
rejection to sign the Final Acts as follows: "we all agreed that content was not intended to be part of the ITRs, but content 
issues keep coming up". Similarly Sweden put it as follows: "Sweden has serious concerns about some of the provisions in 
this ITRs, especially in relation to content and security" (International Telecommunication Union 2012f, 30-31)   
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Russian delegation criticized the American decision. The ITU secretary-general issued a statement 
commenting on the outcome of the conference. These reactions, which are demonstrated below 
further clarify the rationale of each actor's stance during WCIT.  
   In an interview with Ambassador Terry Kramer, the head of the United States' delegation to 
WCIT (US Department of State 2012), he clarified that his country believes that the scope of ITRs 
should extend neither to Internet governance nor to content. He added that because other countries 
made it clear that the treaty should be extended to cover those issues, the United States can not be 
part of that consensus. 
   Kramer identified five critical issues in the ITRs that led his country to refrain from signing the 
treaty; four of them are related to the Internet. Firstly, expansion of the scope of the entities that will 
be subject to the regulations from 'recognized operating agencies' to 'operating agencies', which 
means that this scope has been extended to include the Internet Service Providers (ISPs). Secondly, 
the provision related to regulation of spam, which is a form of Internet content. For the United 
States, regulating spam will inevitably opens the door to regulation of other forms of content, 
including cultural and political speech. Thirdly, several proposals related to the Internet governance 
seek to enable governmental control over the Internet, specifically Internet naming and addressing 
functions.  The United States believes that these issues can only be handled through multi-
stakeholder organizations. Fourthly, the resolution on the Internet directly extends the scope into the 
Internet and of the ITU’s role therein.  The fifth reason, which is not related to the Internet, is an 
article of the treaty about 'security of telecommunication networks'; an issue considered by the 
United States as inappropriate to be placed under the ITRs. 
   Moreover, Kramer undermined the direct impact of the new treaty mentioning that he does not 
"see a lot of near-term or intermediate-term risks here, because it's not a legally binding document." 
Eventually, he affirmed that the United States will continue to support and advance the multi-
stakeholder model of Internet governance along with liberalized telecommunication markets.   
   After the closing of the WCIT, the European Commission issued a memo on December 14, 2014 
entitled "No change to telecoms and Internet governance: EU member states - amongst dozens not 
signing proposed new International Telecommunications Regulations (ITR) Treaty, remain 100% 
committed to open Internet" (European Commission 2012). The European Commission clarifies 
that a proposal to extend the scope of the treaty to cover Internet issues was made during the final 
discussions, which ruptured the possible compromise. The memo adds that a vote was then called 
by Iran, which subsequently determined the final revised version of the treaty text. It adds that the 
European Union's member states were not in a position to sign such revised version. 
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   According to the memo, the European Commission views the ITRs treaty in its current form a 
threat to the future of open Internet and Internet freedoms. The multi-stakeholder model should 
continue as a basis for Internet governance through the recent processes including the IGF and 
ICANN. Remarkably, the memo undermined the share of the signatory countries in international 
telecommunication traffic by mentioning that the signatories account for a "small proportion of 
global telecoms traffic." Thus, the European Commission invoked economic power as key factor in 
establishing an accepted international regulatory framework. Significantly, while the European 
states sought to address Internet administration issues during WSIS, they firmly refused to follow 
the same approach in WCIT. This reaffirms that the stance of European states during WSIS did not 
seek to address the Internet issues through intergovernmental channels. 
   Furthermore, the stance of the United States has been seconded by strong lobbying from the 
groups that oppose any restrictions on the Internet such as ISOC as well as the Internet's giant 
corporations like Google. Notably, the concerns about the outcome of the conference were fueled 
by the fact that it is convened in the United Arab Emirates, whose government was alarmed by the 
role of the Internet social networking in bringing about the Arab Spring (Pfanner 2012).  
   The statement of ISOC supported the United States' position indicating that the treaty is 
inconsistent with the multi-stakeholder model of Internet governance. The statement emphasized 
that the treaty should not extend to content of the Internet, or implicitly or explicitly undermines the 
principles that have made it so beneficial (Internet Society 2012c). This view was also supported by 
the Internet and web pioneers, Vinton Cerf and Tim Berners-Lee, who warned that any changes to 
the current Internet governance mechanisms could pose a "disruptive threat to the stability of the 
system" (Kelion 2012). 
   On the other hand, Russian delegation criticized the American stance. “The Americans are the 
fathers and mothers of the Internet, and we have to appreciate that… but words like ‘Internet’ and 
‘security’ should not be treated like curse words. They have been treated like curse words by some 
delegations at this conference” said Andrey V. Krutskikh, a Russian Foreign Ministry official. In an 
interview, Mr. Krutskikh expressed disappointment that the United States' position did not change 
after Russia conceded by accepting a mere resolution, rather than treaty text, on the issue of the 
Internet public policy issues. He added that the proposal sought to reflect the reality that the Internet 
is a telecommunication service that should be subject to governmental regulation affirming that it 
can not be considered a form of content as being claimed by the United States (Pfanner 2012). 
   Furthermore, ITU, in a statement issued after closing of the conference, emphasized that the 
repetition of the word 'Internet' throughout the conference is a recognition of the reality that the 
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"telecommunications and Internet are inextricably linked". The statement clarifies that the 
conference is not about the Internet governance and there are no provisions on the Internet in the 
treaty text.  It adds that a non-binding resolution annexed to the treaty aims at fostering growth and 
development of the Internet, which is a task central to the ITU’s mandate in connecting the world 
that "today still has two thirds of its population without Internet access." The statement affirms that 
scope of the new ITRs treaty does not cover content issues, and the first article explicitly states that 
the treaty does not cover content-related issues (International Telecommunication Union, 2012d
 
).   
   ITU further clarified that that the non-binding resolution on the Internet featured only in the 
treaty's appendices following the United States' efforts to remove it from the main regulations. It 
also indicated that the provision on spam in the treaty text was not related to deciding which content 
should or should not be permitted to get through, but about finding technical solutions to those 
sending "a million emails and flooding the pipes" (BBC 2012). 
   The above-mentioned reactions indicate that divergence over the Interne is not only on the entity 
that should be mandated to administer its architecture, but also on the different perceptions of such 
global network. Such divergence was framed in terms of perception where some actors perceive the 
Internet as form of content and others consider it a telecommunication service. Such framing of the 
issue adds a political and cultural aspect to the international controversy on the Internet governance 
since the debate extended beyond the administration of the Internet architecture that was the initial 
trigger behind placing the Internet on the international agenda. 
   Moreover, different perceptions of the Internet among actors participating in WCIT replicate the 
national debate that took place in the United States throughout the 1990s as demonstrated in chapter 
5. Clearly, the domestic dynamics of the United States, which settled the perception of the Internet 
as form of content, has determined the country's international stance on Internet governance. This 
indicates that the extent to which domestic politics can shape international stance of state actors. 
Conclusion 
   Examination of the key international events that addressed Internet governance demonstrates the 
struggle between various actors over how the Internet should be governed. Initially, there was no 
clarity about what constitute Internet governance, but it became clear that technical administration 
of the Internet represents only one component of the Internet governance. While the international 
debate on the Internet was launched under the label of Internet governance, most of the discussion 
had focused on the Internet technical administration that was the most controversial issue discussed 
under such label.  
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   The international debate over the Internet administration embodies the struggle between the 
traditional intergovernmental governance through governmental organizations versus the de-facto 
self-regulatory multi-stakeholder governance embodied in ICANN's system.   Evidently, the self-
regulatory multi-stakeholder approach has been internationally recognized as the appropriate 
governance model for the Internet administration. This represents recognition for ICANN's system 
as the appropriate arrangement for the technical administration of the Internet. Thus, the ongoing 
debate within the United Nations regarding Internet governance is not expected to change the status 
quo of the Internet administration. However, such debate might address international cooperation in 
issue-areas related to the Internet other than the Internet technical administration.   
   Furthermore, the domestic dynamics within the United States has shaped its international stance 
as to Internet governance. Without understanding how the Internet has evolved and the influence of 
the Internet epistemic community on shaping the American perception as to the Internet, it is 
difficult to account for the American stance that seeks to promote self-regulatory governance of the 
Internet. The state-centric approaches to international regimes, which focus on the international 
dynamics among state actors ignoring how perception and preference are constructed, fall short of 
providing coherent account for the American stance. Clearly, knowledge has explanatory power in 
this regard. 
   While the international debate on Internet governance focused initially on the Internet technical 
administration, it has evolved over time to include other political and cultural aspects related to 
different perceptions of the Internet. Western countries perceive the Internet as a forum for 
published content and free expression that should not subject to governmental interference in line 
with their liberal values.  On the other hand, certain states consider the Internet a communication 
tool that should be subject to governmental regulation. This indicates the extent to which different 
perceptions of the Internet can lead to divergent international stances of the relevant actors. 
   Finally, it is clear that multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance does not reflect 
'diminishing state role' in global governance of the network. Instead, multi-stakeholderism is the 
preference of the key state actors, particularly Western countries, which is based on constructed 
perception of these actors as to the utility and usefulness of such governance model.   
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Conclusions 
I. General conclusion  
The analytical work conducted throughout this study validates its hypothesis. The role of states does 
not diminish in regime formation. States, especially great powers, are the main actors that set 
international principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures. They create regimes 
in order to regulate international behavior as to global sectors, including the Internet. States 
deliberately enable certain non-state actors to participate in regime formation and 
governance of some global sectors, based on conscious perception of the utility and 
usefulness of such participation. However, the structural state-centric perspective, which 
views the world in terms of symmetrical units of states struggling to maximize their power 
and interests does not reflect the growing complexity of international relations in the era of 
globalization and complex interdependence.  
   Globalization and complex interdependence did not only lead to spread of transnational 
actors, but also enabled complex mutual interaction among state and non-state actors at 
both national and international levels, whereby non-state actors can affect states' perception 
of their preferences and interests. Moreover, proliferation of technology-based sectors, such 
as the Internet, enabled certain epistemic communities, which own the technical knowledge, 
to affect the relevant international policies related to these sectors as well as policymakers' 
perception of national interest. 
   Thus, states' behavior could be affected because of cognitive change of their interests, as 
opposed to the behavioral change that respond to structural dynamics like distribution of 
power and wealth. In this context, involvement of non-state actors in regime formation and 
global governance of some sectors, including the Internet, is a conscious preference of 
states; it is not an indicator of a 'diminishing state role.'    
      In the case of the Internet, the Internet epistemic community has established and 
developed an international regime for the Internet administration under the patronage of the 
United States' government. The principles and values of such community as well as the 
domestic dynamics contributed to shaping the American perception of the Internet as an 
open and free medium that should not be subject to governmental regulation and should be 
administered through multi-stakeholder arrangements. Such perception, which has spread to 
European states through the Internet epistemic community, is the basis of the American 
international stance as to the Internet. Hence, the multi-stakeholder administration of the 
Internet reflects conscious preference of the key states to involve non-state actors in the 
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relevant arrangements, which is based on constructed perception of interests as to the 
Internet. The following paragpraphs elaborates on this brief general conclusion in 
accordance with the outcome of the analysis carried out in the chapters of this study. 
II. Detailed conclusions     
   Since most of the literature addressed the Internet under the label of 'Internet governance', this 
study draws certain conceptual distinctions in order to set clear framework for the research. We 
draw a conceptual line between the 'Internet governance' and the 'Internet administration.'  The 
Internet governance is a broad concept that can involve any aspect related to the Internet such as the 
governance of its content or its physical infrastructure. From international regimes perspective, the 
Internet governance can involve wide-ranging spectrum of issue-areas such as technical 
administration, electronic commerce, protection of intellectual property rights, combating 
cybercrime, human rights online etc… On the other hand, the Internet administration specifically 
concerns the technical operation and management of the Internet. Thus, the Internet administration 
is one among many elements that could constitute Internet governance, which we have 
demonstrated throughout this study. However, the Internet administration is a key element of the 
Internet governance, since it can affect all the activities performed over the network.  
   This study focuses on the international regime related to the Internet administration, which we call 
the Internet architecture regime. This specification helps identify the relevant configuration of 
actors that can affect formation and administration of such regime. We used the label of Internet 
architecture regime since the Internet operation and functioning depends on its architectural 
components. Seeking to identify these architectural components, we have employed Lessig's and 
Domanski's conceptual models that break up the Internet into distinct layers where we have 
identified the technical protocols layer as the architectural layer of the Internet.  
   In this context, we argue that there are two architectural components responsible of the Internet 
functionality: the TCP/IP for communications and the DNS for addressing. The two components 
give the Internet its global status since TCP/IP is the common global language that enables 
communications to occur among independent networks worldwide, and DNS is the global system 
of addressing that guarantees the delivery of transmitted data to the right destination. Any host 
connected to the Internet must use TCP/IP and must be registered in the DNS name space.  
   These architectural components are not only responsible for the proper operation of the Internet, 
but also determine its expansion and growth. They give the Internet its two critical resources: IP 
addresses and domain names. The expansion and growth of the Internet depends on the availability 
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of IP addresses, which subsequently determines the extent to which the name space can be 
expanded over the global network. 
    Operationally, DNS combines those two critical resources of the Internet within a network of 
hierarchical database. While the structure of the Internet is extremely decentralized, the DNS 
database is the central point since it includes the authoritative list of all hosts connected to the 
Internet. The technical design of the DNS requires uniqueness of the domain name space 
(competing versions of domain names are not allowed) as well as the uniqueness of its policy 
authority (only one entity must coordinate the database of the name space). While the requirement 
of a unique DNS name space and a single authority to administer the system is a technical necessity, 
it is also a political arrangement for governing the system. The requirement that one entity should 
govern the system is inherently a political constraint. Moreover, the governance of the system can 
be exercised through the unique DNS name space, which determines who exists and who does not 
exist on the Internet. Thus, the DNS centrality along with the uniqueness requirement inherent in its 
technical design makes it an effective instrument to enforce policies over the Internet. The control 
flows down the hierarchy from the root into the remaining elements of the name space. Clearly, the 
technical design defines the political parameters of the system.  
   TCP/IP has been designed to avoid centralized control, both over the content of the network traffic 
and over its functionality. It was deliberately designed - according to the 'end-to-end' principle - to 
disregard the nature and purpose of data being transmitted, and to contain instead the minimum 
information required to enable exchange of data from one device to another. TCP/IP was designed 
to be permissive to the current decentralized structure of the Internet since any network that adopts 
TCP/IP can be easily connected to the Internet. This led to proliferation of the independent networks 
connected to the Internet worldwide. The deliberate design of TCP/IP to avoid centralized control 
has inherent political implications; for instance, it will limit the governmental control over the data 
transmitted. This reveals the extent to which the design of the Internet protocols has shaped the 
entire Internet environment. The Internet protocols can enable and constrain behavior on the 
Internet, such as enabling openness and anonymity and constraining centralized control and content 
censorship. 
   Consequently, the architectural components of the Internet, TCP/IP and DNS, are not only 
technical systems, but also have inherent political arrangements. They dictate the governance 
structure and define the political parameters of the Internet administration system. 
   This led us to argue that the technical parameters can define the framework of governance and 
determine the policy options in technology-based regimes such as the Internet technical 
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administration.  Therefore, in order to understand the governance of a technology-based regime 
such as the Internet technical administration, a careful examination of the technical design and 
technological characteristics is needed. In addition, this highlights the significance of the technical 
knowhow and knowledge, and to which extent it could shape governance structures and determine 
the range of possible policy options. 
   Furthermore, this conclusion led us to examine the role of the actors that have developed the 
architectural components of the Internet. We have indicated that the Internet architecture was 
developed by a group of researchers and engineers that constituted an epistemic community, which 
we call the Internet epistemic community. This community has emerged and developed under 
sponsorship of the United States government that gave it an extensive operational autonomy for 
constructing the network. In this regard, we draw another conceptual distinction between such 
community and other technical communities and groups that are associated with the Internet 
technology. We define the Internet epistemic community as the individuals, with technical 
knowledge and knowhow, who work voluntarily to preserve the smooth functionality and operation 
of the Internet through maintaining and upgrading its architectural layer. Other technical 
communities, such as software programmers and designers of hardware equipment, are not 
concerned with the Internet core operation.  
   Thus, we have examined the institutions developed by the Internet epistemic community, 
particularly IETF and ISOC, analyzing their historical and current role in the Internet 
administration. IETF has designed and maintained the Internet architectural components TCP/IP 
and DNS. It has created and expanded the Internet critical resources, IP addresses and domain 
names. IETF continues to provide solutions for the problems that might counter the expansion of 
the Internet, which was proved by its capability to upgrade the Internet protocols in order to 
overcome the problem of IP addresses' exhaustion. Without such solution, the expansion of the 
Internet was impossible. Despite the rivalry with the official standards-setting organization, such as 
ISO and ITU, IETF is the de-facto dominant institution that set the Internet's protocols and standards 
as well as the principal body responsible for maintaining its architecture. 
   Moreover, we have indicated that IETF has established and developed a system for administration 
of the Internet. IETF has created and administered IANA throughout the Internet history until 
establishment of ICANN. It has set a system for IP addresses allocation and delegation scheme for 
databases of domain names, which is currently the basis of ICANN's policy. We have also 
demonstrated that even with the creation of ICANN, IETF still play a significant role in maintaining 
the Internet ecosystem. Thus, IETF has established the Internet architecture and developed an 
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effective system for its administration. Accordingly, we conclude that IETF has established a de-
facto regime for governing the Internet architecture. 
   Furthermore, we have examined three aspects of IETF: institutional structure, principles and 
values, and policymaking model. Regarding the institutional structure, we have demonstrated that 
IETF represents an individual-based international community open to any interested individual 
without requirement of formal membership. The members of such community share common goal 
of preserving the smooth operation of the Internet through maintaining and developing its core 
architecture. IETF conducts much of its work on a daily basis via mailing lists. The institutional 
structure of IETF and its working methods makes it an open transnational community with common 
goals rather than an international organization with a structured membership. 
   Regarding the principles and values, we have indicated that the design of the Internet architecture - 
which determines the overall Internet design - can be traced to the principles adopted by the Internet 
epistemic community during the early stages of the Internet evolution. These principles, which is 
technically known as 'end-to-end, have been codified in special set of IETF's technical documents 
that describe the Internet design. The lack of centralized control, both over the content of the 
Internet's traffic and over its functions , follows from this 'end-to-end' design philosophy. We have 
indicated that these Internet’s architectural principles reflect the political and ethical beliefs and 
embody some value judgments of the Internet epistemic community. Those values have been 
deliberately advanced and reflected in the architectural design of the Internet. Therefore, we 
conclude that the current Internet architecture is not technologically deterministic or inevitable; 
rather it has been consciously and deliberately designed according to those values and principles. 
The possibility to create alternative Internet architecture existed, but the Internet epistemic 
community chose to create the design that reflects its values and principles. Those values and 
principles are centered on openness, lack of centralized control, providing the broadest access and 
use, and sharing of computing and communications resources as possible. 
   As to the policymaking model of IETF, we have investigated how IETF formulate the Internet 
standards and how decisions are taken about which standards to be adopted. The IETF's community 
has developed an informal practical policymaking model in order to create such standards through a 
process known as 'rough consensus and running code'. This process follows a decentralized bottom-
up approach where any individual or groups, including the newcomers, can introduce a proposal of 
standard, which will be subject to collective discussion and continuous refinement throughout 
several phases until it achieves the required 'rough consensus'. In such process, there is no central 
authority that prepares standards and proposes them for adoption. 'Rough consensus and running 
code' has constituted the guiding principle of governing the Internet architecture throughout the 
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Internet history. It has been the de-facto approach of creating norms in an environment that 
historically lacks central regulating authority. This policymaking model does not only characterize a 
technical process of standardization, but also the institutional system that governs it. It reflects the 
open structure of IETF itself, which lacks the formal character and requires no membership. 
Accordingly, this model and its guiding principle do not only reflect the technical values of IETF 
community, but also their political values that are evident in the very political structure of IETF. 
Therefore, we conclude that the informal open decentralized governance structure and the bottom-
up policymaking characterize the core political values of the Internet epistemic community, which 
are embodied in the open informal structure of IETF and its policymaking approach. Those values 
shape this community's perspective about governance of the Internet architecture as well as the 
Internet governance in general. Remarkably, the current administration system of the Internet 
mirrors those values. 
   Furthermore, we have indicated how IETF's policymaking model has dominated over the rival 
traditional model of the official standards setting organizations (particularly ISO) and became the 
normative decision-making model for setting the Internet standards. This dominance of IETF over 
the Internet protocols and standards was not deterministic nor was not inevitable; instead, IETF 
competitively succeeded to establish its prevalence in setting the rules of the Internet architecture. 
The political values of IETF community have become the fundamentals of governance over the 
Internet protocol layer. We have also demonstrated that the rivalry between IETF's model versus 
that of ISO embodies a struggle between two governance systems: informal bottom-up 
decentralized self-regulatory system of IETF versus highly formalized central system of ISO. Thus, 
the prevalence of IETF over ISO led to political implications regarding governance of the Internet 
architecture and administration of the Internet, which is the dominance of the open informal self-
regulatory governance model over the traditional formal country-based model. We have indicated 
that, the current ICANN's system is based on IETF's self-regulatory governance model. Therefore, 
we conclude that the political values of the Internet epistemic community are embedded in the 
current system of the Internet administration. 
   We have also indicated how the Internet epistemic community established ISOC, as the host 
organization to IETF, in order to support its goals and to promote its principles and values. ISOC, 
which officially became the institution representing the Internet epistemic community, has 
transformed the technical concepts of IETF into policy objectives. While IETF seeks to maintain the 
community's values through the architectural design of the Internet, ISOC promotes them within 
policy and public circles through its broad outreach to governmental and non-governmental entities 
across the world. IETF's values have evolved and moved from the technical level to the public and 
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political domain through ISOC. The technical concepts, which aimed initially to achieve technical 
efficiency, have evolved into political and social values that address public policy issues related to 
the Internet. The 'end-to-end' principle, decentralized structure, user-empowerment, and the bottom-
up standardization process have crystallized into policy goals such as openness, resistance to 
governmental control and regulation, freedom of expression, and self-regulatory form of 
governance. ISOC, with IETF as its technical affiliate, has emerged as a major non-state actor that 
seeks to limit governmental control over the Internet and to keep self-regulation as fundamental 
principle for the Internet administration. ISOC does not only focus on governance of the Internet 
architecture but also on the Internet governance as a whole, since its goals include supporting 
freedom of expression, opposing any efforts to restrict the type or content of information exchanged 
over the Internet, and opposing any governmental control over the Internet content. We conclude 
that the Internet epistemic community has transformed its technical principles, which aimed initially 
to achieve the optimal technical efficiency, into set of political and social values that promote self-
regulatory governance and non-governmental control over the administration and content of the 
Internet. 
   The Internet epistemic community has established a de-facto regime for governing the Internet 
architecture, which is the basis for the current system of the Internet administration. Such regime 
reflects the values and principles of such community, which have been deliberately advanced in the 
Internet design and the governance model of its architecture. Such community has evolved, along 
with the exponential growth of the Internet, into a transnational influential non-state actor that 
seeks to promote self-regulatory governance and non-governmental control over administration 
and content of the Internet. This indicates that the knowledge could have a significant explanatory 
power in understanding the dynamics related to the Internet architecture regime as well as the 
Internet governance as a whole. 
   Significantly, the evolution of the Internet epistemic community took place under the patronage of 
American government that provided an enabling environment for its members to consolidate and 
diffuse their principles and values into the design of the Internet. Moreover, the recruitment of the 
Interne epistemic community's members into the relevant governmental agencies, combined with 
the operational autonomy given to such community, allows for those principles and values to 
spread through the American governmental machinery.  
   We have investigated the domestic dynamics related to the Internet governance that took place 
within the United States throughout the 1990s, which accompanied the transition of the Internet 
from a research facility into a commercial public network. We have focused on how the United 
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States has constructed its perception as to the Internet as well as how it has identified its preference 
and interests regarding its governance with a view to clarify the premises of its policy in this regard.  
   The United States' domestic politics resulted in transforming the ad-hoc informal regime for 
managing the Internet architecture into a formal regime for the technical administration of the 
Internet with creation of ICANN. The Internet epistemic community has been the key influential 
actor in the formative process that led to establishment of the new regime due to its accumulated 
knowledge and historical experience in developing and administering the Internet architecture. We 
have concluded that the United States' government embraced the Internet epistemic community's 
principles of self-regulatory bottom-up governance for the Internet administration, which 
successfully characterized development of the Internet architecture. 
   Moreover, the United States' government has developed a conscious policy towards the Internet, 
which goes beyond the mere administration of the Internet architecture. This policy considers the 
Internet a valuable commercial medium that can be used as a vehicle to boost and enhance the 
American economy.  
   Furthermore, the Internet has been perceived nationally as a medium that should reflect and 
promote the liberal values of openness and freedom of expression. It is a medium for published 
content where civil liberties should be protected from governmental interference. Thus, the non-
governmental control and interference in both administration and content of the Internet has 
materialized as preference of the United States regarding the Internet. Such preference shapes the 
American international stance towards the Internet governance, which is clearly reflected in its 
position to promote the model of non-governmental self-regulatory governance for the Internet.  
   While the United States generally oppose governmental regulation of the Internet and promotes 
multi-stakeholder approach to its administration, it has consciously resorted to intergovernmental 
organizations, as the case in the WTO and WIPO, in order to establish international regimes that 
promote its commercial interests over the Internet. This led us to conclude that states, particularly 
the Untied States, are still the main player in formation of the international regimes related to the 
Internet. The self-regulatory administration of the Internet by delegated non-state actors has been a 
preference perceived by states as the most convenient arrangement that ensures the network's 
smooth operation, which is not the case for other Internet-related regimes such as e-commerce and 
intellectual property. Clearly, self-regulatory arrangement of the Internet administration is a 
constructed preference of the United States; it is not an indicator for 'diminishing state role' in 
regime formation.  
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   Moreover, we further conclude that international cooperation regarding the Internet can take 
different forms with various configurations of actors based on the issue-area of such cooperation. 
For instance, the Internet architecture regime was formed through United States' national process 
that was associated with extensive influence of the Internet epistemic community, whereas the 
international regimes related to electronic commerce and protection of intellectual property rights 
over the Internet were formed by state actors through WTO and WIPO respectively. 
   Then, we have explored the governance framework of the new Internet architecture regime 
through examination of ICANN, which currently assumes the responsibility of the Internet technical 
administration. We have investigated three aspects related to ICANN: the role of the Internet 
epistemic community in ICANN's system, the evolution of ICANN and its quest for international 
legitimacy through broadening the scope of stakeholders associated with its system including 
national governments, and ICANN's relationship with the American government. Firstly, we have 
indicated how the Internet epistemic community, through ISOC, has played an influential role in 
formation of the new Internet architecture regime that led to establishment of ICANN. Members of 
such community drafted ICANN's bylaws and established its governance structure. We have also 
demonstrated that ICANN's system is functioning through a self-regulatory bottom-up process 
replicating IETF policymaking process. Moreover, the Internet epistemic community, represented 
by IETF, has secured itself significant influential role in ICANN's system by the favor of its 
knowledge of maintaining the Internet architecture. We have concluded that ICANN embodies 
values, principles, and governance model that were developed by the Internet epistemic community 
throughout the Internet history. 
   Secondly, we have demonstrated that the dominance of the technical community over ICANN's 
governance structure as well as the oversight role of the United States on its decisions triggered 
international criticism for ICANN since its inception. Such criticism led ICANN to conduct a 
revolutionary reform process that aimed at acquiring broader international legitimacy. The reform 
resulted in enhancing the institutional role of governments within ICANN's system - without 
undermining its non-governmental nature -well as enlarging the representation scope for other 
Internet stakeholders. We have concluded that this multi-stakeholder governance embodied in 
ICANN's system became the basis of its international legitimacy. Such multi-stakeholderism became 
a model for global governance whose legitimacy is based on participation of all the relevant 
stakeholders in the policy making process. 
   Thirdly, we have investigated the relationship between ICANN and the United States' government 
through examination of the contractual documents signed between the two parties, whereby 
ICANN is delegated to assume administration of the Internet. We have indicated that despite the 
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American authority over the DNS root and its oversight function over ICANN's decisions, the 
substantive policies related to administration of the Internet have been formulated through a bottom-
up and self-regulatory process conducted by ICANN.  The role of the United States' government 
was limited to be a facilitator for this process without direct intervention. However, the continuous 
international pressure eventually led American government to announce its decision to relinquish 
control over the DNS root as well as its oversight function over ICANN, which enhanced ICANN's 
legitimacy.  
   Moreover, we have also indicated that multi-stakeholder model is not a unique example in global 
governance. We have demonstrated that there are well-established international regimes based on 
similar models. Thus, ICANN's system is not an anomaly, and can sustain as global governance 
model for the Internet administration, where non-state actors are indispensable players. Therefore, 
we have concluded that self-regulation and bottom-up policymaking as well as multi-stakeholder 
governance, embodied in ICANN's system, are expected to continue characterizing parameters of 
the Internet architecture regime. We have also concluded that multi-stakeholder approach to global 
governance, including the Internet administration, is a conscious preference of states, rather than 
an indication of a 'diminishing state role' in formation and administration of international regimes. 
 
   Furthermore, we have examined the key international events that addressed Internet governance, 
particularly WSIS and WCIT in order to investigate the struggle between various actors over how 
the Internet should be governed. Since the Internet governance was a new issue placed on the 
international agenda, there was no clarity about what constitute Internet governance during the early 
phases of the relevant international debate. However, such debate made it clear that technical 
administration of the Internet represents only one component of the Internet governance. Moreover, 
while the international debate on the Internet was launched under the label of Internet governance, 
most of the discussion had focused on the Internet technical administration that was the most 
controversial issue discussed under such label.  
   We have demonstrated that the international debate over the Internet administration embodies the 
struggle between the traditional intergovernmental governance through intergovernmental 
organizations versus the de-facto self-regulatory multi-stakeholder governance embodied in 
ICANN's system. We conclude that the self-regulatory multi-stakeholder approach has been 
internationally recognized as the appropriate governance model for the Internet administration. 
This represents recognition for ICANN's system as the appropriate arrangement for the technical 
administration of the Internet. Thus, the ongoing debate within the United Nations regarding 
Internet governance is not expected to change the status quo of the Internet administration. 
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However, such debate might address international cooperation in issue-areas related to the Internet 
other than the Internet technical administration. 
   We further conclude that multi-stakeholder approach to Internet governance does not reflect 
'diminishing state role' in global governance of the network. Instead, multi-stakeholderism is the 
preference of the key state actors, particularly Western countries, which is based on constructed 
perception of these actors as to the utility and usefulness of such governance model. 
    We have also indicated that the international stance of the United States, which seeks to promote 
self-regulatory governance of the Internet, has been shaped by its domestic dynamics that took place 
throughout the Internet history. Without understanding how the Internet has evolved and the 
influence of the Internet epistemic community on shaping the American perception as to the 
Internet, it is difficult to account for such American stance. The state-centric approaches to 
international regimes, which focus on the international dynamics among state actors ignoring how 
perception and preference are constructed, fall short of providing coherent account for the United 
States' stance. Clearly, knowledge has explanatory power in this regard.  
   While the international debate on Internet governance focused initially on the Internet technical 
administration, it has evolved over time to include other political and cultural aspects related to 
different perceptions of the Internet. Western countries perceive the Internet as a forum for 
published content and free expression that should not subject to governmental interference in line 
with their liberal values.  On the other hand, certain states consider the Internet a communication 
tool that should be subject to governmental regulation. This indicates the extent to which different 
perceptions of the Internet can lead to divergent international stances of the relevant actors. The 
interest-based approaches to international regimes is not sufficient for providing convincing 
account for such international divergence on the Internet.  
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Appendix I 
 
The Internet pioneers 
 
   J.C.R Licklider worked as associate professor in the department of electrical engineering at 
MIT (1950-1957). He Worked as vice president at the company that was subsequently 
contracted by ARPA to design ARPANET, Bolt Beranek and Newman (BBN) (1957-1962). 
He then worked as a director of the IPTO at ARPA (1962-1964), where he formulated the 
earliest ideas of global networking in a series of memos about an “Intergalactic Computer 
Network", which envisioned the predecessor of today's Internet, ARPANET. From 1964–
1967, Licklider served as consultant to IBM director of research. He Taught at MIT as 
professor of electrical engineering and then professor of computer science (1967–1985) and 
then he went on leave from MIT (1974 to 1975) to serve a second time as director or 
ARPA/IPTO (Kita 2003). 
    
   Vinton Cerf began his career as assistant professor at Stanford University (1972–1976). He 
was recruited by ARPA and became ARPANET project manager (1976-1982), and then 
served as vice-president of MCI (1982-86). Cerf is now vice-president and Chief Internet 
Evangelist for Google (Google 2014b). 
 
   Robert Khan began his work on the Technical Staff at Bell Laboratories and then became 
an Assistant Professor of Electrical Engineering at MIT. Then he joined BBN, where he was 
responsible for the system design of the ARPANET. In 1972, he moved to ARPA and 
subsequently became Director of ARPA's Information Processing Techniques Office (IPTO). 
While he was Director of IPTO, he was able to mobilize one billion dollar from the United 
States government for Strategic Computing Program, which was then the largest computer 
research and development program ever undertaken by the United States federal government. 
Kahn conceived the idea of open-architecture networking. He is a co-inventor of the TCP/IP 
protocols and was responsible for originating ARPA's Internet Program. Kahn also coined 
the term National Information Infrastructure (NII) in the mid 1980s, which later became 
more widely known as the Information Super Highway (Corporation for National Research 
Initiatives 2014). 
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Appendix II 
  How does the Internet operate? 
   The Internet is based on a 'packet switching' technology. This technology 
represents a unique communication model, where the content is converted into a 
digital form of the machine language that takes the shape of binary numbers (0 or 
1). The packet switching technology divides the content of communication into well 
defined, small groups of coded data, each with specific identifying numerical 
address. Once the content is digitized, it can be transmitted over the Internet in the 
form of packets. This communication model enables sending an unlimited number 
of packets through the same circuit. The routers are responsible to deliver the 
packets to the intended destination (Mathiason 2009, 6-7). This process is 
implemented by the TCP/IP and the DNS as demonstrated below. 
1. Transmission Communication Protocol/ Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) 
   A protocol can be defined as a set of standards and rules for communication that 
are used by computers when they send data packets back and forth. Both the sender 
and recipient involved in the same data transfer must have the same protocols 
(Blank 2004, 14). The Internet standards are formulated in IETF's technical 
documents called Request For Comments (RFC), which are given serial numbers 
from 1 onwards (Dostálek and Kabelová 2006, 5). The IETF, which is the dominant 
institution for setting and developing Internet protocols and standards, formulate 
and issue those RFCs. IETF lays down the motivation of the Internet protocols
47
 as 
follows:  
"The internet Protocol[s] is designed for use in interconnected systems 
of packet-switched computer communication networks…The internet 
protocol[s] provides for transmitting blocks of data called datagrams 
from sources to destinations, where sources and destinations are hosts 
identified by fixed length addresses. The internet protocol[s] also 
provides for fragmentation and reassembly of long datagrams, if 
necessary, for transmission through small packet networks" (Postel 
1980, 1). 
  Furthermore, IETF sets the operation of the Internet protocol[s] as follows: 
                                                 
47 Internet protocol is sometimes used to describe the standardized Internet networking protocols that consist of 
two elements, Transmission Communication Protocol (TCP) and Internet Protocol (IP). This study uses the plural 
format, Internet protocols, to refer to these two elements in order to avoid confusing them with Internet protocol as 
only one element.   
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"The internet protocol[s] implements two basic functions:  addressing and 
fragmentation.  The internet modules use the addresses carried in the 
internet header to transmit internet datagrams toward their destinations. 
The selection of a path for transmission is called routing.  The internet 
modules use fields in the internet header to fragment and reassemble 
internet datagrams when necessary for transmission through "small 
packet" networks.  The model of operation is that an internet module 
resides in each host engaged in internet communication and in each 
gateway that interconnects networks.  These modules share common rules 
for interpreting address fields and for fragmenting and assembling 
internet datagrams. In addition, these modules (especially in gateways) 
may have procedures for making routing decisions and other functions" 
(Postel 1980, 2). 
   The growing number of independent networks connected to the predecessor of the 
Internet, ARPANET, brought about the need to develop a standard routing protocol 
to serve as a gateway between networks to send and receive data. In 1983, 
ARPANET and all the networks linked to it, adopted TCP/IP as the networking 
protocols, which were developed in the 1970s by Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn. 
From then on, ARPANET and all affiliated networks that use TCP/IP became to be 
collectively known as the Internet. 
   Therefore, the Internet protocols, TCP/IP, are the standardized communication 
language of the Internet. TCP/IP enables interconnectivity among different 
networks. Every host connected to the Internet is provided with a copy of the 
TCP/IP. The standardization of the TCP/IP contributed substantially to the 
exponential growth of the Internet. The TCP/IP consists of two layers. The first 
layer is the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) that disbands a message (of the 
sender's computer) into small packets, which are subsequently transmitted over the 
Internet, and then received by a TCP layer (of the recipient's computer) that 
reassembles those packets into the original message. The second layer is the 
Internet protocol (IP), which is responsible for routing those packets into the right 
destination where they reassembled by TCP into the original message (Blank 2004, 
6-10). Dostálek and Kabelová (2006, 239) provide simplified explanation for 
TCP/IP as follows : 
"TCP is an upper layer protocol from the IP point of view. The first 
question that always occurs to a beginner is 'why do we need two 
protocols, IP and TCP?' While IP transmits data between two individual 
computers on the Internet, TCP transfers data between two actual 
applications running on these two computers. IP is used for data transfers 
between computers. An IP address is the address only of a computer's 
network interface, while TCP uses a port number as its address. If we 
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were to compare this to a standard postal system, the IP address would be 
the building address and the port number (the address in TCP) would be 
the name of an actual resident in the building." 
  The Internet protocol (IP) uses the Internet Protocol address (IP address) to route 
the data packets into the intended destination. The Internet Protocol address is 
simply a series of numbers assigned to each device connected to the Internet, which 
serves as an identifier of the location of that device (Blank 2004, 68). The system of 
the Internet protocol, known as IP version 4 (IPv4), determines IP address as 32-bit 
number (Blank 2004, 76). IETF describes the function of IP address as follows:  
"A distinction is made between names, addresses, and routes. A name 
indicates what we seek. An address indicates where it is. A route 
indicates how to get there. The internet protocol deals primarily with 
addresses….Addresses are fixed length of four octets (32 bits)" (Postel 
1981b, 7). 
   Significantly, IPv4 has pool of 4.3 billion unique addresses that have not been 
sufficient to satisfy the accelerating growth of the Internet. The designers of IPv4 
did not anticipate this exponential growth of the networks connected to the Internet, 
which eventually led to the depletion of the available 4.3 billion IPv4 addresses 
(Chimiak, Patton, and Janansky 2013, 62). On February 2011, the exhaustion of the 
available free pool of IPv4 addresses has been officially announced (Number 
Resources Organization 2011). This limitation of the addressing space means that 
new devices could not connect to the Internet. 
   Early before the actual exhaustion of IP addresses in 2011, IETF designed a 
successor version of IPv4 to compensate for the rapidly diminishing of addressing 
space (Internet Engineering Task Force 2007). IPv6 has expanded the addressing 
space from 4.3 billion addresses to 340 undecillion (i.e. 340 trillion trillion trillion), 
which means a growth factor of 79 octillion (billion billion billion) (Goldman 2012).  
However, the migration from IPv4 to IPv6 has accelerated only after the actual 
exhaustion of the available IP addresses. IPv6 was standardized by IETF in 1998 
with the following motivation:  
"IP version 6 (IPv6) is a new version of the Internet Protocol,   designed 
as the successor to IP version 4 (IPv4) [RFC-791].  The   changes from 
IPv4 to IPv6 expand Addressing Capabilities… IPv6 increases the IP 
address size from 32 bits to 128 bits, to support more levels of 
addressing hierarchy" (Deering and Hinden. 1998, 2). 
   Clearly, the number of IP addresses determines to which extent the Internet can 
grow. Without an IP address, the existence over the Internet system is impossible. 
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With their function as identifiers for each host
48
 connected to the Internet, IP 
addresses represent critical resource of the Internet. Moreover, it is clear that IETF 
has played the main role in designing and maintaining the Internet architecture. 
IETF has designed and standardized TCP/IP, which is a core element of the Internet 
architecture that ensures growth of the Internet and interconnectivity among its 
networks. IETF's role continues in maintaining and upgrading such architecture, 
which has been evident in the creation of IPV6 as a solution provided for the 
depletion of IPV4 addresses. 
The role of IETF in establishing system for administration of IP addresses 
allocation
49
 
   In addition to its role in creating, designing and expanding IP addresses space, 
IETF has established a system for administration of IP addresses allocation and 
assumed the responsibility of managing such system until the creation of the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1999. The 
guidelines for management of IP address space have been formulated in a series of 
IETF's RFCs documents: RFC 1466 (Gerich 1993), RFC 2050 (Hubbard et al. 
1996), and RFC 7020 (Housley et al. 2013). 
   IETF has created what is known as the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 
(IANA), whose main task is the allocation of IP addresses in accordance with the 
prescribed guidelines. IANA is a "role, not an organization", for managing the top 
of IP addresses hierarchy (Housley et al. 2013, 4). In performing its functions for 
global IP addresses allocation, IANA delegates five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs) – each 
of which serves a continental region - for subsequent allocation of IP addresses. 
IANA allots IP addresses from the pools of unallocated addresses to these RIRs 
according to their needs. RIRs subsequently allocate IP addresses to Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) and users within their areas. When an RIR needs more IP 
addresses for allocation within its region, IANA can make an additional allocation 
to that RIR (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 2015a). Thus, the system of IP 
addresses allocation depends on delegating responsibilities by IANA to RIRs, as 
sub-administrators, which subsequently allocate IP addresses to ISPs and users. 
                                                 
48 Host can be defined as "any device (such as workstation, server, mainframe, or printer) on a network or 
internetwork that has a TCP/IP address" (Blank 2004, 3). 
49 Since Internet users need IP addresses to connect to the Internet, there has been a need for a system of IP 
addresses allocation to organize assignment of IP addresses to these users.   
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    Such system of delegating responsibility to regional sub-administrators as well as 
identifying qualifications of these sub-administrators has been established by IETF 
(Gerich 1992, 1-2). This delegation of responsibilities and division of labor is a 
distinguishing characteristic of the Internet ecosystem. 
   Remarkably, IETF's administration of IANA had been actually implemented by 
Jonathan Postel, who assumed this role until his death in 1998. Postel had been one 
of the founders and prominent figures of IETF known for his role as the editor of its 
RFCs document series since its inception (Cerf 1998, 1-2). In 1999, administration 
of IANA has been delegated to the newly created non-profit organization, ICANN, 
according to a contract signed with the United States government (US National 
Telecommunications and Information Administration 2015a). The current system of 
IP addresses allocations are made in line with the ICANN Global Policy (Internet 
Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers 2014f). Significantly, this ICANN 
Global Policy is based on the same system that has been initially established and 
administered by IETF including delegation of responsibility to RIRs.  Therefore, 
IETF has established the foundations of IP addresses allocation system that is 
currently administered by ICANN. 
   Furthermore, even after moving IANA administration from IETF to ICANN, 
ICANN has allocated IPV4 addresses in coordination with IETF (Internet Assigned 
Numbers Authority 2014). After establishment of IPV6, IETF delegated IPV6 
addresses management to IANA in 1995 in accordance with RFC1881 (Internet 
Architecture Board and Internet Engineering Steering Group 1995), and the relevant 
procedure was confirmed with IETF's chair in 2000 (Internet Assigned Numbers 
Authority 2013). Hence, although IANA functions have been delegated to ICANN, 
IETF still a key player regarding IP addresses allocation. 
   Whereas IP addresses are the 'numerical' identifiers of each host connected to the 
Internet, domain names are the corresponding 'alphanumeric' identifiers. DNS 
combines both identifiers in order to achieve its role as 'naming' and 'addressing' 
system of the Internet. The following paragraphs demonstrate the foundations of 
DNS. 
2. Domain Name System (DNS) 
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   As indicated above, IP address is a sequence of numbers identifying each device 
connected to the Internet. For IPV4, IP address takes the form of xxx.xxx.xxx.xxx, 
with each 'xxx' ranges from 0 to 255 (for example 192.0.2.54). IPv6 expanded the 
range so that each 'x' can be a 0 through 9 or 'a' through 'f'  and it's structured as 
follows: xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx:xxxx (for example, 
2001:0db8:582:ae33:30) (Deering and Hinden 2006, 4)  
   Since it is difficult to remember IP addresses, it was necessary to develop a more 
human-friendly readable format to facilitate communications among hosts 
connected to the Internet. The idea has emerged to register host names that 
correspond to IP addresses; so that each host can be located by its name through a 
'name resolution' process, which converts such name into the corresponding IP 
address. 
  At the early stages of the Internet, the initial idea was to maintain a file, known as 
HOSTS.TXT file, which contains a list of all host names and their corresponding IP 
addresses in one single file. When a new host was to be connected to the Internet, a 
simple entry had to be inserted into HOSTS.TXT file with the name and the 
corresponding IP address of this new host. The idea is similar to a phone book that 
includes the names and their corresponding phone numbers, and is being updated 
continuously to reflect the new additions. When a host was to connect to another 
host on the Internet, it could use the name of this host, and TCP/IP would look at 
the HOSTS.TXT file in order to translate the name into the corresponding IP 
address (Blank 2004, 190). 
   Initially, each host maintained a copy of the "HOSTS.TXT" file, which provided a 
chart of host names and the corresponding IP addresses in a set of simple text 
records that were readable by an individual or program. With any modification of 
the hosts file, each host had to download the updated version of the file. In 1973, 
IETF realized that keeping multiple copies of the "HOSTS.TXT" file at each host 
proved inefficient. Consequently, IETF proposed, in its RFC 606, centralization of 
maintaining the hosts file, whereby the file will be kept online on a single host that 
is accessible to anyone without a need for copies at each host (Deutsch, Peter1973, 
1). The matter was further addressed in RFC 608 (Kudlick, 1974) and RFC 623 
(Krilanovich, 1974) until it was settled  in 1974 (RFC 625) that the Stanford Research Institute 
158 
 
Network Information Center (SRI-NIC) would serve as the official source 
maintaining the master hosts file  (Kudlick and Feinler 1974)
50
.  
   HOSTS.TXT file was stored on what is known as 'name server', which is the 
computer or the server performing the resolution (conversion) of names into their 
corresponding IP addresses. With the exponential growth of the Internet, the file 
turned out to be unmanageable and only one 'name server' proved to be insufficient 
to perform the required functions. The process of the name resolution (converting a 
host name into its corresponding IP address) became to be bottlenecked (Blank 
2004, 190). 
   Seeking to solve this problem, IETF members wrote several RFCs aiming to find 
out a more effective system. Those efforts resulted in outlining what is known as 
the Domain Name System (DNS), which had been introduced by Paul Mockapetris 
in RFC 882 that presents the conceptual framework of the system (Mockapetris, 
1983a). This was followed by RFC 883, which presents the operational aspects of 
the system (Mockapetris, 1983b). IETF continued its effort to develop the system, 
which has been eventually established in RFCs 1034 (Mockapetris, 1987a) and 
RFCs 1035 (Mockapetris, 1987b). 
   The basic idea of DNS is to divide the task of name resolution between several 
'name servers' in order to avoid the bottleneck that had been associated with a single 
name server performing such task. DNS makes it possible for several 'name servers' 
to coexist, and enables communications among them. Thus, DNS consists of a 
network of name servers; each of them contributes to the name resolution 
(Mockapetris 1983a, 1-3). Klein (2002, 195) provides a simple explanation for DNS 
operation as follows: 
"Internally, the DNS consists of a database and a dynamic lookup 
service. The database includes pairs of domain names and IP numbers. 
Domain names are alphanumeric (and hence human-friendly) 
identifiers of computers on the Internet. IP (Internet Protocol) numbers 
(or addresses) are machine-friendly numeric identifiers. For example, a 
given computer's domain name might be mycomputer.org, and its 
corresponding IP number might be 12.34.56.78. The DNS resolves 
{translates} domain names into IP numbers. In name resolution, the 
DNS accepts a domain name from a user and returns the corresponding 
number. The DNS computers performing name resolution are called 
                                                 
50 Jonathan Postel had been in charge of maintaining this file, along with administration of IANA, until his death 
in 1998. 
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name servers. Only after resolution has occurred can the user-to-user e-
mail or web communication begin" 
  Nevertheless, this is a simplified explanation for DNS. Operationally, DNS is a 
distributed database that contains IP addresses and the corresponding host names. 
The database is distributed since one database containing all host names on the 
Internet can not be efficient. Instead of maintaining all host names and IP addresses 
in a single overloaded database, DNS divides the job across the Internet. In other 
words, instead of having a single name server containing one database of all host 
names and IP addresses, DNS distributes the task over many name servers where 
each of them has its own database that contains specific category of host names and 
their corresponding IP addresses.  In order to do this, categorization of host names 
had been required. 
   Categories of the Internet host names are called 'domains', and categorization of 
these domains follows a hierarchical structure where 'Top-Level Domains' are at the 
top of the hierarchy. IETF conceptualizes domains in RFC 920 as follows: 
"Domains are administrative entities. The purpose and expected use of 
domains is to divide the name management required of a central 
administration and assign it to sub-administrations…Most of the 
requirements and limitations on domains are designed to ensure 
responsible administration… The domain system is a tree-structured 
global name space that has a few top-level domains. The top-level 
domains are subdivided into second level domains. The second level 
domains may be subdivided into third level domains, and so on" (Postel 
and Reynolds 1984, 1). 
   All host names on the Internet is referred to as 'name space' and the hierarchical 
subdivision (or the tree-structured) of this name space is known as 'domain name 
space' (Mockapetris 1987a, 6). The domains serve the purpose of dividing the labor 
regarding management of the Internet name space. They enable distribution of tasks 
among sub-administrators. Therefore, domain can be defined as "a unique portion 
of the name space in which an administrator creates an authoritative database of 
records to give resolution of names within the zone to an IP address" (Blank 2004, 
190).  
   The Top-Level Domains are specific categories of host names; for instance, .edu 
domain includes the hosts of the educational institutions, and .com domain contains 
hosts of the commercial organizations (Postel and Reynolds. 1984, 7). There are 
two kinds of Top-Level Domain: Generic Top-Level Domain (gTLD) and Country 
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Code Top-Level Domain (ccTLD). The most famous gTLDs are .com, .net, .edu, 
and .mil; which are mostly used in the United States. ccTLD is composed of two 
letters referring to specific country in accordance with the relevant ISO standard 
(Postel 1994, 1). For example, .eg domain refers to Egypt and .uk domain refers to 
the United Kingdom. 
   Those Top-Level Domains are subdivided into second-level domains, and so 
forth. Apple.com is an example of second-level domains. Each Top-Level Domain 
keeps a database that contains all the second-level domains. Subsequently, each 
second-level domain keeps a database for the next layer, and so forth. The databases 
maintained by the Top-Level domains are used to identify DNS servers (i.e. name 
servers) of the next layer. For instance, .com database contains the data needed to 
locate all .com DNS servers. Then, apple.com server maintains a database 
containing all the host names and the corresponding IP addresses of its sub-hosts 
(such as store.apple.com). In other words, the Top-Level Domains are further 
divided into sub-domains for particular entities (company, organization, etc…), 
such as google.com. This sub-domain can be broken up into lower levels of sub-
domains such as news.google.com and images.google.com and so forth (Dostálek 
and Kabelová 2006, 274-275). 
   The root is at the top of the domain name space. The root zone file describes 
where the DNS servers for Top-Level Domains are located; i.e., which server the 
user has to ask for names ending in one of TLDs, such as .com, .edu, or .eg. IANA 
is the single authority that can edit the root zone file. The root name servers publish 
the root zone file to other DNS servers and clients on the Internet (Karrenberg 
2007).  
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Figure (2)
 51
: Part of the domain name space. 
These distributed databases of DNS operate as follows: 
"When network users attempt to connect to an Internet address, their 
computer send a request to the nearest name server, which searches for the 
IP number for that address. If it can not find the number, it asks another 
name server, and so on until the correct IP number is found and the 
message is delivered or the site is called up. The first name server stores 
the IP number for a set amount of time, so that the user (or other users) can 
access the site more quickly on the next attempt. The DNS is known as a 
distributed database; it encompasses all the name servers around the planet, 
but there is no single organization or site that stores all the information on 
all the name servers. Distributed databases can typically handle vast growth 
without encountering problems related to size." (Moschovitis 1999, 118). 
   Therefore, DNS has three major components: domain name space (the 
hierarchical structure of the name space), name servers (which maintain the 
databases including the information about each of name space subdivision), and 
resolvers (programs extracting information from name servers in response to client 
requests) (Mockapetris 1987a, 6).  
   The question arises about who coordinates this division of labor of DNS's 
management. IANA assumes such responsibility along with its above-mentioned 
role in allocation of IP addresses. IANA is responsible for the management of the 
DNS 'root zone'. This role means the responsibility of assigning (selecting) the 
operators of Top-level Domains, and maintaining their administrative and technical 
details (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 2015b). In order to perform these 
tasks, IANA maintains the 'Root Zone Database', which includes the delegation 
details of Top-Level Domains. IANA coordinates these delegations in accordance 
with its established policies and procedures (Internet Assigned Numbers Authority 2015c).  
   In this regard, the responsibility of operating each Top-Level Domain is delegated 
by IANA to a particular entity, which maintains a registry (database) of the domain 
names registered under this Top-Level Domain. These entities are referred to as 
'registry operators' (Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers 2014g). 
While administration of generic Top-Level Domains (gTLDs) are assigned to 
private entities that do not have geographical or country designation, administration 
of country code Top-Level Domains (ccTLDs) are assigned to individual country 
                                                 
51 https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/cc786128(v=ws.10).aspx. 
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managers, which are mostly governmental entities performing a public service on 
behalf of their Internet communities (Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and 
Numbers 1999). For instance, VeriSign (private company) operates the generic 
Top-Level Domain of .com, and the Egyptian Supreme Council of Universities 
(national entity) operates the country-code Top-Level Domain of .eg (Internet 
Assigned Numbers Authority 2015c
 
). 
   Each generic Top-Level Domains registry (such as VeriSign for .com domain) 
operates its corresponding domain through a contract with ICANN, which currently 
administers IANA (Internet Corporation of Assigned Names and Numbers 2014c). 
Each country code Top-Level Domain manager (such as Supreme Council of 
Universities for .eg domain) operates its corresponding domain under a 
memorandum of understanding with ICANN (Internet Corporation of Assigned 
Names and Numbers 2014d). Significantly, IETF – during its administration of 
IANA - has established the DNS structure as well as the above-mentined delegation 
system, which has been laid in RFC 1591 (Postel 1994). This structure and 
delegation system is the basis for the current system administered by ICANN. 
  Interestingly, the domain names management is based on the same principle of IP 
addresses allocation: the division of labor and delegation of responsibilities.  The 
delegation of Top-Level Domains' management to sub-administrators is similar to 
the delegation of subsequent IP addresses to Regional Internet Registries (RIRs).  It 
is clear that delegation of responsibilities and division of labor is a distinguishing 
characteristic of the Internet ecosystem, where IANA is the single authority 
responsible of formulating the relevant policies. Apparently, the driver behind such 
principle of delegation is to achieve efficiency and resilience in the administration 
of the whole Internet system. Thus, technical and administrative efficiency is the 
value that characterizes IETF's decisions related to design and administration of the 
Internet architecture.    
   Furthermore, the domain names are another critical resource of the Internet along 
with IP addresses. Both domain names and IP addresses are the building blocks that 
compose the Internet architecture. They are the unique identifiers of each host 
connected to the Internet.  In other words, they are manifestation of the existence 
over the Internet. Since DNS operates through combination of those unique 
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identifiers, the following paragraphs investigate whether DNS can be a system of 
governing the Internet.  
Does DNS represent a system of governing the Internet? 
   DNS defines the name space of the Internet, which lists all hosts connected to the 
Internet. For a computer to exist on the Internet, it must be registered in the name 
space. Without such registration (without a domain name and corresponding IP 
address), a host cannot be found on the Internet. Elimination of a computer from the 
name space represents an expulsion from the Internet, since this computer 
disappears from the listing of addressable hosts (Klein 2002, 194-195).  
   IETF claims that the domain name space must be unique and must be 
administered by a single entity. Only one name space includes the definitive listing 
of all hosts on the Internet should exist.  While copies are permitted to coexist, 
independent name spaces are not allowed since they could end up having different 
contents. With the existence of several independent name spaces, a given domain 
name could be translated into different IP addresses based on which name space is 
used, which could make the communication unreliable. This accordingly requires a 
global unique 'root', which should be supported by a set of 'root servers' 
administered by a single authority. IETF explains the rationale behind the 
uniqueness requirement of name space as follows: 
"To remain a global network, the Internet requires the existence of 
globally unique public name space.  The DNS name space is a 
hierarchical name space derived from a single, globally unique root.  This 
is a technical constraint inherent in the design of the DNS. Therefore, it is 
not technically feasible for there to be more than one root in the public 
DNS.  That one root must be supported by a set of coordinated root 
servers administered by a unique naming authority. Put simply, deploying 
multiple public DNS roots would raise a very strong possibility that users 
of different ISPs who click on the same link on a web page could end up 
at different destinations, against the will of the web page designers. This 
does not preclude private networks from operating their own private name 
spaces, but if they wish to make use of names uniquely defined for the 
global Internet, they have to fetch that information from the global DNS 
naming hierarchy, and in particular from the coordinated root servers of 
the global DNS naming hierarchy...The DNS fulfills an essential role 
within the Internet protocol environment, allowing network locations to 
be referred to using a label other than a protocol address.  As with any 
other such symbol set, DNS names are designed to be globally unique, 
that is, for any one DNS name at any one time there must be a single set 
of DNS records uniquely describing protocol addresses, network 
resources and services associated with that DNS name.  All of the 
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applications deployed on the Internet which use the DNS assume this, and 
Internet users expect such behavior from DNS names.  Names are then 
constant symbols, whose interpretation does not specifically require 
knowledge of the context of any individual party.  A DNS name can be 
passed from one party to another without altering the semantic intent of 
the name. Since the DNS is hierarchically structured into domains, the 
uniqueness requirement for DNS names in their entirety implies that each 
of the names (sub-domains) defined within a domain has a unique 
meaning (i.e., set of DNS records) within that domain.  This is as true for 
the root domain as for any other DNS domain" (Internet Architecture 
Board 2000, 1-2). 
  This explanation of the name space uniqueness indicates that the DNS is in fact a 
centralized system. The single unique root of the DNS is the central point within the 
system that rests at the top of the name space hierarchy. Thus, while the Internet 
structure is extremely decentralized, its addressing system, DNS, is centralized.  
   Moreover, while the requirement of a unique DNS name space and a single 
authority to administer the system is a technical necessity, it is also a political 
arrangement for governing the system. The requirement that one entity should 
govern the system is inherently a political constraint. Moreover, the governance of 
the system can be exercised through the unique DNS name space, which determines 
who exists and who does not exist on the Internet. The control flows down the 
hierarchy from the root into the remaining elements of the name space. Here, the 
technical design defines the political parameters of the system. 
  In this regard, Klein (2002, 196-197)
 
applies Robert Dahl's four minimum 
requirements needed to achieve governance - authority, law, sanctions, and 
jurisdiction
52
 - on the DNS in order to examine whether DNS is a system of 
governance. Klein argues that the four requirements of governance can be achieved 
through DNS. Firstly, the uniqueness of the name space necessitates a single central 
authority whose decisions apply to all hosts registered in the name space. ICANN is 
the current central authority of the domain name space through its role in the 
administration of IANA. Secondly, the law is included in the contracts of the 
                                                 
52 According to Klein, Dahl argues in his book Democracy and its Critics that any system of governance should 
have four requirements: Authority, law, sanction, and jurisdiction. Regarding the authority, any governance 
needs an entity, whether it is an individual or group, which has the authoritative power to make policy 
decisions. The laws, whatever the form they take, are the binding rules to implement policy decisions. Sanctions 
are instruments to enforce laws, and can be imposed to punish those who breach those laws. Jurisdiction defines 
the constituency over which policy decisions, laws, and sanctions are applicable  
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domain name registration that are signed between ICANN and every registry 
operator. The provisions of those contracts regulate the actions of the networks' 
administrators as well as the sub-administrators. Moreover, the scope of regulation 
can be extended through those contracts. Thirdly, the sanctions can be enforced 
through the denial of a domain name (the elimination of a domain name from the 
name space). The users that do not obey the specific regulations provided in the 
contracts could be eliminated from the name space. Registration in the name space 
is a privilege that can be revoked if a user infringes the rules. Fourthly, the 
jurisdiction of the DNS regulating authority includes every host connected to the 
Internet. This jurisdiction is manifested in the registration contracts whereby every 
user must abide by the policies prescribed by the DNS authority. Therefore, the 
DNS provides the means to attain the four requirements of governance. If needed, 
the regulatory scope can be merely broadened by the DNS authority through 
introducing broader regulations in the registration contracts with networks 
operators. Regulation of individual users could be realized through 'flow-down 
contract'; i.e., the regulations flow down from the central authority of the DNS to 
networks operators and from there to all users.
 
   This led Klein to conclude that that DNS is an effective instrument for governing 
the Internet arguing that DNS it is the point through which the Internet can be 
controlled, and the entity that controls the database of the name space controls the 
Internet. While we agree with Klein's argument that DNS is an effective instrument 
of governance, we argue that such governance is currently limited to the technical 
administration system of the Internet. The DNS neither regulate nor enforce policies 
regarding the Internet layers of infrastructure, software applications, and the 
content. However, this does not undermine the critical indirect role of the DNS in 
affecting these layers as it relates to the core operation of the Internet, which could 
affect all activities performed over the network. Significantly, the DNS 
management through ICANN as well as the unilateral control of the United States 
over the DNS root was the trigger of the international debate on the Internet 
governance. 
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Appendix III 
ISOC 
   In 1992, the two Internet pioneers, Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn, formed ISOC as non-profit, 
non-governmental international organization with a view to mobilize financing for IETF 
activities. Although ISOC emerged out of IETF, it became its organizational host. ISOC aims 
at promoting the open development, evolution and use of the Internet (Internet Society 2015a). 
   Besides its main offices are in Washington and Geneva, ISOC has established 100 
Chapters across the world. ISOC currently enjoys worldwide membership that 
comprises more than 145 organization members and 65,000 individual members. 
ISOC's members include government agencies; corporations and organizations that 
have historically been involved in developing the Internet-related technologies; in 
addition to foundations, educational institutions and non-profit, trade and professional 
organizations (Internet Society 2015b). 
   ISOC is governed by board of trustees who are elected or appointed by three groups: 
Chapters, organization members, and IETF (Internet Society 2013). ISOC has four 
membership levels for the individuals; each is determined on the basis of annual 
contributions that ranges from 75 to 500 $ a year. Similarly, it has six membership 
levels for organizations and corporations, each level is granted on the basis of the 
annual financial contributions that range from 1250 to 100000$ (Internet Society 
2015c).  
   As with any institution, the influence and power of each organization is weighted 
according to the membership level. The highest ranking of the 'organization and 
corporation' members is the ‘platinum membership’, which includes eleven members 
(Internet Society 2014b). Those members are granted corresponding powers to this 
membership level, such as, the right to participate in nomination of four representatives 
of the organization members to the ISOC's board, participation in development of the 
ISOC's global public policy positions, and provision of major financial and 
organizational support for IETF (Internet Society 2014c). 
   Examination of the list of ISOC members indicates that five of those platinum 
members are affiliated with ICANN's system: ICANN, two of the Regional Internet 
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Registries
53
, an administrator of country code Top-Level Domain
54
, and an 
administrator of Generic Top-Level Domain
55
. The remaining six members represent 
American cable industry and services as well as manufacturers of networking 
equipment: three American-based multinational corporations of cable and broadcasting 
services
56
, the American trade association for cable industry
57
, two American-based 
multinational corporations that manufacture networking equipment
58
. It is clear that the 
high-ranking members of ISOC belong to ICANN's system as well as the American 
business related to cable and networking industry. 
   However, what makes ISOC distinct from other non-state actors associated with the 
Internet, particularly its organization and corporate members? The following 
paragraphs address this question.  
ISOC and other non-state actors associated with the Internet  
   As indicated above, the initial rationale behind the establishment of ISOC was to 
provide financial support for standardization activities of IETF. Nevertheless, IETF 
faced a dilemma about how could it keep its independence from the entities that will 
provide funding for its activities. In other words, how could IETF preserve its 
principles and values, which seeks to maintain the neutral architecture of the Internet, 
from the external influence of the donor entities that will become members of ISOC? 
As one of IETF's members puts it:  
"The IETF is not an industry consortium, and much of our integrity comes 
from the fact that we operate outside corporate and governmental structure.  
Our mission is to create standards for the Internet in general, not geared 
towards anybody in particular.  I do not see how we could do this without 
bias while accepting funding from an entity that does not necessarily share 
this goal" (Pelstring 2003). 
   ISOC handled this dilemma by defining itself as a global cause-based organization 
and not a membership-driven organization. The members should support the cause, 
values, and principles of ISOC, not vice versa. The members are not entitled to alter 
such cause and values. Formulation of ISOC's position towards various Internet policy 
                                                 
53 American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN) and Reseaux IP Europeens Network Coordination Center 
(RIPE NCC).  
54 DENIC, the administrator of the country-code for Top-Level Domain of Germany (.de).  
55 Afilias, the administrator of the Generic Top-Level Domain of .INFO 
56 Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and NBC Universal. 
57 National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA).  
58 Cisco and Juniper Networks.  
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issues must respect its cause and values as benchmarks that determine the parameters of 
ISOC's stance.  
   As demonstrated in chapter 6, ISOC was key player in creation of ICANN and 
establishing its system. Accordingly, the organizations affiliated with ICANN's system, 
including those that are organization members of ISOC, share the cause and values of 
ISOC about the Internet. However, this might not be the case with some corporate 
members of ISOC.  
   In general, the private sector actors, including the corporate members of ISOC, share 
ISOC's values of openness of the Internet, resistance to governmental control over the 
Internet, as well as the self-regulatory form of its governance. The reason is that those 
values reinforce the commercial prospects of the Internet and enhance it as market-
oriented facility. Therefore, ISOC and the private sector actors oppose any 
governmental control over the Internet, and they reject accordingly its governance 
through traditional intergovernmental arrangements. They support the de-facto self-
regulatory model of the Internet, which is perceived to maintain its openness as well as 
its market-oriented characteristics. 
    However, some of those private sector actors, particularly telecommunication and 
cable companies, seek to limit the Internet 'neutrality' aspect in order to promote 
specific interests, which could relatively jeopardize the 'end-to-end' architectural 
principle of the Internet (Lessig 2002). Companies such as AT&T, Comcast and 
Verizon – which are corporate members of ISOC - seek to interfere with the delivery of 
Internet content so that they can deliver the content on a differential basis according to 
specific arrangements with content providers. For example, those companies could 
strike deals with certain content providers, such as Amazon or Netflix, to deliver their 
videos and data to consumers faster than those of other content providers could. This 
allows cable and telecommunications companies to discriminate against content 
providers and to charge them differentially based on such deals (New York Times 
Editorial Board 2014). This can be done through creation of different tiers of online 
service, which enable those companies to "sell access to the express lane to deep-
pocketed corporations and relegate everyone else to the digital equivalent of a winding 
dirt road" (Lessig and McChesney 2006). This dynamic triggered what is known in the 
Internet policy circles as 'Net-Neutrality' debate. 
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   On the other hand, ISOC considers the economic power of the incumbent 
telecommunication monopolies can delay or prevent the growth of the Internet, much as 
governmental regulation can do, advocating policies that promote competition in 
telecommunications and Internet services (Internet Society 2015e(. Thus, while ISOC 
and the private sector actors share the goal of preventing governmental control and 
regulation over the Internet, the motivation seems to be different. ISOC's values derive 
from the IETF community views of maintaining the Internet as an open neutral 
decentralized public facility shaped by its users.  Differently, some of the major private 
sector actors, in particular cable and telecommunication companies, are motivated by 
specific monopolistic interests that could contradict such views of IETF community. 
This distinguishes ISOC from the private sector actors, including its corporate 
members. Moreover, it is clear that the private sector actors may have different, and 
even contradictory, interests regarding the Internet, as demonstrated by the case of 
cable and telecommunication companies versus content provider firms. Therefore, 
ISOC can not be considered a profit-oriented industry consortium. On the contrary, 
ISOC is a political embodiment of the Internet epistemic community and its values. 
 
